Operation Auvergne (June-July 1954)

OPERATION AUVERGNE
From: Revue Historique des Armees (Number 2, 1980)

RETREAT OF THE SOUTHERN ZONE OF THE TONKIN DELTA: 18 JUNE – 4 JULY 1954

The entrenched camp at Dien Bien Phu had succumbed on 8 May 1954, and the conference for Indochina opened in Geneva on the same day.  A new Government, the seventeenth in France since 1945, has come to power in Paris.  Its chief, invested on June 18, complies with the views of the majority of the French population who were tired on the nine year war, and affirms to the National Assembly that he would conclude a peace deal by 20 July 20 1954 at the latest.  In this climate of renouncement, the evacuation of the southern zone of the Tonkin delta was decided in order to "regroup the battle corps" and to put it in a "position to face a possible massive attack ".  Auvergne is the code name adopted for the operation.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTHERN ZONE:

The zone opens to the sea in the east and southeast by two rivers: the Red River and the Day River.  The first waterway is linked to Hanoi, and drains through the provinces of Thai Binh and Bui Chu.  The other crosses Phat Diem and marks between Ninh Binh and Phu Ly, the western limit of the zone.  Beyond this, the ground climbs into the limestone hills of the Muong, where the VietMinh found shelter against French air actions and where they established bases to launch innumerable raids against the delta, rivers, canals, and the infinite flat country of the rice fields surrounding Phat Diem and Bui Chu.

Only one road, RN1, connects Ninh Binh in the southern zone to the north of the delta and Hanoi.  Connecting to RN1 via RP21 is Nam Dinh.   Phu Ly, on RN1  is a unique point of vulnerability, at it is the point at which RP21 connects to Nam Dinh, and also the canal connecting the Day and Red rivers.  The Vietminh have organized on the west bank of the Day a network of automatic weapon sites, AA positions, and mortars, which are frequently used against friendly operations.

Four areas with clearly different characteristics make up the zone: -

• Phat Diem, the economic, political and religious activities of this zone are subjected to the authority of its bishop, Mr. Le Huu.  The Vietminh command had attempted to insulate this area for a few months with hard attacks on the ground, river and air links.

• Bui Chu, another religious and economic centre, the only province of Tonkin transferred to Vietnamese command, with Vietnamese officers and a Vietnamese staff.  It is the subject to numerous attacks and attacks on posts.

• Thai Binh, which is used by the VietMinh as a zone of passage, with numerous fortified villages and enemy bases, where friendly activity is devoted to the safety of the roads.

• The Nam Dinh – Phu Ly – Ninh Binh triangle, the zone in which forward VietMinh units infiltrating into the delta from the limestone hills mix with the local population.  It is an area of frequent violent combat, and a reservoir of men - friendly and enemy.

Everywhere and especially in Phay Diem and Bui Chu, there are strong catholic communities, who are very active in their resistance against the VietMinh.  Outside these communities, the lack of dynamism of the Vietnamese political authorities, and usual misery born of demographics, there is support for our adversaries.  This left the population, sensitive to the VietMinh propaganda, to reach accommodations with the agitators and the military and paramilitary units.  Another factor came from the refugees moving into the area, with the population of Nam Dinh growing from 40,000 to 85,000 inhabitants.  The defeat at Dien Bien Phu, skillfully exploited by our adversary, also carries a blow to morale.

THE FORCES INVOLVED:

The means of disposition of the colonel commanding the Southern Zone (with its HQ in Nam Dinh), as of 15 June, consists of:

• The territorial units (18 light Vietnamese battalions, the commandos and light supplementary companies, the brigades of provincial militia); a group of 105mm (HM2) howitzers; 13 platoons of 105mm (HM2, and HM3) howitzers; 6 platoons of 120mm mortars; a battalion of engineers; a battalion of Algerian Triailleurs (22e BTA); and 2 companies of the 3e Vietnamese Reconnaissance Regiment.    

• The service units and depots with approximately 8,000 tonnes of materials and provisions.

• The means of one dinassaut; and

• The units of the general reserve, that is to say three mobile groups ; an amphibious sub-group (S/GA2) ; an armoured sub-group (S/GB 2) ; and a 155mm howitzer group (IV/4e RAC).

That is to say, approximately 39,000 men of which 32,000 were Vietnamese (not including 5,000 PIM).

