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THE AFFAIR OF GM4, INDOCHINA, 1953
by General Castries Sat Aug 01, 2020 11:12 pm
THE AFFAIR OF GM4, INDOCHINA, 1953
(From “Revue Historique des Armées, December 1984)
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The present article relates to an unhappy episode in the Indochina War, occurring in October 1953. In March 1954, the Command in Saigon drew on this event in the “Notes on the Combat in Indochina”.
Thirty years latter, a study of the archives and the collection of the memories of three witnesses to the events make it possible to consider the facts in a new light. This article is not here as a polemic question, but to present the most objective research of the historical truth. The collection of the testimonies is welcomed and would make a positive supplement to the information held by the Army Historical Service on this affair.
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A vision of the history of an event can often be considered differently, at the time, by protagonists without their good faith being blamed. This article is to verify an unhappy episode in the Indochina War that happened to Mobile Groupment 4 in October 1953 during Operation Mouette.
The state of our forces engaged was considered to be poor at the time of the investigation by the command. A study of the archives of the Army Historical Service of this affair, supplemented by the memories of the author and two other witnesses, modifies this conclusion somewhat.
Operation Mouette:
In October 1953, General Navarre, who had succeeded General Salan as the head of our forces in Indochina, decides to take again the initiative against the Viet-Minh. He hopes to assemble an effective battle corps from the elements of the French army involved in territorial tasks, with those tasks being taken over by the armies of the three associated states: Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Operation Mouette involves an Operational Groupment of two divisions formed by gathering all the intervention elements available in the Tonkin in order to destroy or seriously reduce the Vietminh’s Division 320. This is to facilitate the relief of the French forces established in two catholic provinces of the South-Tonkin by the Vietnamese army.
From 15 to 25 October the first phase of the operation begins, aiming to occupy the zone of refuge of the Viet-Minh Division 320 on the Tonkin-Annam frontier. The Division 320 is strong with three regiments, the 48th, 64th, and 52nd, with support elements (anti-aircraft weapons in particular).
The Operational Groupment is commanded by General Giles, who is established in Ninh Binh with the reserve, supporting and aerial elements, and engineers and logistical services. The two divisions each include an armoured sub-group, three mobile groupments, and a company of engineers. The Division A is in Lai Chuc. The Division B is in Cho Gan. This first phase causes serious combat at Lai Cac in which our adversary suffers heavy losses and has many supply depots destroyed.
On 25 October, General Giles decides to actively seek contact with Regiment 48 thought to be in Yen Lai. The Division B made the movement towards North Annam in the region of the royal tombs. On the 26th, GM4 receives the mission of making a deep reconnaissance into the refuge zone of the 320th Division, passing from Division B to Division A, from Annam to Tonkin through the forest. GM 4 has 2 organic battalions: the 2nd battalion, 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion (“II/13e DBLE”); and the Battalion de March Indochine (“BMI”). It is reinforced with 2 battalions: the 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment of Chasseurs de Parachutists (“II/I RCP”); and the 3rd Battalion Thai (“BT3”).
On 28 October, at 12h45, the BT3 falls into an ambush on the forest road and in half an hour loses half of its manpower. This is not easily accepted by the command, taking into account the support provisions made, with permanent air cover and the ability for 2 or 3 artillery groups to always provide concentrations of fire.
The Inquiry of 1953: Its Conclusions
An inquiry was carried out by the General Gilles, commanding Operational Groupment Mouette, drawing from reports, the most important of which are those of the Colonel commanding GM4 and the Colonel commanding Division A. The conclusions were drawn up by General Cogny, commanding the ground forces of North Viet-Nam, and were addressed to General Navarre (commander-in-chief of French forces in Indochina). This investigation follows the proceeding chronology of the operations the 27, 28, and 29 October 1953.
The Progression of 27 October
The Operational Groupment had expected that GM4 would be inserted, with its 4 battalions, in the operations of Division A on the forest road by the end of the day. This was despite 10km of bad tracks through the jungle, and an area with the difficult terrain. In the event, only the II/I RCP, BMI (the lead battalions), and the light PC of the GM4 arrived in Yen Lai [where Division A was now located] that evening.
Why was GM4 reproached? Primarily for its slowness. In his report, General Gilles states “indisputably”:
- That the units were not sufficiently lightened ... in some battalions and, in particular the BMI, trailed the herd, with the mountainous ground and thick forest adding to their tiredness.
- That there was a certain ignorance of the real environment. It was an error not to impose on the battalion commanders a religious respect for schedules.
- That the inappropriate adoption of a manoeuvre operation going beyond the existing track and sometimes in the absence of a return path for such a manoeuvre - moreover useless – was exceptionally slow.
General Cogny reproaches the Commander of Division A for the "lack of firmness of the commander of the GM4 which did not turn back with a battalion (BMI) which had passed the point where the Commander of the Division had ordered it to install a security element” (Annam Pass on the 27th at 19h00 to relieve GM3, appointed to the defence of Yen Lai).
The Engagement of 28 October:
The II/13th DBLE, and the BT3 will begin again this day their progression in the direction of GM4 without particular protection apart from a Morane aircraft used for of guidance and observation. Three of the five companies of the BMI are on alert in their cantonment in Yen Lai. The II/13th DBLE receives order to leave a company for security in the Annam Pass to the benefit of the BT3 that follows it.
The brutal Viet-Minh action at 12h45 surprises the BT3. It scatters the 12th company; isolates the 10th company in tail of battalion and remained outside the enemy dispositions; and inflicts serious losses on the command company and the 11th company. Only the lead 9th company and the PC, installed firmly in the Annam Pass, resist the attacks. Intervention by supports elements is obstructed by the confusion on the ground and soon aerial observation is lost as the Morane is shot down by enemy AA at about 13h15.
The BMI cannot intervene because it has begun its movement, as planed, starting from 12h00 towards Lai Cac. Only the 5th company will be retained by the commander of GM4 when he joined the area of combat at around 14h00, on his return from the PC of the division. The commander of GM4, on the spot, will find that GM3 will come to the rescue only with a platoon of tanks, which will try to recover the dispersed elements of BT3 along the road in the forest.
From 16h30, it will encounter savage and unfavourable resistance and will not be able to move in the direction of the 10th company of this battalion, cut off behind two limestone hills and encircled by Viet-Minh. At the end of the day, II/I RCP allows the disengagement of the II/I3 DBLE, and the 5th company of the BMI is engaged in the recovery of the Morane shot down at 13h15. It is fair to say that this recovery, and the retreat of the platoon of tanks of the GM4, is carried out in the face of a full Viet-Minh counter-attack.
From General Gilles: “the battalion commanders, like the commander of the Groupment, should have convinced themselves that such an operation by enemy elements could at any moment emerge from the area of Yen Lao (precisely from where Regiment 48 known to be) to launch its raid ... The commander of the Groupment missed this matter... The engagement of II/I RCP was carried out tardily and only on the orders of the Colonel commanding the Division.”
General Cogny especially reproaches "the ineffective installation of security elements, which were insufficient and allowed the Viet-Minh to carry out their ambush.” (The engagement of II/I RCP)
The Relief Operation of 29 October:
GM4 less the BMI (which is in divisional reserve, with exception of the 5th company), succeeds at the end of the day in recovering the 10th company of BT3 which has remained isolated since the day before, following very hard combat between II/13 DBLE and Battalion 706 of Regiment 64.
General Cogny, who went to the site of the battle, as well as General Gilles, at the moment of engagement of the II/13 DBLE, stated that ”the Commander of GM4 showed himself to be uncertain with his second battalion (II/I RCP) and effectively only started his artillery on orders of higher authorities”.
Results of the Inquiry:
General Gilles advises that after these three days, the general assessment was "favorable in the collection of weapons"
French losses: 163 men and 67 weapons.
Viet-Minh losses: 460 men and 45 weapons
He estimates however that "if the commander of the GM4 and his staff can succeed in classical operations, they are ineffective in commanding a Groupment by themselves". He asks "for the replacement of this team which does not know how to engage." But he does not demand disciplinary action against them.
General Cogny “entirely shares the conclusions given by General Gilles and the Commander of Division A on operations of the commander of the GM4 ... It is believed that the current commander should not remain at the head of this Groupment". Consequently, the latter will be transferred to another territory, to a post with less responsibility.
1984 - Complementary Study of the Files
A historical search of the archives of SHAT was conducted in 1984 by the author, a veteran commander of the 5th company of BMI, supplemented by his own memories and those of General Brancion (then Operations Officer of the Artillery of Division A), and Lieutenant-Colonel Armingaud (a veteran radio operator sub-officer with the PC of GM4).
Movement on 27 October:
The delay in the advance is largely due to execution faults at the battalion-level, with redressable difficulties in the progress of the operation, which cannot be ascribed to the commander of GM4. These are
A delay of one hour in departure following an error of orientation of BT3, then in the lead (as this battalion was supposed to be more suited than the others to movement in such terrain).
Limitation on the speed of progress of the II/13th DBLE to 1km/h, due to the obstacle to its march, whereas II/I RCP, passed into the lead from 12 noon, moving at 1.5 km/h, while opening the road with machetes.
The spreading out of the GM4 in two separate elements was caused by this difference in speed; and was made inevitable by the refusal of the commander of the Division (at around 17h00), to authorize the GM to regroup in a security position established by GM3 on the track coming from the royal tombs on the forest road between the Annam Pass and Lai Cac.
