THE FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORPS BEFORE THE BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU

THE FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY CORPS BEFORE THE BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU
Michel Bodin, doctor of letters

When on 20th November 1953 the paratroopers of the Airborne Group No 1 (1st and 6th BPC, and the II/1st RPC) established a foothold in the valley of Diên Biên Phu, the war in Indo-China was already in its ninth year. Indeed, while one still frequently reads that the conflict did not really start until 19th December 1946 by the general Vietminh attack against all the French garrisons, it should be known that the first clash between Vietnamese elements and French soldiers actually went back to the end of the summer of 1945 in the Tonkin.

By 1953, after long years of combat under very difficult conditions, the Expeditionary Corps has undergone a general counter-attack by the PAVN, countering some blows, sometimes anticipating them. Despite constant reinforcements and the establishment of the armies of the Associated States, the Franco-Vietnamese forces yielded ground regularly. Even in the zones known as “controlled”, the Vietminh was able to mount operations and to take the populations in hand through its parallel hierarchies. After the stabilization of the situation under the command of General de Lattre, General Salan had to retreat in many sectors in the face of the offensives carried out by Giap. In May 1953, his successor, General Navarre, found a delicate situation which, according to him, was worse than the one had presented to Salan. The new commander-in-chief inspected, examined the situation on the ground, and then presents a coherent suite of proposals which are summarizes under the formula of “the Navarre Plan”. At a strategic level, he initially planned to hold in 1953-1954 with a rather defensive attitude to the North of the 18th parallel, in order to protect to the maximum the areas of the South where offensive operations could be mounted; then in 1954-1955 to take the initiative in North when the battle corps had been hardened. He wished to develop more mobile elements, ready to face the Vietminh everywhere; to support the national armies with men; and to thus engage a little more with the independence of the Associated States [1].

The success of the Navarre Plan was based on only two conditions: on the one hand that no serious reverses occurred in 1953 and in 1954; and that the Chinese aid was not significantly increased, on the other hand.

The PAVN, for its part, had reached a certain maturity in its structures. At the top of the pyramid was the regular army (“Vê Quôc Doàn”) including formations of infantry, artillery, engineers, AA and intelligence; structured into divisions or not. The seven large units (Daï Doan 304, 308, 312, 316, 320, 325 and the Heavy DD 351) constituted the mobile battle corps of the PAVN, capable of driving the Expeditionary Corps out of Indo-China. Next in the pyramid were the regional troops (“Bô Doi Dia Phuong). Lastly, at the bottom of the structure, were the popular forces (“Dân Quân” and “Dân Quân Du Kich”). A report by the French intelligence services estimates the manpower of the PAVN at 123,000 regulars (including 81,000 in North-Vietnam), with 63,000 regional and at 119,000 popular soldiers. These forces could, moreover, request the population for work, porters, the transport of equipment, and the provision of intelligence [2].

This was an adversary increasingly more powerful (thanks to Chinese aid evaluated at 2,160 tons in 1952 and 4,400 tons in 1953), made up of convinced nationalist soldiers, politically trained by political commissars, true police chiefs intellectually guiding the troops. But then what was the state of the Expeditionary Corps prior to Operation Castor? To describe in a few pages the overall aspect of the Expeditionary Corps can appear as a challenge, but was the defeat at Diên Biên Phû enviable for the situation of the Franco-Vietnamese troops?

We will present only one succinct outline of the armies of the Associated States. Nevertheless, to ignore them would fail to give a clear panorama of the French Union forces at the end of 1953. As at 1 January 1954, this force could count on manpower of 250.000 regulars and auxiliaries, without counting paramilitary elements [3]. The ANVN, the most important element in the dispositions of the Associated States, had actually enlisted 155,830 regulars and 47,025 auxiliaries, cadred by 3,961 French of the FTEO at November 1, 1953 [4]. In theory, the army was to be ready in 1956. Sometimes grouped into mobile groups, half of its regular battalions had a good valour under fire. Their efficiency varied from high to zero; with the 1st and 5th BPVN passing as the better ones. On June 14, 1951, ANVN troops had inflicted significant losses on the Vietminh in the area of Vinh Phuoc (Cochinchine): 140 killed, 300 wounded, and 20 rifles and one mortar captured [5]. The majority of the ANVN was assigned to static defensive duties, in order to release the maximum amount of French manpower to constitute a manoeuvre corps wanted by General Navarre. The Associated armies were, in fact, regarded as a complement to the TFEO which, in the long term, they were to relieve. But in 1953, the ANVN still depended heavily on the Expeditionary Corps - for example, in its artillery all the battery commanders were metropolitan [i.e. French].