On the VietMinh side were the 320e Division; 1 regiment of the 325e Division; and 2 independent regiments, infiltrated in the zone in February, combined with efforts of provincial and regional regular units (4 battalions and 33 companies) to paralyze the communications between the posts and to intensify the “rotting” of the population.  However these forces had undergone severe losses from friendly forces, and some of these units were at rest to the west of the River Day.
 
Finally, as at 15 June, the essential VietMinh battle corps is engaged at Dien Bien Phu (4 divisions, with 34 regular battalions, 5 artillery batteries, 7 AA battalions), with its bases on the periphery of the delta.  But its reorganization requires longer deadlines that those of the operation.

PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION AUVERGNE:

On 15 June, Colonel Vanuxem, commanding the South Zone, is charged with the preparation of the evacuation of the Zone, and is to carry out the evacuation from 1 July, with the general conditions hereafter:

a) The retreat of the forces in Thai Binh and Bui Chu by river (the Red River) by the navy;

b) The retreat of the forces in Ninh Binh and Phat Dien by river (the Day River) by the navy;

c) The retreat along RP21 and RN1 of the forces in Nam Dinh, and Phu Ly by the elements implanted on the Dong Van-Tia road (the latter under the command of the southern zone at D-Day); and

d) The means of the general reserve are in the disposition: GM4 ; III/41e RAC (155mm howitzers); S/GB1; I/61e engineering company; a mobile surgical team (ACM28); and the equivalent of 5 transport groups (GT3, GT5, GT7, 2 companies of GT515 and 516, and 80 rented civilian trucks.

There is no doubt that the revelation of the projected retreat would result in a collapse of morale of the Vietnamese soldiers and the population of all the zone, as much as it would cause the mobilization and a concentration of the enemy elements.  It would result a paralysis preventing any action and an ashaming debacle without any possible rectification, and so the secrecy of the preparation and the speed of execution were critical success conditions.

PRELIMINARY WORK:

On 20 June, the 3e Vietnamese Engineering battalion (Commander Legrand) begins work on the road routes (strengthening culverts, establishing multiple garages, preparing materials, setting up signposts, working on boats, etc).  The artillery seeks to arrange or create artillery positions, as the conditions for maneuver along a single road in rice field country do not allow for improvisation. A demolition plan, approved by the Commander FTNV (Forces Terrestrial North Vietnam) envisages the destruction of the principal bridges and the gasoline and ammunition depots in Nam Dinh, and the devices are set up the 29 and 30 June.  On the Red and Day rivers, the loading points are arranged.  The airstrip at Nam Dinh is lengthened.   Finally, the air support plan envisages from 28 June the bombardment of the VietMinh bases and depots in the limestone hills, and the neutralization of the crossing points of the Day.

DECEPTIONS AND SECRECY:

The deception plan was developed on the theme of: the South Zone will pass under the command of Vietnamese military authorities, and that a war of movement will replace positional warfare.  Forces will be made into mobile groups in a certain number of strong points in the Zone (Thai Binh, Nam Dinh, Phu Ly, Ninh Binh, and Phat Diem) for the preparation of offensive operations.  And the establishment of defensive works also continues: concrete bunkers in Phu Ly; runways; messes for officers and sub-officers, and a headquarters in Thai Binh.  Some 800m3 of stone for road works is transported between Thai Binh and Ninh Giang.  The announcement of the sale of cotton of Nam Dinh to a Hindu society masks the departure of the families of French cadres and the evacuation a part of the stocks. Finally, the media reveal that a "Vietnamese military person" would soon be assuming an important command in the South Zone.

To preserve the secret, only 3 officers work out the operational plan and articulate the commands according to the various phases selected:  the commander of the Zone, his chief of staff, and the commander of the 3e Bureau (Operations).  However the safety of the staff of the Vietnamese civil administration, who will be in danger, is not forgotten. But they will not be informed of their retreat by inland waterway, road or air until the very last moment (at the same time as our adversary and... our own forces).  It is only on 27 June that the VietMinh, surprised by extent of retreat started on 18 June, decide to intervene against Phat Diem.  It will be too late. And it will be always this way during the other phases of the retreat.
 
RETREATS BEFORE D-DAY:

The evacuation of the zone (families of the military, PIMs, civilians in danger, units, depots, fixed establishments such as hospital and units not essential to operation, etc) starts on June 18 by way of road and river, and on June 22, by air from Nam Dinh to Hanoi and Haiphong.   The following is evacuated from the 18 to 30 June:

• By river (9 LCTs and 1 gasoline barge): 6000 tonnes of stores and 10,000 men;

• By road (3,000 trucks): 9,000 men and 5,000 tonnes of stores; and

• By air: 13,000 men.