For the commander of the Division, it was a question of needing to have the four battalions of GM4 that very evening in Lai Cac in order to start a new operation as soon as possible towards the north. This explains the attitude aimed at increasing the speed of the Groupment, without taking into account the difficulties involved. We therefore understand the behaviour of GM4 commander’s refusal to delay the BMI by stopping it in Annam Pass at 19h00. The separation of the GM4 into two elements thus became inevitable.
The II/13th DBLE and the BT3 (which followed it) were to thus spend the night in forest some 6kms from the remainder of the GM4 stationed between Annam Pass and Yen Lai. An examination of the real facts appreciably attenuates also the fault that the commander of Division A assigns to GM4 "while not turning back with the BMI and not setting up a security element."
In addition, the reproach made by the General Gilles of GM4 of its "ignorance of the real environment" can just as easily be applied to Division A.
Engagement of 28 October:
The Viet-Minh ambush would certainly have turned out better for our troops if both indigenous battalions of GM4 (BMI and BT3) had had as much solidity as II/13th DBLE and II/I RCP.
The principal weakness of the BMI was not to be found in the valour of the unit and the men, which remained always good. But the weaknesses were to a great extent those of command, since Battalion Commander Taro was killed in Dai Nham on 19 October (a few days before the course of these events). Its second weakness was its failure to adapt to the Middle Region. The BMI’s support came from coolies, which certainly allowed the battalion a great fluidity for combat in the rice-fields, but which became a heavy handicap on the tracks of mountains and in forest (1 coolie for 2 soldiers, considerably lengthens the column).
The Commander of GM4, very familiar with this battalion, certainly over-estimated its weaknesses, and seems to have wanted to use it neither in the opening of the forest roads nor in the disengagement operation, except for the company engaged in recovering the wreck of Morane. This was a marginal operation and limited to an elementary level.
The weaknesses of the BT3, a battalion little known to the GM4, appeared only with use. The first surprise to us was its failure to adapt to the Middle Region, however similar that country was to the origin of its tirailleurs of the North Tonkin. The second surprise was the lack of combativeness of a number of the indigenous troops, who believed the position to be secure and were not on their guard. Sergeant Armingaud saw, arriving at Annam Pass, many unwounded tirailleurs returned by the Viet-Minh without weapons, equipment or clothing! He also collected the statements of a wounded European warrant officer who complained that his men had not wanted to fight!
The disengagement operation could have been started earlier in the afternoon, and should have been led more firmly under the command of Division A. Division A should not have:
Remained its PC at Lai Cac during all the morning to command GM4, thus preventing it from being on the spot at its PC at the time of the ambush. Captain Brancion saw the Commander of GM4 seeking in vain the authority to take command when he had just learned the news of the ambush.
Withdrawn, at the beginning of the morning, the II/I RCP from GM4, and not returning it until 16h00, much too late for it to be engaged in force before nightfall.
Carrying out the movement of the BMI to Lai Cuc much too early, without having ensured that the regrouping of GM4 had been completed.
GM4 was thus short two battalions out of its four, on orders of the division, at the time when it needed them the most. Reinforcement from a platoon of tanks of GM3 and its Colonel could not mitigate these deficits.
Disengagement Operation of 29 October:
The operation achieved its goal perfectly: the recovery of the company isolated from the BT3. The company would have held the respect of the enemy for more than thirty hours, and the behaviour of its tirailleurs was worthy of praise. The reproaches which were directed at those commanding GM4 came from the arrival of General Cogny, accompanied by General Gilles. Lieutenant Paillard was with his unit just behind II/13 DBLE when it cleared Annam Pass. He saw these authorities arriving and was questioned by them on the situation and the absence on the spot of command for GM4.
The 5th company of the BMI, had saved, the day before, the wounded observer of the Morane, recovered 2 radio sets (out of 3) and the papers on board. The company had, on the 29th, completed its manoeuvre, bringing back the body of the dead pilot, but the third radio set remained trapped in the wreckage.
Results of the Historical Search in 1984:
The new study carried out leads to a significant change in the first conclusion:
GM4 benefits from extenuating circumstances, taking into account the handicaps of BMI and BT3, and the faults of execution of these battalions and II/13 DBLE at the time of the progression of the 27 October.
Division A underestimated (in particular) the risks of an enemy counter attack, and did not take sufficient precautions.
The responsibility of the commander of the GM4 for this incident, such as could be shown at the time, thus is very appreciably attenuated.
Conclusion:
In connection with the GM4 affair, it has thus been possible to measure the variations that can exist, in the research of the truth, between an immediate investigation and a study carried out with the passing of time. Whereas the first puts forward the responsibility on the commander of the GM4, the second attenuates this responsibility appreciably, returning to the sad sequence of events, and the command of the senior levels and the subordinate levels, and the share of responsibility which falls to them
On a more general note, this affair shows that is necessary for the historical analysis to search not only the files, but also the memories of witnesses of the events. The latter often bring new illumination to the course of the events. They also make it possible to reconstitute the environment, and thus to easier to understand what really happened.
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Indochina 1953
By Christophe Dutrone
Ambush on the forest road
A tactical case of an attack on a column in the Middle Tonkin Region
During the summer of 1953, General Navarre, the new Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, decides to launch a series of pre-emptive actions in the coming autumn with the objective of disrupting the preparations for the next Vietminh campaign in the Tonkin and Northern Laos. It appears unquestionable that an offensive will begin in the South, with the assistance of Division 320. Navarre, whose provisional strategy consists of buying time while awaiting reinforcements, decides to act in advance of the blow by going to meet the Vietminh Division on its own ground, in the middle region at the North frontier of Annam, south of Ninh Binh. Thus Operation Mouette, entrusted to General Gilles, is launched on 15 October 1953 against Division 320, which at that time is beginning to infiltrate into the Southern part of the Delta.
Operation Mouette
Gilles decides to establish an entrenched camp at Lai Cac, Southeast of Nam Dinh. Remembering the experience of Na San, he hopes to encourage the enemy to attack the French positions, and to then inflict on them once again heavy losses by the combined fire of the artillery and aviation. As early as 18 October, the Vietminh, biting moderately on the hook, carry out attacks on two support positions of the Lai Cac camp. The regulars of the Trung Doan 64 (“Regiment 64”) of Division 320 engaged in the matter are sufficiently manhandled so that the Commander of the Vietminh division, understanding the uselessness of a direct assault, takes what is left and withdraws into the jungle to await the French on more favourable terrain. In the days that follow, General Gilles, applying the orders received from Navarre to bring decisive blows against Division 320, launches a series of raids in the enemy’s zones of refuge, in order to locate and destroy its depots.
In this context, the Mobile Group 4 (“GM4”) is engaged from 25 October on the tracks of TD48 of Division 320. The column leaves the Dong Giao defile, and receives on the morning of 27 October the order to move to Northwest, after searching without success the region of the Royal Tombs. It must follow a track to rejoin the Forrest road, a route constructed by the Vietminh to ensure the transit of its supplies between the Red River Delta and North Annam. The 3rd Thai Battalion (“BT3”) having opened the track at about 10h30 adopts a positions around the defile, covering the passage of the other battalions before rejoining the column as its rearguard at the end of the afternoon, at about 17h30. The Mobile Group moves through terrain typical of the Tonkinese Middle Region. The track it follows winds through a wooded landscape dominated by limestone calcaires covered in dense vegetation, on terrain punctuated by water courses with steep banks, and punctually obstructed by abattis. At 22h30, the battalions install themselves in a “hedgehog” around the track, to bivouac there until the next day. On 28 October, at 9h00, the whole column resumes its progression, and (two and a half hours later) reaches the valley and attains the road that climbs back towards the north and Lai Cac.
As magnificent as it is, the landscape is also disturbing. The slow progression imposed by the terrain, and the need to approach obstacles carefully, gives the enemy the advantage of the mobility through the ground that it masters and on which it can quickly modify its positions. Nevertheless, the forest road makes progression easier, but the Thai tirailleurs are not reassured, owing to the partially wooded heights and the high grasses that border the road - offering perfect conditions for a major ambush.
It is at 12h30 when, suddenly, the inevitable ambush occurs. Initially, a rain of mortar shells falls upon the road, while several automatic weapons unveil themselves, simultaneously opening fire on the points of “obliged” passage, namely where crossroads comes from the forest, the "radier " of the river, as well as the Annam Pass, that constitutes a passageway which is narrow, wooded and comparatively restricted. As soon as the firing ends, immediately there is an assault. The infantrymen of Division 320, emerge from the high grasses and cover, armed with grenades and fixed bayonets, and charge into the end of the 3rd Thai Battalion which has just been thrown into a gigantic trap.
The Ambush:
The 9th Company is at the head of the battalion and ascends towards the Annam Pass. It nevertheless reaches the Pass, followed by the CP. Immediately, its 57mm RCLs are put in battery in order to reply to the enemy automatic weapons that unveil themselves, while the approaches to the road are swept. The 11th company, which follows in the second position, succeeds in turn of rallying at the Pass, dragging with it some of its wounded. The 12th Company and the Battalion Command Company (“CCB”), are both caught in the heart of the trap, are less happy. The CCB, at the price of some losses, succeeds (despite everything) in releasing itself with the bulk of its weaponry, but loses almost all its ammunition abandoned by the PIM porters.