Far from its traditional bases, the Expeditionary Corps had to carry out a multiform war in which 80% of its manpower was limited in a ground war of clashes against a daily guerrilla and revolutionary war (night harassment, ambushes, convoy attacks, booby-trapping transport routes, and sometimes massive attacks by PAVN regulars …). The intervention troops, at the disposal of the sector commanders or the commander-in-chief, assembled operations for the relief of threatened sectors or the destruction of Vietminh forces infiltrated into Franco-Vietnamese dispositions. For these combatants, it was the true war; which was likely to lead to a major clash with the enemy in 1953, a clash welcomed by the combatants, compared to the anguish and routine lived by “those of the posts”. In May 1953, these forces (approximately 10% of the manpower) were composed of seven mobile groups, two armour subgroups, two amphibious subgroups, and eight paratrooper battalions [6]. Other combatants provided logistical support from the rear bases and often “those of the front” (if this term had a meaning in Indo-China, even if the reports used it) scorned them a little, and were even jealous of them. In the Navy, there was the “Khaki Navy” which carried out river surveillance, transported troops and materials, conveyed reinforcements, and gave fire support during clearing operations. The coastal and deep-sea naval forces took part in maritime security operations, with such effectiveness that in 1953 the Vietminh had practically given up the use of sea routes to supply its forces. Lastly, the aviators supported the troops on the ground.

The Question of Manpower and its Consequences:

From the point of view of manpower and organization of the troops, one must distinguish the Expeditionary Corps from the French Troops of the Far East (“TFEO”) formed of the ground, naval and air forces of the Far East (“FTEO”, “FMEO” and “FAEO”); the forces of the Associated States (the National Army of Vietnam – “ANVN”, the Royal Khmère Army – “ARK”, the Laotian National Army – “ANL”); and a certain number of “off-plan” personnel, such as members of the SDECE - the counter espionage service.

At the beginning of the engagement of the Expeditionary Corps in Indo-China, the question of manpower arose. At no point did the Far East command have the resources to fulfil the missions assigned to it. The financial problems, having to conduct a campaign without political direction from the France, having to guard the other territories of the French Union, the desire to hold an eminent rank in the defence of Europe, and the need to modernize the armed forces constitute the leading causes of this chronic shortage [7].

The FTEO (“Ground Forces of the Far East”):

In 1953, the manpower situation was not any more dramatic than it had been in 1948 or 1949. But the plans established in 1952 had not taken into account the progress of the Vietminh or the change of commander-in-chief. The manpower requested, desired, granted, and provided all underwent fluctuations throughout the year. In 1952, General Salan had decided to reduce the size of the FTEO, i.e. to reduce the need for “imported” manpower and also to reduce the number of native regulars. These measures were due to the need to make budgetary economies, and also to encourage the development of the national armies. It was necessary that, in the long term, the national armies would have to take in hand the destiny of their country. In other words, the national armies would have to be assisted by the TFEO, and not the reverse. In addition, the growth of the national armies would show the United States, which was needed in all fields, that France had finished with colonialism. Also, by the end of 1953, the inter-arm staff and that of the terrestrial forces (EMIFT) envisaged 158,566 men for the FTEO - including 53.870 natives, reinforced by 60.000 auxiliaries - whereas by the end of 1952 it could count 170,389 regulars and 51,830 auxiliaries [8]. The idea was thus to reduce the size of the FTEO by 11,839 men, including 2,271 metropolitans, and to compensate for their departure by an additional 10,000 auxiliaries (whose maintenance was 50% less expensive than that of “imported” soldiers) [9]. Moreover, it was hoped to prepare native soldiers for their future transfer to the national armies. As of his arrival, General Navarre stated that he was opposed to any reduction because of: (i) the battle in High-Laos and Thai Country; and (ii) the effort required to cadre the new units of the Associated States. For him, to go below 169,000 men “was not reasonable”. However, he was ready to accept: (i) the reduction of native over-manning; (ii) a deceleration in the arrival of French sub-officers and soldiers, on the condition of reinforcing the African and Maghrebian troops [10]. And he proposed, on the contrary, reinforcements for the Expeditionary Corps in order to have 169,562 soldiers, while the Government in 1954 imposed a limit of 160,000 men [11]. The reality on the ground was different. While exploiting voluntary extension of tours, the delays in embarkation, the lawful (two month) delays in repatriations, and the number of natives - the FTEO counted 174.736 men in April 1953 and 175,648 in May [12]. In short, everyone was trying to juggle the figures to obtain a satisfactory result. General Navarre, who had asked for three regiments of infantry, a battalion of engineers and a group of artillery, received only part of this – spread out over time. Thus the 7th RTA and the 5th RTM (a march battalion of which was already in Indo-China) were disembarked, along with the 62nd engineering battalion. The FTEO thus passed from 171,121 men in June, to 182,424 on November 1953, and 184,234 in February 1954 (not including the cadres detached to the national armies (approximately 5,000 men). According to the plans, with 52,000 to 58,000 auxiliaries, the FTEO was reinforced [13].