Between the 20 and 29 June the retreat of eleven posts located along the roads is carried out - even our own forces initially interprets this as confirmation of the rumors of a regrouping.  Manpower thus released is regrouped into the GML (Group Mobile Light) made up around the staff of sectors (GML5 at Phu Ly, and GML7 at Thai Binh). However in Phat Diem, the setting-up of the GML6 is delayed by the dispersion of the units and the manpower absorbed by the strengthening of the under-sector at Cho Ganh.  Also, S/GB2 reinforces the garrison of Ninh Binh and the GM32 at My Coi.

COLONEL VANUXEM LAUNCHES “AUVERGNE”:

On 27 June, in the evening: alarm!  The VietMinh menace in the South is worrying, and in Phat Diem sector it is necessary to the withdraw units at Cho Ganh and Ninh Binh without delay.  

The choice of D-day is left to the colonel commanding the zone.  In Nam Dinh, Vanuxem hesitates.... but then "the die is cast!".  And by message of 27 June at 21h40, he orders (with two days advance on the plan), the immediate evacuation of Ninh Binh of all manpower.  The armaments of the forts at Cho Ganh (100 machine guns, and 37 and 47 turrets) were evacuated the previous day.  The Operation begins on 28 June in the morning, under the protection of the S/GB2 (Lieutenant-Colonel Audemard d'Alencon). The enemy, surprised, does not react.  But mines damage a tank and a half-track.

THE EVACUATION OF NINH BINH:

As the enemy is now alerted, the execution proceeds with speed.  At dawn on 29 June, the S/GB2 undertakes to open the road from Ninh Binh to Phuc Nhac in order to allow the movement of the units having to embark in Phat Diem.  Some 2kms from Ninh Binh, at 7h00, a large ambush is revealed.  S/GB2 attacks, with artillery and aviation support. The engagement is short but violent. The Viets retreat to the South, abandoning 150 dead, 13 prisoners, a 57mm RCL, a mortar, machine guns, automatic rifles, and individual arms. The losses of S/GB2 are 2 killed and 24 wounded, and the crew of a Morane observation aircraft is lost.

A VietMinh Battalion of 9e Regiment, responsible for the ambush had arrived in the night, coming from Thanh Hoa after a forced march of 10kms.  It is not alone; two other battalions from the same one regiment bar the road from Phat Diem, in front of Phuc Nhac.  

At Nam Dinh, Vanuxem quickly decides.  Abandoning loading plans envisaged for Phat Diem, he orders the retreat of all the units of the Ninh Binh under-sector (Commander Parent) to Nam Dinh, by the RP10.  By the afternoon, they are displacing along the Cho Ganh - Ninh Binh road.  By 30 June the posts at My Coi are evacuated, always under the protection of S/GB2, with the enemy detonated mines destroying two tanks and a truck.  By the evening of 30 June, S/GB2 holds My Coi with 4e BVN and a battery of 105mm of the IV/41e RAC.

THE EVACUATION OF PHAT DIEM ALONG THE DAY RIVER:

The same day, 30 June, instead of 1 July as envisaged, the evacuation of Phat Diem is begun.  Indeed, there are not merely three battalions of VietMinh regulars, but five, on the morning of 29 June threatening the south of the zone, between Ninh Binh and Phat Diem.  And the arrival of two more is expected for following night.  Within this information, Vanuxem again accelerates the established calendar: he prescribes the immediate regrouping at Phat Diem and Xuam Day of all the Vietnamese units in the sector.  This operation is carried out normally during the night of the 29 to 30 June. However, two posts are hit hard, and the supplementary troops lose 7 killed and another 26 missing.  A third post does not receive the order to retreat.

As at dawn, the loading of the mass of personnel and materials begins in Xuan Day.  At 9h00, three LCM and a Monitor of Dinassault 4 (Lieutenant Commander de Champfleury) approach Phat Diem and begin the immediate loading of the sector CP and the 105mm guns, not without muted opposition from the Vietnamese personnel.  

Bishop Le Huu Tu had rallied to Ho Chi Minh and his associates in 1945-1946, but had since become a fierce anti-communist.  Informed as of 24 June by General Cogny, commanding FTNV, of the retreat of the Franco-Vietnamese forces, he is formally opposed to it.  In Saigon where he is taken via the general’s aircraft, he obtains the support of Ngo Dinh Diem, the first Minister of Bao Dai, the head of state who has remained in France since April.