The 12th Company is immediately engaged in hand-to-hand combat. It does not have a chance, and is literally "cut up" into several groups, condemned to fight individually for their survival. Some of the remaining survivors succeed in getting themselves under cover in the surrounding vegetation. The 10th Company, which closed the march, and which was still on the track at the time when the ambush is released, immediately advances, to come to the aid of those elements ahead of it. Coming up against the tirailleurs of the 12th Company, in the process of ebbing back, it ceases its advance, and soon runs up against a strong enemy cordon. Seeking to force a passage (on the orders of the battalion commander), it is violently pushed back and is forced to break off the battle. Carrying its wounded, split into two, the Company seeks refuge on nearby knolls, where it establishes its defensive positions. The Commander of the 10th Company is fortunately able to preserve radio contact with the Battalion CP, established in the Annam Pass. The CP is informed of the perilous position of the company, isolated from the remainder of the battalion and cut in two.
As early as the beginning of the ambush, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion, which preceded BT3 in the march order of the column, follows the events of the ambush over the radio. Without waiting for orders, on its own initiative, the battalion commander turns his battalion around, to takes up positions in the Annam Pass, alongside the 9th Company and the CP of BT3.
While a crisis CP is established, an armoured platoon of the RICM (“Colonial Moroccan Infantry Regiment”) is detached from Lai Cac, to support the attack aimed at relieving the 10th Company of BT3. This movement begins at 14h30, and it takes the tanks one and a half hours, with legionnaires sweeping either side of the road, to reach the heart of the ambush. Opening a route through the enemy positions allows the recovery of some of the materiel lost in the morning’s end, as well as a number of wounded from BT3. The II/3rd DBLE nevertheless faces a determined adversary, who refuses to break-off, despite the presence of the tanks, as well as aircraft. At 16h30, a Vietminh counter-attack is launched from the cover of the radier, and puts an end to all hopes of moving forward and coming to the aid of the 10th Company. At 18h00, a decision is taken to disengage, given the approach of night. Although a company of the 2nd battalion of the 1st Regiment of Chasseurs Parachutist (“RCP”) comes as reinforcements to support them, the withdrawal is carried out with difficulty, under the protection of the tanks that are brought up to support the infantry. The Annam Pass, too dangerous to hold, must be evacuated, and the French positions are brought back towards the north, near to Lai Cac.
For the 10th Company of BT3, totally isolated, three kilometers from the Pass, having taken refuge on either side of the track leading to the Royal Tombs, a night of anguish begins. Towards 19h30, there is a probe against the defensive positions on the southern knoll. However, as is their habit, the Vietminh only begin their assault in the early morning. The 10th Company, benefits from that interval to better adjust its positions. The assault on the knoll, launched at 06h00, with a silent approach, is pushed back with sub-machine gun fire and grenades. The regulars of the TD48, exhausted by the violent combat in the day, which has caused serious losses in their ranks, do not push hard, to the deep relief of the defenders.
In the morning of the 20th, a new operation is assembled to relieve the 10th Company of the BT3. The II/13th DBLE supported by tanks, again makes a frontal assault on the Vietminh, climbing alongside the Forrest Road, seeking to push them back, or to at least fix their positions. Simultaneously, a flanking maneuver will be launched from the East of the Pass by two companies of BT3 and the II/I RCP. The axis of progression must create uncertainty as to the real goal of the counterattack. The column must oblique its attack towards the south, to come to the aid of the 10th Company.
In the course of the night, the Vietminh (and more precisely the regulars of Battalion 706 of Regiment 64) solidly establish themselves in the Annam Pass, abandoned the day before, as well as on a dominant calcaire the borders the northern entrance to the Pass. The legionnaires nevertheless manage to force the passage, conquering the heights that dominate the Pass at bayonet-point. Reaching the valley, they fail to reach, just as the day before, the radier that constitutes the heart of the enemy dispositions. Taking advantage of this diversion, the II/1st RCP and the two companies of the BT3 that progress East before cutting a path South with machetes. Radio contact is established with the 10th Company. At around this time, the enemy seems to have partially relaxed its pressure, and it is important to quickly take advantage of this. At the beginning of afternoon, the 10th Company receives orders to prepare to leave the two knolls, and to escape North under the cover of artillery fire.
The relief column, cutting a path through the jungle, arrives close to the North knoll, where an element of the 10th Company is in position, under the command of Adjutant Pradel. Towards 15h30, the relief column recovers the elements located there. At 16h20, while the battle rages in the valley, the major element of the 10th Company, under the command of Lieutenant Michel-Levy, which is perched on the top of the knoll situated to the south of the track to the Royal Tombs, leaves in turn after the immediate surroundings of his refuge are subject to a short artillery preparation, guided by aviation. The 800 meters to the relief column must be crossed to escape the enemy’s clutches. Aircraft provide assistance by marking the progression of the 10th Company with smoke markers. The relief column also indicates its position by sporadic firing of automatic weapons from the heights. At 17h30, a junction between the paratroopers of the II/1st RCP is at last achieved.
The disengagement of the 10th Company is a success. The paras and the Thais are able to turn back. As night falls, the legionnaires of the II/13th DBLE fall back in turn, not without difficulty considering the pressure exercised by the enemy, who (faithful to their practice) seeks hand-to-hand combat. At the beginning of evening, the Annam Pass is crossed again, this time heading for Lai Cac. The battle ends as a tactical success for the French, who were able - while preserving almost the totality of their effective – to relieve the battalion caught in the ambush.
Considering the violence of the clash, the assessment of the losses of the units engaged during the two counter-attacks is relatively low. For the Thais, they have been treated harshly, but their good reflexes displayed at the beginning of the engagement, and the skillful plan implemented by the crisis CP to relieve the 10th Company, allow a catastrophe to be avoided.
The Tactical Lessons of a Model Operation:
The Forrest Road affair constitutes a concrete case on the manner of intelligently driving the penetration of a mobile column in a hostile rebel zone. Contrary to a practice too often observed in Indochina, General Gilles took the precaution of not engaging his elements beyond the range of his artillery. The perfect counter-example will be observed in 1954 in the Seno region. On this occasion, General Franchi, commanding the Middle Laos Operational Group, ¬orders several paratroop battalions to seek contact with Division 325, at the beginning of January. Dispatched beyond the range of the French artillery, the 3rd Vietnamese paratroop battalion will undergo, in the middle of the night, without any artillery support, a violent assault. By a miracle, it survives the assault, but at the price of heavy losses....
On the contrary, in the case of BT3, the wise precaution not to isolate the column from its artillery umbrella, made it possible to effectively support the infantry at the time of its advance, and also to cover its retreat from an enemy seeking contact. It is important, however, to also stress the importance of aircraft as means of ensuring the delivery of powerful fire support, in particular through the use of napalm. Aircraft also provide the general staff throughout the operations with almost a real-time view of the battlefield, ensure radio contact with the units on the ground, and provide coordinates for artillery fire.
From a tactical point of view, the exfiltration of the 10th Company, isolated to the south of the field of battle, is a model of its type. Fixing the enemy with a powerful frontal action, the French forced Regiment 48 to concentrate its resources against the II/13th DBLE to prevent the relief of the 10th Company. But the rescue party succeeds in misleading the enemy as to its real intentions, and succeeds in angling towards the south to relieve those besieged there. The 10th Company’s radio connection with spotter aircraft allows extremely precise artillery support, enabling the Company to escape by surprise towards the North.
It should be noted that the deception plan functioned particularly well, and there were probably nothing more than scouts close to the principal knoll where 10th Company had taken refuge. The elements from Regiment 48, having taken part in the attack at the end of night had obviously returned to the Radier sector to reinforce the defence against the legionnaires of the II/13th DBLE. It is certain that, if it had not been relieved, the 10th Company (isolated on its knoll) would have been the object the following night of a new assault intended to destroy it.
From the point of view of the infantry, one needs to point out the respect of the security distances from between different the companies of BT3, which enabled the battalion to avoid a disaster which would certainly have occurred if the unit had fallen into a trap along its entire length.
The rapid reaction of the lead company prevented the Vietminh from establishing a blocking position at the Annam Pass, and gave the opportunity to collect in the first minutes of the ambush a large number of escapees from the 11th Company and the CCB from the heart of the ambush. In addition, at the Pass, it was possible for French automatic weapons and 57mm RCLs to take out several enemy machine guns which were sweeping the road. The rearguard company, recognizing the impossibility of force a passage, had the saving reflex to seek refuge in the direction of the heights. Retiring to the two knolls, they were able to effectively organize its defence in the face of an enemy very superior in number, and await relief. The commander of the II/13th DBLE reacts with initiative, and turns his companies around and “marched to the sound of the guns”, coming to the aid of BT3. This move also reinforces positions in the Annam Pass, and hastens the first counterattack. It also saves time, and allows a number of lost weapons and several wounded to be recovered.
It is interesting to note that the presence of dense vegetation, which favoured the establishment of the ambush, also allows an important number of French combatants the opportunity to escape from the melee by disappearing into the high grass. Many of those who escaped in this manner were able to avoid death or capture, and return to French lines in the hours or days that followed.
From a more general point of view, Operation Mouette – which ends on 6 November 1953 - is incontestably a tactical success. The Division 320 lost in the different engagements 1,081 dead, 182 prisoners, and 2,500 wounded. A major part of the Vietminh depots are destroyed, and the French general staff consider that it would take approximately two months for this unit to once again become operational.