The structure of the FTEO can be synthesized from the following four tables:

Table 1 [14] — Zone of Stationing of Regular Forces as at 1st November 1953
(184,424 men, including natives)
North-Vietnam 94,629 51.9%
Central-Vietnam 23,233 12.7%
South-Vietnam 23,777 13.1 %
Plateaux 256 0.1 %
Total Vietnam 141,895 77.8%
Laos 12,067 6.6%
Cambodia 7,548 4.1%
Unattached Elements 20,914 11.5%
Total 182,424 100%

The FTEO could count 100 battalions of infantry, 17 artillery groups, 40 cavalry companies, and 8 battalions of engineers, without counting the many services and heavy weapon companies.

Table 2 [15]- 1st November 1953
French 52,918 29%
PFAT 1,960 1.0%
Legionnaires 18,282 10.1%
North-Africans 38,024 20.9%
Africans 17,978 9.8%
Native 53,262 29.2 %

Table 3 [16] — Distribution of the Regular Troops, and their Branch of Service (natives includes) as at 1st May 1953
French Union Forces Natives of the FTEO Total %age of Branch of Total
Infantry 66,946 24,413 91,359 52.3
Paratroopers 5,445 5,118 10,564 6.1
Artillery 8,654 5,301 13,955 7.9
Cavalry 9,849 5,331 15,180 8.7
Engineers 5,272 3,874 9,146 5.2
Supply 4,659 3,822 8,481 4.8
Signals 4,737 1,463 6,200 3.5
Stores 4,292 1,615 5,907 3.3
Administration 1,550 333 1,883 1.0
Medical 3,360 1,055 4,415 2.5
Veterinary 104 106 210 0.1
Fuel 524 289 813 0.4
Gendarmerie 1,916 191 1.1
PFAT 1,790 1,790 1.0
Other 2,445 462 2,907 1.7
Total 121,554 53,182 174,726 100

Tableau 4 [17] — Distribution of Ranks as of 1st November 1953
Officers Sub-officers Other Ranks
French 6,003 22,380 52,918
North-Africans 42 2,322 35,660
Africans 14 727 17,237
Legionnaires - 2,437 15,845
Natives 91 4,087 49,084

At the end of 1953, the command in Indo-China had been obliged to request the acceleration of the sending out of reliefs [i.e. soldiers relieving someone whose tour had been completed] by air, in order to address the lack of cadres for the infantry. The essential problem was that of the relief and maintenance. While the command had no difficulty in finding Africans, Maghrebians and legionaries, it was harder to find metropolitans [i.e. Frenchmen], so much so that General Salan anticipated by the end of the year a deficit of 12% in the relief of sub-officers [18]. To satisfy General Navarre, it was decided to temporarily draw from maintenance. For 1954, some 48,000 men would have been needed for reliefs. The problem of manpower remained recurring without any true solutions, as the French armed forces had reached its limits.