A wave of desertions reduces the number of the diocese’s excellent supplementary troops, retained to defend Phat Diem.  It is a shock for the prelate, his clergy, notables, and functionaries, but supported by the mass of the population, they act to transform the diocese into an entrenched camp, and to prepare for the regrouping into the zone of governmental forces.  Returning to Phat Diem on 29 June, Mr. Le Huu Tu learns that the evacuation is set for the following day.  At once, he prepares for a siege of the sector. And at 00h30, he moves to the CP.

At about 10h00, firing breaks out.  A VietMinh battalion has infiltrated into the city, menacing the embarkation quays.  In haste, the navy puts down protective fire, and the last elements of the CP are evacuated, including Mr. Le Huu Tu.

In short, approximately 2,5000 soldiers and 5,000 civilians, 50 tons of material, a 105mm cannon, and four 120mm mortars are evacuated.  Destroyed on site are 3 105mm cannon, 100 tons of ammunition (immersed in the river and mined), 150 tons of food (sprinkled with fuel oil), a disabled Moranne, and transport vehicles.

THE EVACUATION OF THAI BINH AND DU BUI CHU PHAT ALONG THE RED RIVER:

The Lieutenant Colonel commanding the Thai Binh sector and the GML7, has assumed since 22 June, the command of the forces of the two provinces.  He begins the operation to retract the posts on 30 June.  At dawn, as planned, the operation begins without incident.  But by 11h30, artillery and aviation must be employed as two VietMinh battalions attack at An Le, 10kms to the north of Thai Binh.  And as the first part n artillery section begins the retreat, a remote-controlled mine is detonated, blocking passage across a bridge.  Two artillery pieces, after being put out of action, must be abandoned.

By the end of the journey, the group reaches Thai Binh, without much incident.  But at 19h00, intelligence locates three VietMinh battalions (Regiment 64) moving to threaten any retreat towards Nam Dinh or the embarkation points on the Red River.  With this new threat, Colonel Vanuxem frees up the established calendar and orders the retreat to take place that evening at 22h00.  With less 4kms with the south Thai Binh, an ambush is revealed.  The artillery reacts.  A DC3 Luciole illuminates the landscape. The engagement lasts three quarters of an hour costs 13 killed and 15 wounded from GML7. Later a concentration of mortar fire kills 14 men.

At 09h00, on 1 July, the embarkation of the families commences under the protection of the 27e BTA, unloaded to reinforce Van Mon.  Ten hours later, 4,000 soldiers, 1,200 civilians, vehicles, cannons, and mortars etc are loaded onto the convoy, harassed by light enemy elements.

No incidents marks the evacuation of the posts at Bui Chu, carried out during the night of the 30 June to the 1 July, nor of the loading operations that continued all the next day, except for harassing mortar fire.

Towards 22h00 all of the flotilla  is gathered at the mouth of the Red River.  In addition to the ships having evacuated Thai Binh and Bui Chu, it includes the river forces of Nam Dinh (Lieutenant Commander Juilien-Binard).  After having embarked (from June 29 to the 1 July) various militia units, garrisons, the CP of Colonel Galibert, and posts from My Loc, the Nam Dinh Group has fulfilled its mission, as has the Costal Operational Group.

With the families piled up in the LST, LSM, LCT, LCM mixed up with the semimarists, and the personnel from the orphanages, old people's homes etc of the diocese of Thai Binh, and with them, the bishop in person.  In Bui Chu, there was no dispute. For a long time, the religious congregations were dissatisfied with the assumption of responsibility of the province by the Vietnamese army, were exiled to Hanoi and the bishop followed.

In Nam Dinh, where pupils of the large religious colleges are on holiday, many parishes travel by road or river, into exile.  The exodus thus started will continue later in all the delta.  Other groups and families, in the order of hundreds of thousands, will give up their family rice fields, native soil, tombs of the ancestors, to flee the risks and dangers of the VietMinh regime to gain South Vietnam

Proceeding on 1 July 1954, some 10,000 soldiers, 5,000 Vietnamese civilians, 75 vehicles, 10 105mm cannons, mortars, etc, are embarked on the Red River at nine different points, and sail towards Haiphong.  At the same time, the evacuation of Nam Dinh is completed.