General Giap, no longer able to count on this major formation to disrupt the French positions in the southern delta, is consequently condemned to approaching the Expeditionary Corps via the north, thereby risking a frontal assault. In a paradoxical manner, it is not ridiculous to think that the success of “Mouette” in a way hastened the French defeat in Indochina. A Vietminh offensive against the Red River delta, despite its impact on French public opinion, would undoubtedly have been a failure, as it had been two years earlier. The divisions of the Vietminh battle corps were not yet able to face the fire power of the CEFEO in open country. Obliged to postpone his projected general attack against the Tonkin Delta, Giap found himself obliged to find a new way of striking a major blow. However, the opportunity was not long in coming. Three weeks later, on 30 November, concerned about control of North Laos, and seeking to repeat the experience of Nasan, General Navarre ordered the reoccupation of the valley of Dien Bien Phu...
Sources and Biography
Anonymous, “Notes of Combat in Indochina”, Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, EMIFT, Instruction Bureau, Saigon 1954.
Anonymous, “March and Operations Journal of the 3rd Thai Battalion.”
Yves Gras, “History of the Indochina War”, Denoel 1954.
Raymond Legoube, “The War under X”, unpublished manuscript.
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Accounts of the Battle
Record of Lieutenant Courdesses, Commander 11th Company, BT3 (1952-1954)
The ambush was unleashed on that part of the road that crossed a clearing, making it possible to see a little further through the undergrowth, and what's more, I believe that this clearing was located between two passes. As always I march behind my first section: I had the two others behind me and we moved in single file. When the heavy fire of enemy individual weapons started, I was very close to the foot of the pass and I saw the head of my company reaching the heights.
The sound of mortar rounds exploding is rapidly heard, and I turn to see my men seeking shelter off the road. Remaining on the spot with the command group, I pushed the men that preceded me. On hearing the fire behind them, they had assumed they were under attack also. The commander of my lead section, by reflex, installed the section on the heights, to act as a collection element, for the remainder of the company, if the battle evolved in this direction. That is what happens. But a few seconds later, I see arriving on the road, less than twenty meters away, a dozen "shrubs" that, the instant before, were dispersed in the clearing. They are knocked back by the fire of my men, and I see that every shrub concealed a Viet soldier with a package, linked up to their belts. I understood that this is their manner of transporting ammunition. After a number of years Indochina, and after several clashes with Vietminh units, this was the first time that I saw such a spectacle, and this detail remains engraved in my memory. They disappeared back into the undergrowth.
My preoccupation was to regroup my company. The firing and the explosions appeared to me to intensify towards the rear of the column, and it was necessary to react quickly to get my unit out of this dangerous zone. I succeeded in this maneuver without losses.
The second detail that returns to me is of a more personal nature, and takes place some time after the ambush: my company has reorganized itself in the pass, and I immediately saw in the distance the plain that we had to reach. While we certainly could not risk another ambush, I let the pace accelerate and we rapidly found ourselves at the foot of the pass, in drained paddy-fields. A beautiful metalled road passes through a true village of canvass: the CP of the operation. Over the radio I had learnt that the company of Lieutenant Michel-Levy, the last in the column, is encircled on a hill by a strong Vietminh force. Advancing towards me at speed, in a cloud of dust, is a jeep carrying a colonel. Very angry, the colonel stops in front of me, and demands to know where my battalion commander is. Stunned, I tell the colonel that I do not know, but I indicated that I could contact him with my radio set. That did not seem to please him, and he set off again from where he had come.
A little later, at the CP, I learned that this was Colonel Roumiantzoff, commanding the Mobile Group, nicknamed “Le Roum”. Immediately, I remembered that in 1944, in the 2nd Armoured Division, there had been an officer of that name, with the same nickname. He was a legendary figure in the 1st Moroccan Spahis for his actions in the liberation of France, but I never saw him again, either that day or later.
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Accounts of the Battle
Record of Lieutenant Legoube, Commander of the Commandos of BT3
On 27 October it is necessary to return towards Lai Cac by a difficult path through forests and boulders. The BT3 leads for the first kilometers, before allowing the other battalions to pass in the middle of the afternoon, moving into the rearguard. And X…, who is installed in that rocky chaos through which the track twists and turns, can see to march of the 2/1st RCP, silent and closed; then the 2/13th faithful to the image of the legion - powerful but a little uncouth, and (between the two) the BMI.
The BMI is an old and brave unit, with a very well developed sense of family and the mentality of pirates. X… looked at the succession of soldiers, women, children, buffalo, pigs suspended on bamboo poles, and chickens bundled together in groups of ten or twelve without cages, all overlapping. They seem to believe that every fighter should have access to his home and his poultry yard... the horde of Attila.
In these conditions, is it surprising that the column becomes delayed and divided along a difficult track? As night falls, the two last battalions (the 2/13th and BT3), with the remainder of the BMI, are in the middle of the jungle. We sleep poorly. Somewhere out there gunshots are heard. Nervous sentries or the signals of enemy agents?
In the small hours of the new day, the column resumes its march (with precautions), the legion in front, and the BT3 in the rear. By the end of the morning, the first clearings appear, the landscape humanizes itself, and the sky is clear. We relax a little. In a few kilometres, we will have returned to the French positions, which the lead elements of the 2/13th have already reached.
Towards noon, the battalion moves onto the well-built and well-frequented road: the Forest Road. This road was constructed by the Viets to link up the Middle Region with the west Delta, to Than Hoa in north Annam. A large and flat-bottom valley, covered with high grass and bordered by wooded massifs, 1500 metres in length, closed at its end by a small pass, is located precisely on the Annam frontier. All is calm, too calm. Worried, Archambault [Battalion Commander, BT3] spaces out his units, and put two hundred metres between each company.
X... accompanies the light CP, which moves behind the lead company, the 9th. The movement continues. From place to place, by the track, under the forest cover can be seen light huts, with tables and benches made from bamboo. They were probably used as shelter by the Viets when they do traveled on this road.
After some minutes, as the first elements reach the end of the valley, the ambush is suddenly unleashed. The ambush is large, and it takes place along the whole length of the valley. The Viets (latter found to be two battalions from Regiment 52) were only thirty steps off the track, hidden in the elephant grass. They waited for us to pass. Maybe they saw X... to stop for an instant close to a bamboo shack to pee.
Fortunately, the 9th Company, that had reached the approaches of the little pass, jumps in two movements, to occupy the land that dominate the passage of the road, and prevents the Viets from closing the net. The CP and the commando arrive shortly after after, and X... installs himself in the pass.
In the valley, hell fire rages. It is a hot matter, a very hot matter - violent and confused. Those companies in the heart of the ambush, the 11th, the CCB (in particular) and the 12th, find themselves truncated, cut up, interlocked with the Viets, and quickly lose their initial rigidity. For two hours, pieces of the units arrive in small groups, having successfully escaped the trap, thanks to the 9th Company, that kept open the door, and the 2/13th which turned around and marched to the sound of the guns, supported by an armoured platoon. The artillery fires, a little randomly. A spotter, circling above the melee, is hit, as is one of the tanks of the RICM. At the other end of the valley, the 10th Company, in the tail of column, succeeds is releasing itself, and establishes itself on two knolls, where it remains for twenty-four hours, totally isolated by the enemy. In the following day it requires accurate artillery fire, and the energetic action of the 2/1st RCP, to help it release itself, almost undamaged.
In the final analysis, the battalion, although having lost about one hundred men, dead, wounded, and missing, escapes from a trap that could have devoured it, largely thanks to the spacing between the units ordered by Archambault. Without this measure, the Viets would have closed the trap, thrown themselves on the five companies, and chopped them up finely. If only for this initiative, our commander deserves a big blow to his hat (i.e. a promotion).
And X…, what of him? All went well, and he was satisfied to hold the pass, and to sweep its approaches. This allows him to recover several weapons of Chinese origin that equipped the Division 320, - the forebear of the Kalashnikov - the Chinese pepechka (or PPHK). Maybe he lacked the nerve, or simply the presence of spirit, to push out patrols in the direction of the units struggling to free themselves... But he did not dare, and eventually received the order to hold the pass.
But this does not prevent him from laughing afterwards, with the whole battalion, at the misadventure of Lieutenant Depoisier. Commanding the CCB, he had located himself in the heart of the heavy elements and their army of coolies. Very quickly, his unit crumbles. Sometime later he finds himself, sheltering behind the trunk of a cut down tree, with a 7.65mm pistol is his fist.
He raises his head: a "Viet" is also sheltered behind the same trunk, but on the other side, maybe three or four metre away. Depoisier raises himself, aims his pistol, and pulls the trigger. The pistol jams. Simultaneously, the "Viet" shoulders his weapon and fires. It jams as well. Then both of them flee, each in the opposite direction.
Depoisier claims to have heard very clearly, despite the fury of the battle, the small dry noise of the striker of his enemy’s weapon.
Raymond Legoubé
“The War under X” (unpublished manuscript)
(From “Revue Historique des Armées, December 1984)
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The present article relates to an unhappy episode in the Indochina War, occurring in October 1953. In March 1954, the Command in Saigon drew on this event in the “Notes on the Combat in Indochina”.
Thirty years latter, a study of the archives and the collection of the memories of three witnesses to the events make it possible to consider the facts in a new light. This article is not here as a polemic question, but to present the most objective research of the historical truth. The collection of the testimonies is welcomed and would make a positive supplement to the information held by the Army Historical Service on this affair.