These tables make one statement very clear: the FTEO had a complete heterogeneity in which the French elements were a minority. This constituted a true headache for the various branches, for the supply corps in particular, given the question of food for the different nationalities. All the units were “yellowed”, but here too there were difficulties. The development of the Associated armies restricts substitutions, reinforcements and reliefs. The majority of the formations were mixed and often an over-manning of natives was compensated for by under-manning by Europeans. In May 1953, the 2nd BEP had a theoretical manpower of 980 paratroopers, but could actually count 481 native (out of a theoretical total of 439) [19]. The Franco-Vietnamese units were subjected to constant fluctuations - at the end of 1953 ten battalions, two artillery groups, one reconnaissance company, four companies of engineers, two supply companies, and one stores company were transferred to the National Armies [20]. Thus the “yellowing” and the transfers weaken the Franco-Vietnamese Forces (“FFVN”), whereas the Vietminh were reinforced regularly.

At the time of the start of the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the FTEO lived in a fragile balance but the prospects for 1954 were sombre.

The Far East Air Forces (FAEO):

The manpower of the FAEO remained stable throughout 1953 (11,082 men in June and 11,003 in December). But like the FTEO, the FAEO suffered from a lack of human resources. The air force did not have a sufficient number of qualified personnel; it used the reliefs in an anticipated manner, and (despite its reticence) it engaged Indochinese auxiliaries. For the surveillance of bases and installations, the FAEO had set up an Air Force guard company, formed from Moroccans and Africans. But, on many occasions, the guard commander had to be “lent” personnel by the FTEO, and often the paratroopers on jump alert had to take part in guard missions.

As at 1 December 1953 the FAEO counted 9,969 metropolitans, including 5,415 sub-officers, 988 Maghrebians, 1,246 Africans, 97 female personnel of the Army (“PFAT”) and 937 native [21]. The requests fro General Navarre for reinforcements hardly received any response; on the 3,830 men requested, the FAEO received only 653. Moreover 75% of the personnel did not have any true qualifications, so much so that it was necessary to transform Moroccan guards into armourers [22]. The air force could assemble four groups of fighters, two of bombers and three of transports. Reconnaissance groups, liaison squadrons and the various services (such as photo-interpretation centre) supplemented the air forces.

Maritime Forces of the Far East (FMEO)

The Navy had problems comparable with those of the two other armies, but more so as it was to participate in the formation of the cadres for the new Vietnamese navy. The FMEO also had to take on “yellow” manpower “to economise” its European personnel. Grouped in units of the high seas, of river defence, intervention commandos, and in a number of service units, the FMEO could count approximately 11,000 men, including 10% natives [23].

The overall situation of the Expeditionary Corps

The difficulties in satisfying the demands for manpower in the Expeditionary Corps had serious consequences. The majority of units had in their ranks a strong proportion of regular Indochinese, reinforced by a variable number of auxiliaries (as many posts had a “slush fund” to reinforce their indigenous resources). In 1953, it was readily said that the commander of the 13th DBLE actually had under his command a full brigade. The Africans and Maghrebian battalions were not supplemented by Indochinese regulars, but by companies of auxiliaries. Some units of the Expeditionary Corps were completely comprised of natives, from their formation, such as the Thai and Muong battalions and the Laotian Chasseur Battalions (BCL). If the addition of natives gave to the units a “lightness” they lacked, it also created complications in regard to problems with food, clashes over women (as in many units the married men were accompanied by their families), and the fear of the desertions or treasons. The majority of the formations lacked homogeneity as there was insufficient time to perfect their training, which was often too hasty. The units of the Expeditionary Corps also suffered from a lack of specialists, so much so that they had to combine to face the shortage. There were companies, which when landed, lacked anyone who could operate a mortar. The gaps in training before the departure of the units handicapped the FTEO even more so, for a question of morale, as the promoting of those to ranks in which they did not have the capacities normally reserved for their rank. The overall quality of the FTEO fell. Very many soldiers, whatever their origin, arrived in Indochina without any technical training. Surveys of the FTNV reported that, if the majority of the men could make use of their weapons, then they used them badly or ill-advisedly. For example, the fire of a light machinegun was unproductive at 400 m, and machine pistols were used incorrectly. As a consequence, there was an over-consumption of ammunition and frequent calls for the support from artillery or aircraft [24]. However, certain units did take the time to train their men. Thus the 7th RTA, which arrived in October, had the ability to perfect its individual and collective tactical instruction, and to reemphasise marksmanship for several weeks in the area of Hue and Tourane. Technically, the formations of the FTEO were not up to what was needed [25].