THE EVACUATION OF MY COI – NAM DINH ALONG RP10 AND RP21:

After the effective evacuations of 28, 29, and 30 June, the VietMinh are seething everywhere.  And the VietMinh forces operating in front of Phu Ly to the west of the River Day are reinforced by Regiment 48 of Division 320 coming from Chiné and Regiment 95 of Division 325, which are likely to be in place by the morning of 2 July.  No doubt it will be Phu Ly, the ultra-sensitive bottleneck, where the showdown will take place. Thus, while starting the operation to withdraw forces from My Coi, Nam Dinh, and Binh Luc on the morning of 1 July, Colonel Vanuxem maintains in the Phu Ly area, an operating force capable of powerful reaction offensives

On the orders of Colonel Galibert, commander of the Nam Dinh Group, the operation begins at 05h45, with the installation on RP10 of the GB1 of the Lieutenant Colonel Navarre (S/GB1 reinforced by the 22e BTA under Commander Broussy and a battery of IV/41e RAC), to support S/GB2.

In My Coi the premature demolition of ammunition dumps (by setting fire to them) alerts the VietMinh, while the smoke released by the fire obstructs observation. At 07h00 violent fire from VietMinh mortars causes 2 dead and 11 wounded, destroying two trucks and a jeep.  It is then that two battalions of 9e Regiment attack. The riposte, supported by artillery and aviation (6 B26 and 16 Fighters), constrains the attack and the VietMinh withdraw with heavy losses.  The VietMinh’s grip has been broken again.  The S/GB2 then starts its withdrawal at 10h00, with the last tanks leaving My Coi.  At this time the VietMinh AA (with its 20mm guns) harasses the last DC3 flights carrying civilians and supplementary troops out of Nam Dinh.

However, Vanuxem continues to move with speed against the enemy.  Towards 11h00 the CP of Colonel Galibert, its fulfilled mission, together with the Vietnamese light battalion TDKQ 718, embarks on the Red River.  Meanwhile, the first elements of S/GB2 coming from My Coi pass through the town without stopping.  Between 11h00 and 15h00 the ammunition and gasoline depots explode and burn.  And S/GB1 abandons the deserted CP of the Southern Zone.  In front of him, GM32 (Lieutenant Colonel Ton That Dinh) who is charged with maintaining the free use of the RP21, withdraws towards Tinh Duc Ha.  At 20h00, the bridges at Binh Luc are blown up.

The following day, 2 July, before dawn, always under the protection of the S/GB1, commences a convoy of trucks, jeeps and tractors, evacuating towards the north various posts (including that of Binh Luc and artillery from Hill 63), the threatened population of Phu Ly, the service units, III/41e (155mm HM1 howitzers) of Phu Ly, and finally GM31 (Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Huu Cau).  GM31 is attached to the GM4, both being dedicated (together with the 18e BVN and two companies of 3e RRVN) to the protection of RN1 between Lam Cau and Tia.

According to information collected the previous day and in the night, Regiment 9 is coming from My Coi hastening towards Phu Ly.  Two battalions of the 48e Regiment and one of the 95e Regiment are crossing the River Day to the northwest of the town, while the two others battalions of the 95e Regiment reach the immediate south of it.  Lastly, the heavy elements of 320e Division have reached the river to the west of the entrenched camp at Phu Ly.

However, harassed by artillery and aviation elements, the movement of the VietMinh units is difficult, and it does not seem that a serious force can be quickly built up against Phu Ly.  However, they can carry out harassment with automatic weapons and mortars, and tighten ambushes around the light base elements.

In fact, the day passed without outstanding incident, allowing time to take care of the weapons.  And of the evening of the 2 July, the friendly forces prepared for the battle to take place the following day, following plans prepared in afternoon at the CPs in Phu Ly and Hha Tuu, in the presence of General Cogny.

French forces comprise:

• Groupement Hubert  (Colonel Hubert commanding GM8 and the Phu Ly operational sector, with his CP at Phu Ly) commanding the entrenched camp at Phu Ly and Lam Cau.

• Groupement Fonde  (Lieutenant Colonel Fonde, commanding GM4 and the RP1 South operational sector with his CP at Nha Tuu) covering the entry to Dong Ha and Nha Tuu, to support Phu Ly.  He is responsible for maintaining the freedom of movement into Lam Cau and Tia.

• The deployment of artillery  allowing the concentration of fire of four groups (two 105mm and two 155mm) to support Phu Ly and Nha Tuu.