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A vision of the history of an event can often be considered differently, at the time, by protagonists without their good faith being blamed. This article is to verify an unhappy episode in the Indochina War that happened to Mobile Groupment 4 in October 1953 during Operation Mouette.
The state of our forces engaged was considered to be poor at the time of the investigation by the command. A study of the archives of the Army Historical Service of this affair, supplemented by the memories of the author and two other witnesses, modifies this conclusion somewhat.
Operation Mouette:
In October 1953, General Navarre, who had succeeded General Salan as the head of our forces in Indochina, decides to take again the initiative against the Viet-Minh. He hopes to assemble an effective battle corps from the elements of the French army involved in territorial tasks, with those tasks being taken over by the armies of the three associated states: Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Operation Mouette involves an Operational Groupment of two divisions formed by gathering all the intervention elements available in the Tonkin in order to destroy or seriously reduce the Vietminh’s Division 320. This is to facilitate the relief of the French forces established in two catholic provinces of the South-Tonkin by the Vietnamese army.
From 15 to 25 October the first phase of the operation begins, aiming to occupy the zone of refuge of the Viet-Minh Division 320 on the Tonkin-Annam frontier. The Division 320 is strong with three regiments, the 48th, 64th, and 52nd, with support elements (anti-aircraft weapons in particular).
The Operational Groupment is commanded by General Giles, who is established in Ninh Binh with the reserve, supporting and aerial elements, and engineers and logistical services. The two divisions each include an armoured sub-group, three mobile groupments, and a company of engineers. The Division A is in Lai Chuc. The Division B is in Cho Gan. This first phase causes serious combat at Lai Cac in which our adversary suffers heavy losses and has many supply depots destroyed.
On 25 October, General Giles decides to actively seek contact with Regiment 48 thought to be in Yen Lai. The Division B made the movement towards North Annam in the region of the royal tombs. On the 26th, GM4 receives the mission of making a deep reconnaissance into the refuge zone of the 320th Division, passing from Division B to Division A, from Annam to Tonkin through the forest. GM 4 has 2 organic battalions: the 2nd battalion, 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion (“II/13e DBLE”); and the Battalion de March Indochine (“BMI”). It is reinforced with 2 battalions: the 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment of Chasseurs de Parachutists (“II/I RCP”); and the 3rd Battalion Thai (“BT3”).
On 28 October, at 12h45, the BT3 falls into an ambush on the forest road and in half an hour loses half of its manpower. This is not easily accepted by the command, taking into account the support provisions made, with permanent air cover and the ability for 2 or 3 artillery groups to always provide concentrations of fire.
The Inquiry of 1953: Its Conclusions
An inquiry was carried out by the General Gilles, commanding Operational Groupment Mouette, drawing from reports, the most important of which are those of the Colonel commanding GM4 and the Colonel commanding Division A. The conclusions were drawn up by General Cogny, commanding the ground forces of North Viet-Nam, and were addressed to General Navarre (commander-in-chief of French forces in Indochina). This investigation follows the proceeding chronology of the operations the 27, 28, and 29 October 1953.
The Progression of 27 October
The Operational Groupment had expected that GM4 would be inserted, with its 4 battalions, in the operations of Division A on the forest road by the end of the day. This was despite 10km of bad tracks through the jungle, and an area with the difficult terrain. In the event, only the II/I RCP, BMI (the lead battalions), and the light PC of the GM4 arrived in Yen Lai [where Division A was now located] that evening.
Why was GM4 reproached? Primarily for its slowness. In his report, General Gilles states “indisputably”:
- That the units were not sufficiently lightened ... in some battalions and, in particular the BMI, trailed the herd, with the mountainous ground and thick forest adding to their tiredness.
- That there was a certain ignorance of the real environment. It was an error not to impose on the battalion commanders a religious respect for schedules.
- That the inappropriate adoption of a manoeuvre operation going beyond the existing track and sometimes in the absence of a return path for such a manoeuvre - moreover useless – was exceptionally slow.
General Cogny reproaches the Commander of Division A for the "lack of firmness of the commander of the GM4 which did not turn back with a battalion (BMI) which had passed the point where the Commander of the Division had ordered it to install a security element” (Annam Pass on the 27th at 19h00 to relieve GM3, appointed to the defence of Yen Lai).
The Engagement of 28 October:
The II/13th DBLE, and the BT3 will begin again this day their progression in the direction of GM4 without particular protection apart from a Morane aircraft used for of guidance and observation. Three of the five companies of the BMI are on alert in their cantonment in Yen Lai. The II/13th DBLE receives order to leave a company for security in the Annam Pass to the benefit of the BT3 that follows it.
The brutal Viet-Minh action at 12h45 surprises the BT3. It scatters the 12th company; isolates the 10th company in tail of battalion and remained outside the enemy dispositions; and inflicts serious losses on the command company and the 11th company. Only the lead 9th company and the PC, installed firmly in the Annam Pass, resist the attacks. Intervention by supports elements is obstructed by the confusion on the ground and soon aerial observation is lost as the Morane is shot down by enemy AA at about 13h15.
The BMI cannot intervene because it has begun its movement, as planed, starting from 12h00 towards Lai Cac. Only the 5th company will be retained by the commander of GM4 when he joined the area of combat at around 14h00, on his return from the PC of the division. The commander of GM4, on the spot, will find that GM3 will come to the rescue only with a platoon of tanks, which will try to recover the dispersed elements of BT3 along the road in the forest.
From 16h30, it will encounter savage and unfavourable resistance and will not be able to move in the direction of the 10th company of this battalion, cut off behind two limestone hills and encircled by Viet-Minh. At the end of the day, II/I RCP allows the disengagement of the II/I3 DBLE, and the 5th company of the BMI is engaged in the recovery of the Morane shot down at 13h15. It is fair to say that this recovery, and the retreat of the platoon of tanks of the GM4, is carried out in the face of a full Viet-Minh counter-attack.
From General Gilles: “the battalion commanders, like the commander of the Groupment, should have convinced themselves that such an operation by enemy elements could at any moment emerge from the area of Yen Lao (precisely from where Regiment 48 known to be) to launch its raid ... The commander of the Groupment missed this matter... The engagement of II/I RCP was carried out tardily and only on the orders of the Colonel commanding the Division.”
General Cogny especially reproaches "the ineffective installation of security elements, which were insufficient and allowed the Viet-Minh to carry out their ambush.” (The engagement of II/I RCP)
The Relief Operation of 29 October:
GM4 less the BMI (which is in divisional reserve, with exception of the 5th company), succeeds at the end of the day in recovering the 10th company of BT3 which has remained isolated since the day before, following very hard combat between II/13 DBLE and Battalion 706 of Regiment 64.
General Cogny, who went to the site of the battle, as well as General Gilles, at the moment of engagement of the II/13 DBLE, stated that ”the Commander of GM4 showed himself to be uncertain with his second battalion (II/I RCP) and effectively only started his artillery on orders of higher authorities”.
Results of the Inquiry:
General Gilles advises that after these three days, the general assessment was "favorable in the collection of weapons"
French losses: 163 men and 67 weapons.
Viet-Minh losses: 460 men and 45 weapons
He estimates however that "if the commander of the GM4 and his staff can succeed in classical operations, they are ineffective in commanding a Groupment by themselves". He asks "for the replacement of this team which does not know how to engage." But he does not demand disciplinary action against them.
General Cogny “entirely shares the conclusions given by General Gilles and the Commander of Division A on operations of the commander of the GM4 ... It is believed that the current commander should not remain at the head of this Groupment". Consequently, the latter will be transferred to another territory, to a post with less responsibility.
1984 - Complementary Study of the Files
A historical search of the archives of SHAT was conducted in 1984 by the author, a veteran commander of the 5th company of BMI, supplemented by his own memories and those of General Brancion (then Operations Officer of the Artillery of Division A), and Lieutenant-Colonel Armingaud (a veteran radio operator sub-officer with the PC of GM4).
Movement on 27 October:
The delay in the advance is largely due to execution faults at the battalion-level, with redressable difficulties in the progress of the operation, which cannot be ascribed to the commander of GM4. These are
A delay of one hour in departure following an error of orientation of BT3, then in the lead (as this battalion was supposed to be more suited than the others to movement in such terrain).
Limitation on the speed of progress of the II/13th DBLE to 1km/h, due to the obstacle to its march, whereas II/I RCP, passed into the lead from 12 noon, moving at 1.5 km/h, while opening the road with machetes.
The spreading out of the GM4 in two separate elements was caused by this difference in speed; and was made inevitable by the refusal of the commander of the Division (at around 17h00), to authorize the GM to regroup in a security position established by GM3 on the track coming from the royal tombs on the forest road between the Annam Pass and Lai Cac.
For the commander of the Division, it was a question of needing to have the four battalions of GM4 that very evening in Lai Cac in order to start a new operation as soon as possible towards the north. This explains the attitude aimed at increasing the speed of the Groupment, without taking into account the difficulties involved. We therefore understand the behaviour of GM4 commander’s refusal to delay the BMI by stopping it in Annam Pass at 19h00. The separation of the GM4 into two elements thus became inevitable.
The II/13th DBLE and the BT3 (which followed it) were to thus spend the night in forest some 6kms from the remainder of the GM4 stationed between Annam Pass and Yen Lai. An examination of the real facts appreciably attenuates also the fault that the commander of Division A assigns to GM4 "while not turning back with the BMI and not setting up a security element."