Many reports denounced the poor quality of the troops: with low levels of education (and illiteracy for some). In January 1954, a survey of the 1st Thai battalion concludes that “70% of the French troops should be eliminated for their inadequacies” [26]. Companies had to organize night classes. The majority of the Maghrebians were thus unable to successfully pass exams or to qualify to for a promotion to the next rank. In the III/2nd RTM, no rifleman could obtain a written promotion in 1953 [27].

Many officers did not have solid military knowledge. Some officers had just graduated from their training schools, while others came to the FTEO from different branches of the army. In the first quarter of 1953, 123 officers of different branches were assigned to the infantry. Many officers did not have any experience of their men; officers arrived in the tirailleurs without ever having served with such units. As for the reservists, they showed poor military capacities. To the gaps in technical knowledge were added physical deficiencies. Taking into account the needs of the FTEO, many cadres (especially in the infantry) returned for a second tour in Indochina. In the infantry, 50% of warrant officers and subalterns were on their second tour, and 5% on their third. It is also necessary to look at average ages in the Expeditionary Corps (table 5): 36 years for second lieutenants, and 38 years for lieutenants.

Table 5: Ages in the FTEO
1 2 Age
Private 1st Class 21.8 3.8 23 years, 8 months
Corporal 16.6 3.1 24 years, 3 months
Corporal-chefs 31 4.9
Sergeant 34.3 3.4 27 years, 9 months
Sergeant-chefs 31.9 6.1
Adjutants 32 3.1
Adjutant-chefs 34.2 3.1
Lieutenants 22 4 32 years
Captains 31.9 3.8 37 years, 10 months
Majors 34.3 3.9 42 years, 6 months

28. Syntheses of the reports of the BCAAM, “Le soldat des forces terrestres, Indochine, 1945-1954,” thèse d’État de M. Bodin.

1 : Percentage of French personnel carrying out their second tour at the end of 1953.
2 : Percentage of French personnel carrying out their third tour at the end of 1953.

Even the Legion and airborne troops see this trend. The lack of manpower obliged the FTEO to lengthen tours by approximately two months; and many soldiers were on their second or even third tour. They were shown to be less resistant to fatigue [28] and tropical diseases [29]. The troops in posts were employed until the end, without the respites given to intervention units. The paratroopers often passed their “rest time” on jump alert. The III/3rd RTA, at Diên Biên Phu, had received only ten days of respite in the five months which preceded its arrival in the valley. The battalion had fought in the “Street without Joy” during Operation Camargue, operated in Laos and on the Plain of Jars, and had taken part in sweep operations in the Tonkin Delta. The battalion was worn out even before the battle [30]. The companies did not have their full manpower because they had not replaced their losses, those who had fallen sick, those on training courses, and sometimes those on disciplinary charges. On 20th November, the II/1st RPC (theoretically 827 men) could assemble only 569 men. On the same day, the 1st BPC could assemble only 722 paratroopers out of 911 men [31]. On the bases, any increase in the aerial activity increased the workload of the ground staff. These problems had an effect on combat efficiency and the resistance of the men - so much so that General Salan asked for studies on the length of tours in Indo-China, which he hoped to limit to eighteen months in order not to irremediably use up the personnel, and to thus support their return to Indo-China and to maintain their effectiveness on the ground [32].

Despite the development of regular units in the armies of the Associated States - especially in the ANVN - the manpower situation was very likely to become critical. All the means were used to find men. The number of French cadres was minimised; in each commando unit (containing one hundred soldiers), it was common to have only two or three metropolitans. The command used delayed repatriations (two months for Europeans and Maghrebians) and “unexpected” delays. The FTEO mixed reliefs with maintenance, while splitting the reinforcements, by decreasing or delaying them. It juggled its manpower. At the end of 1953, 300 officers and 1,100 sub-officers were used as substitutes in the infantry; and 2,380 gendarmes of various ranks were used for cadres for the infantry. The numerical weakness of the FTEO often generated the weakness of the soldiers [33]. In the II/1st RTA, not only were there 10 officers (rather than the theoretical 18), but also 5 of these officers from other branches (3 from the cavalry, 1 from the artillery, and 1 from the supply corps) [34]. In the II/4th RTM, 5 officers were lacking in May 1953, along with 128 tiralleurs and sub-officers [35]. Only the airborne troops escaped this under-manning, which certainly explains their value in battle. The FTEO “lent” approximately 500 men to the FAEO to guard bases and depots; and some 300 PFAT replaced 300 sub-officers [36]. Despite the employment of cadet reserve officers (EOR), and increasing the quota along with intensified propaganda; and despite the improvements in pay, the FTEO lacked approximately 200 French specialists in the signals, engineering, artillery and infantry branches. Training was reduced to the minimum; and Europeans with less than two months of service were sent to Indo-China; while tiralleurs with six months of service were also sent - whereas the cadres were accustomed to these men having at least one year of service, if not more.