• The rear CP of the zone is established in Tia.  Colonel Vanuxem, in person, arrives in Phu Ly with a light PC in the morning of 3 July.

THE BATTLE OF PHU LY (3 JULY 1954):

In the night of 2 – 3 July, the enemy is able to establish itself in the south (with two battalions of 95e Regiment) and to the northwest of Phu Ly with the 3e battalion of 48e Regiment, where it is joined by two other battalions (infiltrated the day before), together with a battalion of 95e Regiment.  The VietMinh have 3 options for the day:

• To attack in the south of Phu Ly;

• To isolate the fortified camp at Phu Ly  while cutting RN1 to the north of the town; or

• To take both actions simultaneously.

In considering the three hypotheses, the VietMinh can count on the support of the heavy elements of 320e Division and possibly from 6e Regiment.

In regard to this threat, the Colonel Vanuxem wants:

• To hold Phu Ly, and possibly in counter-attack (Operation Vercingetorix South);

• To locate and destroy the enemy forces infiltrated in the North-West of Phu Ly with convergent actions from Nha Tuu (Groupement Fonde) and Phu Ly (Groupement Hubert) supported by massive artillery and aviation fire (Operation Vercingetorix North and West); and

• As soon as the freedom of circulation on the RN1 is no longer threatened, to retreat the forces of Phu Ly, then those units in Nha Tuu - Dong Van.

OPERATION VERCINGETORIX SOUTH:

At 5h45 the first elements of S/GB1 leave Phu Ly, moving to their starting positions for Operation Vercingetorix West.  Believing that the evacuation is underway, the VietMinh (after waiting 1 hour) begin to fire on the town with mortars and MGs, as a prelude to a general assault that began at 07h30.  This attack runs into an infantry company and two of Vietnamese reconnaissance platoons.  Overrun, those units retreat in disorder.  In the tower of Hung Phu, a DLO (Detachment Liaison Observation) team of 3 artillery officers of the 64e RA is also overrun and captured.  

At 08h00, the VietMinh reach the marketplace of the town.  Although artillery and aviation intervene strongly on the attackers and their fires bases to the west of the River Day , by 08h30 VietMinh elements arrive in contact with the barbed wire of the entrenched camp.   Other Vietminh units, equal to two companies, overrun the town from the east, and reach the dike at Ma Trang.  But the fire from the positions of GML5 and the II/5RTM prohibits them from advancing further.

Two platoons of tanks and the III/5e RTM are then withdrawn from Vercingetorix West for the counter attack.  Pushing through the village, with huts in flames, supported by fire from the 64e RA, they do not emerge until 9h30.  The combat is violent in the center of the village, and continues until the tower at Hung Phu falls to an attack at 10h35. The DLO and Phu Ly are recaptured, at the price of 2 dead and 20 wounded (including Captain Parent of the 64e RA).

On the VietMinh side, some 147 are dead (40 of whom are identified as belonging to 227e battalion of the 95e Regiment) and left on the ground, together with important weapon stocks (rifles, FMs, MGs, mortars, etc) and equipment.  At 09h00 the evacuation of last Vietnamese civilians, remaining service units and depots of Phu Ly, begins again along RN1.

OPERATION VERCINGETORIX WEST:

From 06h30, Groupement Hubert attacks in the direction of the Phu Ly - Hang Khu.  At 07h30, at the time when the VietMinh attack in the south of Phu Ly, I/5e RTM occupies Yen Lao after being harassed by light elements, losing one killed and five wounded.  On its side of the advance, 22e BTA, at the costs of 5 killed and 14 wounded, seizes the village of Phu Lao and the northern half of Chan Chau.  The enemy loses 21 killed and 3 prisoners.  

But to their rear, the III/5e RTM in the course of crossing of the bridge-lock at Phu Dam, receives at 08h00 the order to double back for the counter attack on Hung Phu with S/GB1.  The attack of Groupement Hubert halts.  The I/5e RTM keeps firing, but retreats from Yen Lao, and is cut off from the Phu Lao - Phu Dam bridge-lock, covering the River Day and the northwest. Heavy mortar fire from Kim Bang hits them during this movement.  In addition other heavy weapons fire coming from the southern half of Chan Chau and Bai Ngang pins down the 22e BTA in the northern half of Chan Chau.  The enemy is close at hand.