In addition, the reproach made by the General Gilles of GM4 of its "ignorance of the real environment" can just as easily be applied to Division A.
Engagement of 28 October:
The Viet-Minh ambush would certainly have turned out better for our troops if both indigenous battalions of GM4 (BMI and BT3) had had as much solidity as II/13th DBLE and II/I RCP.
The principal weakness of the BMI was not to be found in the valour of the unit and the men, which remained always good. But the weaknesses were to a great extent those of command, since Battalion Commander Taro was killed in Dai Nham on 19 October (a few days before the course of these events). Its second weakness was its failure to adapt to the Middle Region. The BMI’s support came from coolies, which certainly allowed the battalion a great fluidity for combat in the rice-fields, but which became a heavy handicap on the tracks of mountains and in forest (1 coolie for 2 soldiers, considerably lengthens the column).
The Commander of GM4, very familiar with this battalion, certainly over-estimated its weaknesses, and seems to have wanted to use it neither in the opening of the forest roads nor in the disengagement operation, except for the company engaged in recovering the wreck of Morane. This was a marginal operation and limited to an elementary level.
The weaknesses of the BT3, a battalion little known to the GM4, appeared only with use. The first surprise to us was its failure to adapt to the Middle Region, however similar that country was to the origin of its tirailleurs of the North Tonkin. The second surprise was the lack of combativeness of a number of the indigenous troops, who believed the position to be secure and were not on their guard. Sergeant Armingaud saw, arriving at Annam Pass, many unwounded tirailleurs returned by the Viet-Minh without weapons, equipment or clothing! He also collected the statements of a wounded European warrant officer who complained that his men had not wanted to fight!
The disengagement operation could have been started earlier in the afternoon, and should have been led more firmly under the command of Division A. Division A should not have:
Remained its PC at Lai Cac during all the morning to command GM4, thus preventing it from being on the spot at its PC at the time of the ambush. Captain Brancion saw the Commander of GM4 seeking in vain the authority to take command when he had just learned the news of the ambush.
Withdrawn, at the beginning of the morning, the II/I RCP from GM4, and not returning it until 16h00, much too late for it to be engaged in force before nightfall.
Carrying out the movement of the BMI to Lai Cuc much too early, without having ensured that the regrouping of GM4 had been completed.
GM4 was thus short two battalions out of its four, on orders of the division, at the time when it needed them the most. Reinforcement from a platoon of tanks of GM3 and its Colonel could not mitigate these deficits.
Disengagement Operation of 29 October:
The operation achieved its goal perfectly: the recovery of the company isolated from the BT3. The company would have held the respect of the enemy for more than thirty hours, and the behaviour of its tirailleurs was worthy of praise. The reproaches which were directed at those commanding GM4 came from the arrival of General Cogny, accompanied by General Gilles. Lieutenant Paillard was with his unit just behind II/13 DBLE when it cleared Annam Pass. He saw these authorities arriving and was questioned by them on the situation and the absence on the spot of command for GM4.
The 5th company of the BMI, had saved, the day before, the wounded observer of the Morane, recovered 2 radio sets (out of 3) and the papers on board. The company had, on the 29th, completed its manoeuvre, bringing back the body of the dead pilot, but the third radio set remained trapped in the wreckage.
Results of the Historical Search in 1984:
The new study carried out leads to a significant change in the first conclusion:
GM4 benefits from extenuating circumstances, taking into account the handicaps of BMI and BT3, and the faults of execution of these battalions and II/13 DBLE at the time of the progression of the 27 October.
Division A underestimated (in particular) the risks of an enemy counter attack, and did not take sufficient precautions.
The responsibility of the commander of the GM4 for this incident, such as could be shown at the time, thus is very appreciably attenuated.
Conclusion:
In connection with the GM4 affair, it has thus been possible to measure the variations that can exist, in the research of the truth, between an immediate investigation and a study carried out with the passing of time. Whereas the first puts forward the responsibility on the commander of the GM4, the second attenuates this responsibility appreciably, returning to the sad sequence of events, and the command of the senior levels and the subordinate levels, and the share of responsibility which falls to them
On a more general note, this affair shows that is necessary for the historical analysis to search not only the files, but also the memories of witnesses of the events. The latter often bring new illumination to the course of the events. They also make it possible to reconstitute the environment, and thus to easier to understand what really happened.
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Indochina 1953
By Christophe Dutrone
Ambush on the forest road
A tactical case of an attack on a column in the Middle Tonkin Region
During the summer of 1953, General Navarre, the new Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, decides to launch a series of pre-emptive actions in the coming autumn with the objective of disrupting the preparations for the next Vietminh campaign in the Tonkin and Northern Laos. It appears unquestionable that an offensive will begin in the South, with the assistance of Division 320. Navarre, whose provisional strategy consists of buying time while awaiting reinforcements, decides to act in advance of the blow by going to meet the Vietminh Division on its own ground, in the middle region at the North frontier of Annam, south of Ninh Binh. Thus Operation Mouette, entrusted to General Gilles, is launched on 15 October 1953 against Division 320, which at that time is beginning to infiltrate into the Southern part of the Delta.
Operation Mouette
Gilles decides to establish an entrenched camp at Lai Cac, Southeast of Nam Dinh. Remembering the experience of Na San, he hopes to encourage the enemy to attack the French positions, and to then inflict on them once again heavy losses by the combined fire of the artillery and aviation. As early as 18 October, the Vietminh, biting moderately on the hook, carry out attacks on two support positions of the Lai Cac camp. The regulars of the Trung Doan 64 (“Regiment 64”) of Division 320 engaged in the matter are sufficiently manhandled so that the Commander of the Vietminh division, understanding the uselessness of a direct assault, takes what is left and withdraws into the jungle to await the French on more favourable terrain. In the days that follow, General Gilles, applying the orders received from Navarre to bring decisive blows against Division 320, launches a series of raids in the enemy’s zones of refuge, in order to locate and destroy its depots.
In this context, the Mobile Group 4 (“GM4”) is engaged from 25 October on the tracks of TD48 of Division 320. The column leaves the Dong Giao defile, and receives on the morning of 27 October the order to move to Northwest, after searching without success the region of the Royal Tombs. It must follow a track to rejoin the Forrest road, a route constructed by the Vietminh to ensure the transit of its supplies between the Red River Delta and North Annam. The 3rd Thai Battalion (“BT3”) having opened the track at about 10h30 adopts a positions around the defile, covering the passage of the other battalions before rejoining the column as its rearguard at the end of the afternoon, at about 17h30. The Mobile Group moves through terrain typical of the Tonkinese Middle Region. The track it follows winds through a wooded landscape dominated by limestone calcaires covered in dense vegetation, on terrain punctuated by water courses with steep banks, and punctually obstructed by abattis. At 22h30, the battalions install themselves in a “hedgehog” around the track, to bivouac there until the next day. On 28 October, at 9h00, the whole column resumes its progression, and (two and a half hours later) reaches the valley and attains the road that climbs back towards the north and Lai Cac.
As magnificent as it is, the landscape is also disturbing. The slow progression imposed by the terrain, and the need to approach obstacles carefully, gives the enemy the advantage of the mobility through the ground that it masters and on which it can quickly modify its positions. Nevertheless, the forest road makes progression easier, but the Thai tirailleurs are not reassured, owing to the partially wooded heights and the high grasses that border the road - offering perfect conditions for a major ambush.
It is at 12h30 when, suddenly, the inevitable ambush occurs. Initially, a rain of mortar shells falls upon the road, while several automatic weapons unveil themselves, simultaneously opening fire on the points of “obliged” passage, namely where crossroads comes from the forest, the "radier " of the river, as well as the Annam Pass, that constitutes a passageway which is narrow, wooded and comparatively restricted. As soon as the firing ends, immediately there is an assault. The infantrymen of Division 320, emerge from the high grasses and cover, armed with grenades and fixed bayonets, and charge into the end of the 3rd Thai Battalion which has just been thrown into a gigantic trap.
The Ambush:
The 9th Company is at the head of the battalion and ascends towards the Annam Pass. It nevertheless reaches the Pass, followed by the CP. Immediately, its 57mm RCLs are put in battery in order to reply to the enemy automatic weapons that unveil themselves, while the approaches to the road are swept. The 11th company, which follows in the second position, succeeds in turn of rallying at the Pass, dragging with it some of its wounded. The 12th Company and the Battalion Command Company (“CCB”), are both caught in the heart of the trap, are less happy. The CCB, at the price of some losses, succeeds (despite everything) in releasing itself with the bulk of its weaponry, but loses almost all its ammunition abandoned by the PIM porters.
The 12th Company is immediately engaged in hand-to-hand combat. It does not have a chance, and is literally "cut up" into several groups, condemned to fight individually for their survival. Some of the remaining survivors succeed in getting themselves under cover in the surrounding vegetation. The 10th Company, which closed the march, and which was still on the track at the time when the ambush is released, immediately advances, to come to the aid of those elements ahead of it. Coming up against the tirailleurs of the 12th Company, in the process of ebbing back, it ceases its advance, and soon runs up against a strong enemy cordon. Seeking to force a passage (on the orders of the battalion commander), it is violently pushed back and is forced to break off the battle. Carrying its wounded, split into two, the Company seeks refuge on nearby knolls, where it establishes its defensive positions. The Commander of the 10th Company is fortunately able to preserve radio contact with the Battalion CP, established in the Annam Pass. The CP is informed of the perilous position of the company, isolated from the remainder of the battalion and cut in two.