The Expeditionary Corps was thus, overall, of a quality lower than was required by the theatre of operations. The Vietminh infantry battalions outclassed the majority of the standard battalions in the FTEO, which could compensate for this inferiority only through a superiority of artillery and air supremacy.

A PANORAMA OF MATERIAL:

Until 1950, the TFEO had lived under a mix of misery and heterogeneity. Following agreements with the United States, accelerated by the disaster on RC4, there were plans for standardization, restoration and reinforcement. Plan FY53 - under development - made it possible for the services to function normally, and for troops to fight with the correct supplies. In the FTEO, 23,000 vehicles, 3,000 tanks, 6,000 trailers were in service. The armament consisted of 745,000 weapons and 980 guns [37]. The weaponry of the infantry still caused criticisms [38]. According to the nature of the troops, the weapons did vary considerable. If the paratroopers and the companies of the mobile groups had at their disposal the most modern and best-adapted weapons, the static forces and the groups of auxiliaries had to make use of less powerful, sometimes older, and not very suitable weapons on the ground in Indo-China. The airborne troops of Indo-China (TAPI) had 26,000 parachutes in reserve. In mid-1953, the most worrying gaps related to the signals branch as some 1,490 radios had been lost in combat. If the logistic problems were not longer distressing, the balance of materials was still fragile. In addition, storage capacities had reached a saturation point, and the service personnel remained at only 7% - while in Europe they were at 17%.

In the Navy, large efforts had been made. Sailors served on approximately 500 river craft - of American and English origin - of all sizes. If landing craft had been an effective answer to the war imposed by the Viet-minh, the material had aged and now seemed less and less suited to the new conditions of the war, and lacked speed. The FMEO waited for more modern and larger materials (command LCMs to replace LCIs), better armed craft (LCM monitors), and they counted on American assistance. Naval pilots flew Hellcats, Grumman gooses and Privateers, which rendered immense service.

With some 336 aircraft and 18 helicopters, the FAEO compensated for a proportion of the FTEO’s weakness. Bearcats of the fighter groups, while robust, nevertheless lacked autonomy, and were supported by the B26 of the bomber groups. Excellently adapted to the Indochinese theatre, the B26 had a powerful armament and a sufficient operating range. The transport groups still used the old JU52s (from the Second World War) and were incapable of simultaneously dropping more than three battalions. In fact, the FAEO did not have the ability to maintain a fleet of more than 350 planes, or to face unforeseen or urgent needs. On a daily basis it was not rare to have more unavailable aircraft than available ones. The High Command in Indo-China wished to receive an additional fighter group, two transport groups, and one group of bombers equipped with B26. Facing the opposition of the staff and the difficulties in recruiting of personnel, General Lechères proposed to reinforce the existing groups with five aircraft each, and to look at further “yellowing” the formations. But by the autumn of 1953, nothing had been done [39].

According to the plans for materials, the FTEO depended on American support, and they wished even more assistance. If the Expeditionary Corps was not longer a period of crisis, it nevertheless underwent consecutive bouts of difficulties, due to delays in re-supply, sabotages, and weakness in the infrastructure in Indo-China.

MORALE AND THE STATE OF MIND OF THE COMBATANTS

If one agrees to define morale as the will to fight, then it is possible to affirm that the morale of the Expeditionary Corps was still maintained at a good level. However, it was not as solid as is sometimes said [40].