"Halt the attack! Crush them with artillery and aviation! And begin the evacuation of Phu Ly" orders Vanuxem.

A massive concentration of fire strikes the VietMinh forces, and they are decimated.  At 11h00 the retreat of the units in Phu Ly (64e RA, GML5, III/5e RTM, II/5e RTM, etc) commences.  At 13h00, is the turn of 22e BTA, and then that of the I/5e RTM.  The S/GB1 moves with them.  There is no unfavorable reaction.  At 14h15, the bridges at Phu Ly and Phu Dam are blown.  Movement along RN1 to the north of Lam Cau has now become normal again, following action by Groupement Fonde.

OPERATION VERCINGETORIX NORTH:

Before dawn the operation begins with movement south towards the centers of Nha Tuu - Dien Xa (the first objectives).  The troops must then move, in the second stage, southwest towards the flooded River Day.  Usually in June, the ground is passable because of delays in the rains.  But the ground is very suitable for amphibious vehicles.  

To west the BMI , covering the right flank of the, leaves first.  It passes through Sieu Nghe at 05h00.  The village is deserted; not a good sign! This fact is significant. The scouts redouble their prudence. At 06h00, the contact is established at Moi Than with light enemy elements, which retreat.  At 06h30 the battalion occupies the village but, heavy fires from Dong Thin prevent it from advancing further.  The II/13e DBLE  moves in, approaches Ngo Nhi at 06h00.  The battalion encircles there a platoon of VietMinh, and a short battle ensures, but it masters the village.  But further forward, in front of An Xa, at 08h00, the battalion runs up against strong resistance.

At this time, VietMinh forces attack in the south of Phu Ly.  Colonel Vanuxem then decides to stop Vercingetorix West, and to limit the objectives of Groupement Fonde at Dien Xa: "Stop the movement towards the River Day".  However, he attaches the S/GA2, already committed on the Lam Cau - Dong Lao axis, and is also responsible for the mission of covering Vercingetorix North towards the west, and to take part in the destruction of VietMinh elements in contact with the battalions of GM4.  Thus relieved of its mission, the BMI at 09h00 begins its retreat towards Nha Tuu, into the reserve of the Groupement.

The II/6 RTM  is then launched to the flank of II/13e DBLE on the axis Dong Thon - Dong Than.  On the canal are the sixty Vietnamese commandos.  The rice-paddies, thickets, and bamboo are deserted.  The population has fled, except for an old man squatting with his knees to his chin.  In the center, the companies hasten up onto the small flood banks.  The men, however, are exhausted, and sweat pours off them.  With blows from shovels and machetes they clear a passage through the bamboo fences surrounding the village of Dong Thon.  The village is deserted.

After applying massive amounts of artillery on Nha Tuu, the II/13 DBLE moved to the right of the VietMinh company in An Xa. And at about 10h00, the II/13 DBLE and the II/6RTM approach at the same time the villages of Dong Thin and Trieu Khe, both strongly held. Three legionnaires are hit and fall.  Three PIMs  take over the FM, each in the place of “his” legionnaire. Artillery concentrations fall close to the attackers. The enemy undergoes heavy losses, and is pinned down.  Some manage to flee through the gaps in the encirclement of S/GB2, which itself is occupied in clearing the villages of Dien Xa, Dong Lao, and Dong La.

“The Viets are on their knees” mutters Vanuxem, passing through Nha Tuu at about 11h00.  “But watch out, they will seek their revenge.” And at the time he orders: “Prepare this circus to pull back tomorrow, so stand by with automatic weapons along RN1 between Lam Cau and Dong Van”.

Indeed, the VietMinh concealed in the deserted villages between the RN1 and the canal, harass from 09h00 convoys along RNI, without success.  And their time is soon over. The BMI already started from Nha Tuu towards Ngnoc Dong - Thuong Thon, and a detachment of the S/GA2 assembles south to link up with them.  Before 13h00 the VietMinh elements are destroyed.

Beyond the canal, legionnaires and Moroccans carry out, in the mugginess of a greenhouse, the clearing the field of battle, collecting prisoners, the wounded, weapons, ammunition, materials, etc.  There is no unfavorable reaction.  The torpid heat is overpowering.  As the troops moves through the rice paddies, crushed by the sun, a monster with a bloody muzzle, hit by shrapnel, charges through the tepid mud, letting out a low bellow.  A machine gun crackles.  The buffalo crashes to a halt.  

In Nha Tuu staff of the GM4  study the plan to be taken by Groupement for the night ….