As early as the beginning of the ambush, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion, which preceded BT3 in the march order of the column, follows the events of the ambush over the radio. Without waiting for orders, on its own initiative, the battalion commander turns his battalion around, to takes up positions in the Annam Pass, alongside the 9th Company and the CP of BT3.
While a crisis CP is established, an armoured platoon of the RICM (“Colonial Moroccan Infantry Regiment”) is detached from Lai Cac, to support the attack aimed at relieving the 10th Company of BT3. This movement begins at 14h30, and it takes the tanks one and a half hours, with legionnaires sweeping either side of the road, to reach the heart of the ambush. Opening a route through the enemy positions allows the recovery of some of the materiel lost in the morning’s end, as well as a number of wounded from BT3. The II/3rd DBLE nevertheless faces a determined adversary, who refuses to break-off, despite the presence of the tanks, as well as aircraft. At 16h30, a Vietminh counter-attack is launched from the cover of the radier, and puts an end to all hopes of moving forward and coming to the aid of the 10th Company. At 18h00, a decision is taken to disengage, given the approach of night. Although a company of the 2nd battalion of the 1st Regiment of Chasseurs Parachutist (“RCP”) comes as reinforcements to support them, the withdrawal is carried out with difficulty, under the protection of the tanks that are brought up to support the infantry. The Annam Pass, too dangerous to hold, must be evacuated, and the French positions are brought back towards the north, near to Lai Cac.
For the 10th Company of BT3, totally isolated, three kilometers from the Pass, having taken refuge on either side of the track leading to the Royal Tombs, a night of anguish begins. Towards 19h30, there is a probe against the defensive positions on the southern knoll. However, as is their habit, the Vietminh only begin their assault in the early morning. The 10th Company, benefits from that interval to better adjust its positions. The assault on the knoll, launched at 06h00, with a silent approach, is pushed back with sub-machine gun fire and grenades. The regulars of the TD48, exhausted by the violent combat in the day, which has caused serious losses in their ranks, do not push hard, to the deep relief of the defenders.
In the morning of the 20th, a new operation is assembled to relieve the 10th Company of the BT3. The II/13th DBLE supported by tanks, again makes a frontal assault on the Vietminh, climbing alongside the Forrest Road, seeking to push them back, or to at least fix their positions. Simultaneously, a flanking maneuver will be launched from the East of the Pass by two companies of BT3 and the II/I RCP. The axis of progression must create uncertainty as to the real goal of the counterattack. The column must oblique its attack towards the south, to come to the aid of the 10th Company.
In the course of the night, the Vietminh (and more precisely the regulars of Battalion 706 of Regiment 64) solidly establish themselves in the Annam Pass, abandoned the day before, as well as on a dominant calcaire the borders the northern entrance to the Pass. The legionnaires nevertheless manage to force the passage, conquering the heights that dominate the Pass at bayonet-point. Reaching the valley, they fail to reach, just as the day before, the radier that constitutes the heart of the enemy dispositions. Taking advantage of this diversion, the II/1st RCP and the two companies of the BT3 that progress East before cutting a path South with machetes. Radio contact is established with the 10th Company. At around this time, the enemy seems to have partially relaxed its pressure, and it is important to quickly take advantage of this. At the beginning of afternoon, the 10th Company receives orders to prepare to leave the two knolls, and to escape North under the cover of artillery fire.
The relief column, cutting a path through the jungle, arrives close to the North knoll, where an element of the 10th Company is in position, under the command of Adjutant Pradel. Towards 15h30, the relief column recovers the elements located there. At 16h20, while the battle rages in the valley, the major element of the 10th Company, under the command of Lieutenant Michel-Levy, which is perched on the top of the knoll situated to the south of the track to the Royal Tombs, leaves in turn after the immediate surroundings of his refuge are subject to a short artillery preparation, guided by aviation. The 800 meters to the relief column must be crossed to escape the enemy’s clutches. Aircraft provide assistance by marking the progression of the 10th Company with smoke markers. The relief column also indicates its position by sporadic firing of automatic weapons from the heights. At 17h30, a junction between the paratroopers of the II/1st RCP is at last achieved.
The disengagement of the 10th Company is a success. The paras and the Thais are able to turn back. As night falls, the legionnaires of the II/13th DBLE fall back in turn, not without difficulty considering the pressure exercised by the enemy, who (faithful to their practice) seeks hand-to-hand combat. At the beginning of evening, the Annam Pass is crossed again, this time heading for Lai Cac. The battle ends as a tactical success for the French, who were able - while preserving almost the totality of their effective – to relieve the battalion caught in the ambush.
Considering the violence of the clash, the assessment of the losses of the units engaged during the two counter-attacks is relatively low. For the Thais, they have been treated harshly, but their good reflexes displayed at the beginning of the engagement, and the skillful plan implemented by the crisis CP to relieve the 10th Company, allow a catastrophe to be avoided.
The Tactical Lessons of a Model Operation:
The Forrest Road affair constitutes a concrete case on the manner of intelligently driving the penetration of a mobile column in a hostile rebel zone. Contrary to a practice too often observed in Indochina, General Gilles took the precaution of not engaging his elements beyond the range of his artillery. The perfect counter-example will be observed in 1954 in the Seno region. On this occasion, General Franchi, commanding the Middle Laos Operational Group, ¬orders several paratroop battalions to seek contact with Division 325, at the beginning of January. Dispatched beyond the range of the French artillery, the 3rd Vietnamese paratroop battalion will undergo, in the middle of the night, without any artillery support, a violent assault. By a miracle, it survives the assault, but at the price of heavy losses....
On the contrary, in the case of BT3, the wise precaution not to isolate the column from its artillery umbrella, made it possible to effectively support the infantry at the time of its advance, and also to cover its retreat from an enemy seeking contact. It is important, however, to also stress the importance of aircraft as means of ensuring the delivery of powerful fire support, in particular through the use of napalm. Aircraft also provide the general staff throughout the operations with almost a real-time view of the battlefield, ensure radio contact with the units on the ground, and provide coordinates for artillery fire.
From a tactical point of view, the exfiltration of the 10th Company, isolated to the south of the field of battle, is a model of its type. Fixing the enemy with a powerful frontal action, the French forced Regiment 48 to concentrate its resources against the II/13th DBLE to prevent the relief of the 10th Company. But the rescue party succeeds in misleading the enemy as to its real intentions, and succeeds in angling towards the south to relieve those besieged there. The 10th Company’s radio connection with spotter aircraft allows extremely precise artillery support, enabling the Company to escape by surprise towards the North.
It should be noted that the deception plan functioned particularly well, and there were probably nothing more than scouts close to the principal knoll where 10th Company had taken refuge. The elements from Regiment 48, having taken part in the attack at the end of night had obviously returned to the Radier sector to reinforce the defence against the legionnaires of the II/13th DBLE. It is certain that, if it had not been relieved, the 10th Company (isolated on its knoll) would have been the object the following night of a new assault intended to destroy it.
From the point of view of the infantry, one needs to point out the respect of the security distances from between different the companies of BT3, which enabled the battalion to avoid a disaster which would certainly have occurred if the unit had fallen into a trap along its entire length.
The rapid reaction of the lead company prevented the Vietminh from establishing a blocking position at the Annam Pass, and gave the opportunity to collect in the first minutes of the ambush a large number of escapees from the 11th Company and the CCB from the heart of the ambush. In addition, at the Pass, it was possible for French automatic weapons and 57mm RCLs to take out several enemy machine guns which were sweeping the road. The rearguard company, recognizing the impossibility of force a passage, had the saving reflex to seek refuge in the direction of the heights. Retiring to the two knolls, they were able to effectively organize its defence in the face of an enemy very superior in number, and await relief. The commander of the II/13th DBLE reacts with initiative, and turns his companies around and “marched to the sound of the guns”, coming to the aid of BT3. This move also reinforces positions in the Annam Pass, and hastens the first counterattack. It also saves time, and allows a number of lost weapons and several wounded to be recovered.
It is interesting to note that the presence of dense vegetation, which favoured the establishment of the ambush, also allows an important number of French combatants the opportunity to escape from the melee by disappearing into the high grass. Many of those who escaped in this manner were able to avoid death or capture, and return to French lines in the hours or days that followed.
From a more general point of view, Operation Mouette – which ends on 6 November 1953 - is incontestably a tactical success. The Division 320 lost in the different engagements 1,081 dead, 182 prisoners, and 2,500 wounded. A major part of the Vietminh depots are destroyed, and the French general staff consider that it would take approximately two months for this unit to once again become operational.
General Giap, no longer able to count on this major formation to disrupt the French positions in the southern delta, is consequently condemned to approaching the Expeditionary Corps via the north, thereby risking a frontal assault. In a paradoxical manner, it is not ridiculous to think that the success of “Mouette” in a way hastened the French defeat in Indochina. A Vietminh offensive against the Red River delta, despite its impact on French public opinion, would undoubtedly have been a failure, as it had been two years earlier. The divisions of the Vietminh battle corps were not yet able to face the fire power of the CEFEO in open country. Obliged to postpone his projected general attack against the Tonkin Delta, Giap found himself obliged to find a new way of striking a major blow. However, the opportunity was not long in coming. Three weeks later, on 30 November, concerned about control of North Laos, and seeking to repeat the experience of Nasan, General Navarre ordered the reoccupation of the valley of Dien Bien Phu...