After the enthusiasm caused by General de Lattre, and the victories at the edge of the Tonkin Delta in 1951, the mental energy of the FTEO had declined and had begun to fail. The battles of 1952 had shown the progress made by the PAVN; and by 1953 nobody had any more illusions on the final end of the war. The Expeditionary Corps carried out its duty with courage and sometimes self-sacrifice, but without hope of victory. The arrival of General Navarre did not galvanize the spirits of his men, despite the promotion of his plan. Moreover, many officers thought that he asked too much of them and that the new commander did not understand the realities on the ground [41]. Admittedly, the successful actions (regarded as victories) such as Operations Brochet, Gerfaut and Mouette in the Tonkin Delta, without generating a large exaltation, had reinforced the energy of those who had taken part in them. It was the same feeling among the paratroopers who had destroyed the Vietminh depots at Langson (Operation Hirondelle). In the sectors, the garrisons raised questions about the effectiveness of their missions because many areas had fallen out of Franco-Vietnamese control – even if the French controlled the areas by day, the Vietminh controlled the night and imposed his propaganda and politico-military structures. The static units had an inferiority complex in the face of the Vietminh forces, and the mobile troops. This generated a kind of mental wear, which reduced the morale and combat effectiveness in the posts, with those wanting to find a true war, to escape from the ceaseless routine. In the pacified zones, such as Cambodia and South-Laos, an extension of the conflict was feared, and the weakness of the local troops was noted. Many there had been able to wonder where the advance of the Vietminh would ever be blocked. In fact, even among those disembarking in Indochina, the hope of the victory had died and a certain malaise among the cadres was noted. Moreover, there were many pointing out the lack of a clear policy with well-defined goals, which would have strengthened the morale of the men and give a direction to their sacrifices. Many wondered about the number of tours they should serve, if a solution could not be found. The majority noted with anxiety the growing PAVN strength, and feared the resumption of their large offensives. The morale still held, thanks to the discipline of the individual soldiers, within the meaning of the duty and with the desire to fulfil the missions as well as possible.

If the Africans received good food, decorations, and the ability to show their valour, they showed a sharp energy. The resistance of 24th RMTS at Yen VI, which the propaganda service amplified, increased pride and enthusiasm, but the abandonment of this PA caused a harmful shock. However, locally, morale began to decline, particularly in Annam where the tirailleurs wondered whether they could avoid the blows of the Viet-minh.

Throughout the year the Maghrebians showed a good mental disposition, in particular those in the Mobile Groups which - on several occasions – defeated PAVN regulars. However, the tiralleurs did lose their combat capacities in some circumstances, such as the Mugia Pass (where, in the face of an offensive by Giap’s regular regiments, the 4th RTM was literally decimated, abandoning or burning its material. The demoralization of the unit was such that the High Command planned to dissolve it [42].

Few things actually affected the morale. External events only had repercussions at the time soldiers became aware of them, and they really did not have an influence on the life in Indo-China. Rejected by a fraction of the nation, generally ignored, the soldiers lived separate lives, indifferent to anything that did not impact on them directly. The news arrived tardily and thus lost its keenness, so that the current events of France or Africa touched men only superficially. This attitude supported the blossoming of a particular state of mind. In 1953, many felt, with justification, a cut between the country and the Expeditionary Corps. The men suffered from the strikes which prevented them from receiving mail or which delayed the disembarkation of reliefs and material. The majority felt a grudge against Metropolitan France, which did not send the means that were not only promised, but were essential (which to some, explained the deficiencies of the troops, the delays with repatriations, the fatigue at the end of tours, and the losses suffered), which was not interested in their war, and which did not take any measurement against the Communists – while Indo-China was frequently spoke about as a war against communist expansionism.

Although having greater means to be kept informed and to reflect on the issues, the officers maintained a good level of morale. But they did not have any illusions, and knew the likely outcome of the war without massive US intervention or the sending of the contingent. Moreover, the fact that many of them were on a second tour, meant that they were a little older and often married, and they did not cheerfully accept their transfer to Indo-China, especially if they had reduced physical capacities. Amongst the sub-officers, there was a state of mind that worried those in command. The sub-officers were preoccupied by the satisfaction of their material situation, by their daily life and the date of their return to France – rather than by the outcome of the war in itself. Many troops lacked a ¬¬good state of spirit, but there were enormous variations between individuals. For some, volunteers all, wished to shine in combat, while others went through the war without asking too many questions. All were sensitive to the daily life, and to the local conditions of the war, and not to the direction of the war in the Far East.