EVACUATION OF NHA TUU – DONG VAN:

Then at 14h30, a message from Vanuxem, unforeseen (as was his habit), then shakes the somnolence of the staff, at the hottest hours of the day: “Undertake the retreat of your Grouping to relieve GB1 on RN1. The final destination of the various units between Do Xa and Thuong Tin follows.”

At this time the S/GB2 covers the Groupement in the north towards River Day on the axis Dong Van – Cao Mat, and completes the evacuation of this last post, held for these long months, like Nha Tuu, by the colonials of the 6e RIC.  These troops, and the passing surgical team, retreat without hindrance to the north.  At about 17h00, the 155mm group (IV/4e RAC) moves, in turn, along RN1, after having exhausted its supply of ammunition firing on the points of passage of the River Day.  At 18h00 the last tanks of the S/GB1 pass by Dong Van, and the way is finally free for II/6e RTM, II/41e RAC, and the heavy CP of the GM4.

Then, the transport supply train halts.  The night falls.  The plan assumes that the areas around the Dong Van crossroads are vulnerable. One hour passes. In the neighborhood, for three thousand men on their guard, all is silence except for the hooting of owls and the murmur of crickets.  The VietMinh still does not react.

At 21h00 finally the BMI and II/13 DBLE moves off in the black night. The S/GA2 with the commander of the GM4 follows.  And once more, the S/GB1 of d'Alencon, since Ninh Binh, covers the rear.  Behind, post of Dong Van, and the post and bridge at Nha Tuu are destroyed.  Vercingetorix North costs Groupement Fonde 4 killed and 14 wounded, including 1 officer.  The VietMinh have lost 58 killed, from 302e Battalion of 95e Regiment, counting only the casualties in An Xa and Don Thin, with one or two hundred others being observed elsewhere.  Also captured were 53 prisoners, including 23 wounded, with rifles, automatic weapons, mortars, hundred kilograms of explosive, etc.

THE BALANCE SHEET OF OPERATION AUVERGNE:

“Retreat completed” announces the Commander of GM4, arriving at the CP in Tia at 23h00.  The satisfaction of Vanuxem is clear from one glance, and his features slacken. After fifteen days, he has carried out Auvergne to its end.  "Good" he says, “now, I will get some sleep”.  The following day, in the early morning, General Cogny is not secretive in his satisfaction : “Bravo! You have saved 95% of the personnel and materials, with the least cost.  I dared not hope for half as much.”

From 18 June to 4 July, Auvergne has permitted the retreat of:

• 68,000 personnel (civilian administrators - Vietnamese and French, soldiers, and prisoners); some 13,000 by air; 18,000 by river; and 37,000 by road; and

• 11,000 tonnes of materials.
 
The losses reach 38 killed, 129 wounded (including 5 officers), and 26 missing (not including the Vietnamese company in Dong Bien, in the North-West of Phat Diem, that did not receive the order of retreat).  In addition, approximately 2% of the Vietnamese manpower deserts.  In terms of materials, 3% of the vehicles engaged, 3 105mm HM2 howitzers, 2 105mm L36 howitzers, and 2 Morane observation aircraft are destroyed.  Some 700 meters of bridges (Bailey, Eiffel, or floating) had to be abandoned, shredded or destroyed. Lastly, approximately 3% of the total tonnage of food and ammunition supplies were lost.

The losses inflicted on the VietMinh, primarily in the course of the battle of Phu Ly, can be estimated to the value of six battalions (and 119 prisoners).

Auvergne belongs to what is undoubtedly the most difficult type of military operation - a retreat through an insecure zone.

In the Tokin Delta in 1954, the VietMinh was everywhere able to develop its political base, supported by propaganda, terrorism, and guerilla warfare. Against this, neither the French, nor the Vietnamese Government could validly oppose them.

On the other hand, during "classic" confrontations (such as the battle of Phu Ly), observing the laws of economy of forces and concentration of fire allow the French military chiefs (using artillery and aviation), to always carry the field of battle, despite the local numerical superiority and high morale of our adversary.

Auvergne is a full example of retreat maneuvers.  The plan misses nothing, and its design and preparation are adapted following enemy moves, taking into account the terrain and the climate of guerilla warfare, linking in the classic defensive battle using crushing superiority of firepower.

The example of Auvergne, and also the honor of the chief who prepared and led to this success, deserves to be drawn from the lapse of memory.