Sources and Biography
Anonymous, “Notes of Combat in Indochina”, Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, EMIFT, Instruction Bureau, Saigon 1954.
Anonymous, “March and Operations Journal of the 3rd Thai Battalion.”
Yves Gras, “History of the Indochina War”, Denoel 1954.
Raymond Legoube, “The War under X”, unpublished manuscript.
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Accounts of the Battle
Record of Lieutenant Courdesses, Commander 11th Company, BT3 (1952-1954)
The ambush was unleashed on that part of the road that crossed a clearing, making it possible to see a little further through the undergrowth, and what's more, I believe that this clearing was located between two passes. As always I march behind my first section: I had the two others behind me and we moved in single file. When the heavy fire of enemy individual weapons started, I was very close to the foot of the pass and I saw the head of my company reaching the heights.
The sound of mortar rounds exploding is rapidly heard, and I turn to see my men seeking shelter off the road. Remaining on the spot with the command group, I pushed the men that preceded me. On hearing the fire behind them, they had assumed they were under attack also. The commander of my lead section, by reflex, installed the section on the heights, to act as a collection element, for the remainder of the company, if the battle evolved in this direction. That is what happens. But a few seconds later, I see arriving on the road, less than twenty meters away, a dozen "shrubs" that, the instant before, were dispersed in the clearing. They are knocked back by the fire of my men, and I see that every shrub concealed a Viet soldier with a package, linked up to their belts. I understood that this is their manner of transporting ammunition. After a number of years Indochina, and after several clashes with Vietminh units, this was the first time that I saw such a spectacle, and this detail remains engraved in my memory. They disappeared back into the undergrowth.
My preoccupation was to regroup my company. The firing and the explosions appeared to me to intensify towards the rear of the column, and it was necessary to react quickly to get my unit out of this dangerous zone. I succeeded in this maneuver without losses.
The second detail that returns to me is of a more personal nature, and takes place some time after the ambush: my company has reorganized itself in the pass, and I immediately saw in the distance the plain that we had to reach. While we certainly could not risk another ambush, I let the pace accelerate and we rapidly found ourselves at the foot of the pass, in drained paddy-fields. A beautiful metalled road passes through a true village of canvass: the CP of the operation. Over the radio I had learnt that the company of Lieutenant Michel-Levy, the last in the column, is encircled on a hill by a strong Vietminh force. Advancing towards me at speed, in a cloud of dust, is a jeep carrying a colonel. Very angry, the colonel stops in front of me, and demands to know where my battalion commander is. Stunned, I tell the colonel that I do not know, but I indicated that I could contact him with my radio set. That did not seem to please him, and he set off again from where he had come.
A little later, at the CP, I learned that this was Colonel Roumiantzoff, commanding the Mobile Group, nicknamed “Le Roum”. Immediately, I remembered that in 1944, in the 2nd Armoured Division, there had been an officer of that name, with the same nickname. He was a legendary figure in the 1st Moroccan Spahis for his actions in the liberation of France, but I never saw him again, either that day or later.
-----------------------------------------
Accounts of the Battle
Record of Lieutenant Legoube, Commander of the Commandos of BT3
On 27 October it is necessary to return towards Lai Cac by a difficult path through forests and boulders. The BT3 leads for the first kilometers, before allowing the other battalions to pass in the middle of the afternoon, moving into the rearguard. And X…, who is installed in that rocky chaos through which the track twists and turns, can see to march of the 2/1st RCP, silent and closed; then the 2/13th faithful to the image of the legion - powerful but a little uncouth, and (between the two) the BMI.
The BMI is an old and brave unit, with a very well developed sense of family and the mentality of pirates. X… looked at the succession of soldiers, women, children, buffalo, pigs suspended on bamboo poles, and chickens bundled together in groups of ten or twelve without cages, all overlapping. They seem to believe that every fighter should have access to his home and his poultry yard... the horde of Attila.
In these conditions, is it surprising that the column becomes delayed and divided along a difficult track? As night falls, the two last battalions (the 2/13th and BT3), with the remainder of the BMI, are in the middle of the jungle. We sleep poorly. Somewhere out there gunshots are heard. Nervous sentries or the signals of enemy agents?
In the small hours of the new day, the column resumes its march (with precautions), the legion in front, and the BT3 in the rear. By the end of the morning, the first clearings appear, the landscape humanizes itself, and the sky is clear. We relax a little. In a few kilometres, we will have returned to the French positions, which the lead elements of the 2/13th have already reached.
Towards noon, the battalion moves onto the well-built and well-frequented road: the Forest Road. This road was constructed by the Viets to link up the Middle Region with the west Delta, to Than Hoa in north Annam. A large and flat-bottom valley, covered with high grass and bordered by wooded massifs, 1500 metres in length, closed at its end by a small pass, is located precisely on the Annam frontier. All is calm, too calm. Worried, Archambault [Battalion Commander, BT3] spaces out his units, and put two hundred metres between each company.
X... accompanies the light CP, which moves behind the lead company, the 9th. The movement continues. From place to place, by the track, under the forest cover can be seen light huts, with tables and benches made from bamboo. They were probably used as shelter by the Viets when they do traveled on this road.
After some minutes, as the first elements reach the end of the valley, the ambush is suddenly unleashed. The ambush is large, and it takes place along the whole length of the valley. The Viets (latter found to be two battalions from Regiment 52) were only thirty steps off the track, hidden in the elephant grass. They waited for us to pass. Maybe they saw X... to stop for an instant close to a bamboo shack to pee.
Fortunately, the 9th Company, that had reached the approaches of the little pass, jumps in two movements, to occupy the land that dominate the passage of the road, and prevents the Viets from closing the net. The CP and the commando arrive shortly after after, and X... installs himself in the pass.
In the valley, hell fire rages. It is a hot matter, a very hot matter - violent and confused. Those companies in the heart of the ambush, the 11th, the CCB (in particular) and the 12th, find themselves truncated, cut up, interlocked with the Viets, and quickly lose their initial rigidity. For two hours, pieces of the units arrive in small groups, having successfully escaped the trap, thanks to the 9th Company, that kept open the door, and the 2/13th which turned around and marched to the sound of the guns, supported by an armoured platoon. The artillery fires, a little randomly. A spotter, circling above the melee, is hit, as is one of the tanks of the RICM. At the other end of the valley, the 10th Company, in the tail of column, succeeds is releasing itself, and establishes itself on two knolls, where it remains for twenty-four hours, totally isolated by the enemy. In the following day it requires accurate artillery fire, and the energetic action of the 2/1st RCP, to help it release itself, almost undamaged.
In the final analysis, the battalion, although having lost about one hundred men, dead, wounded, and missing, escapes from a trap that could have devoured it, largely thanks to the spacing between the units ordered by Archambault. Without this measure, the Viets would have closed the trap, thrown themselves on the five companies, and chopped them up finely. If only for this initiative, our commander deserves a big blow to his hat (i.e. a promotion).
And X…, what of him? All went well, and he was satisfied to hold the pass, and to sweep its approaches. This allows him to recover several weapons of Chinese origin that equipped the Division 320, - the forebear of the Kalashnikov - the Chinese pepechka (or PPHK). Maybe he lacked the nerve, or simply the presence of spirit, to push out patrols in the direction of the units struggling to free themselves... But he did not dare, and eventually received the order to hold the pass.
But this does not prevent him from laughing afterwards, with the whole battalion, at the misadventure of Lieutenant Depoisier. Commanding the CCB, he had located himself in the heart of the heavy elements and their army of coolies. Very quickly, his unit crumbles. Sometime later he finds himself, sheltering behind the trunk of a cut down tree, with a 7.65mm pistol is his fist.
He raises his head: a "Viet" is also sheltered behind the same trunk, but on the other side, maybe three or four metre away. Depoisier raises himself, aims his pistol, and pulls the trigger. The pistol jams. Simultaneously, the "Viet" shoulders his weapon and fires. It jams as well. Then both of them flee, each in the opposite direction.
Depoisier claims to have heard very clearly, despite the fury of the battle, the small dry noise of the striker of his enemy’s weapon.
Raymond Legoubé
“The War under X” (unpublished manuscript)
General Castries- Legacy Member
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Re: THE AFFAIR OF GM4, INDOCHINA, 1953
by FlyinSquirrel Sun Aug 09, 2020 7:12 am
Very interesting read. Seems like a rough fight. I really enjoyed the personal accounts of the battle. Thanks for sharing.
By the way, which Morane aircraft is this referring too? Was trying to look it up out of curiosity.
By the way, which Morane aircraft is this referring too? Was trying to look it up out of curiosity.
-Rod
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Re: THE AFFAIR OF GM4, INDOCHINA, 1953
by General Castries Sun Aug 09, 2020 1:23 pm
A Morane is a Morane- Saulnier MS-500 Criquet (“Cricket“). The Morane was a French-built Fieseler Fi 156 Storch, used mainly for artillery observation and recon work.
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Re: THE AFFAIR OF GM4, INDOCHINA, 1953
by FlyinSquirrel Sun Aug 09, 2020 2:01 pm
Cool. Thank you.
-Rod
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Re: THE AFFAIR OF GM4, INDOCHINA, 1953
by indotoc Fri Oct 23, 2020 7:25 am
Great stuff!.. Thanks for sharing,
indotoc
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