Among the legionaries, morale did not pose any problems. The engagements were enough to give a raised dynamism to them, although they regretted the weaknesses of the FTEO in all areas.

On the whole, Europeans held together, but without enthusiasm.
The state of mind of the Africans on the whole remained good, but those disembarking no longer had the same desire to serve as the veterans. There was a lot of nonchalance and a lack of respect for discipline. One even began to find signs of grumbling against the white non-coms. The number of charges issued, against poorly executed orders or for orders not being respected, increased considerably, to the point where there was a mood of casualness in certain companies and in certain posts.

Among the North African troops, the state of mind had begun changing. The nationalist tremors of Morocco, without reducing the combative-effectiveness of the tirailleurs, had left an impact on the surrounding effects. The new tirailleurs did not serve with the same attitude of the veterans. They had become egalitarian, asking to receive the same wine rations as French troops, and to receive the rewards equal to their ranks. The North African underwent a true crisis in June 1953. The devaluation of the piastre had been accompanied by a large reduction in pay. This measure created a negative state of mind. All considered that the French had deprived them of sums that they had loyally obtained in battle. This wave of anger lasted some weeks until the High Command took compensatory measures. This change in exchange rate also had consequences in the degradation of the nutrition and an increase in local prices. The North African understood this very quickly. Sensitive to their daily life, this created even more resentment against the French. This crisis added to the lengthening by two months of the statutory tour, which provoked bad spirits and many infringed regulations to sign protests.

Concerns were growing in native units. They were subjected to intense propaganda from the Dich Van, the psychological warfare service of the Viet-minh, menacing them and any calls to join the national army. The majority did not want to serve used the orders of their compatriots, but wished to remain in the French Army. The fear of transfers created a malaise. Some deserted from their national unit to immediately re-enlist as auxiliaries in the FTEO. Certain native formations did not have a great solidity, as their French cadres were defective in number and quality. On the other hand, if taken well in hand, and regarded as true soldiers – equal to the metropolitans, the Indochinese could serve valiantly. The Vietnamese of the Indochinese Paratrooper Companies (“CIP”) were a good example.

The Franco-Vietnamese forces in 1953 seemed never to have been so strong. Its manpower was increasing, and its material was relatively satisfactory. Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider the heterogeneity in composition and valour of its units. Many units showed weaknesses at all the levels: reduced cadres or cadres of variable quality, training barely lacking military capacities and (especially) an intense state of fatigue. The material was not always well adapted to the conditions of the engagements; tanks - for example - had caterpillar tacks too narrow to be committed in wet sectors; and certain aircraft – such as the JU52 - were worn. Too many units of infantry lacked lightness, pugnacity and direction in their operations.

At the end of October 1953, during the Operation Mouette, BT 3 had failed to stand in front of Giap’s regulars [43]. It was this unit which gave up its positions at the beginning of the battle of Diên Biên Phu.

Mentally, the troops no longer have any energy. Although, naturally, there are many exceptions to this, in the paratrooper and legion battalions. From the strict point of view of manpower, the Franco-Vietnamese forces could no longer face an enemy that had developed with constancy and valiancy the art of the revolutionary war. In this type of conflict, it is considered that loyalist troops must outnumber their enemy by at least twenty-to-one in order to be victorious [44]. In 1953, this was far from the case, even more so as the PAVN could be supported by an inviolable sanctuary, China [45].

NOTES
[1] H. Navarre, “Anguish of Indo-China, 1953-1954”, Paris, Plon, 1956, p347.
[2] An excellent synthesis on the PAVN is given by Mr. Rives in the bulletins of the first three quarter of ANAI 2001.
[3] Evolution of the Indochinese military problem, 1950-1953; Salan private files.
[4] SHAT, carton 10:00 186, File n°3151/EMIFT/1/3112/3 of November 1, 1953.
[5] Id., carton 10:00 996, File without reference of 1953.
[6] Y. Gras, “History of the Indo-China War”, Paris, Plon, 1979,600 p., p. 515.
[7] The question of manpower was studied by Mr. Bodin, “France and its soldiers, Indo-China 1945-1954”, Paris, Harmattan, 1996,285 p.
[8] SHAT, carton 10:00 187, Appendix with the letter No 1227/EMIFT/1 of June 20, 1952 and carton 10:00 505, File on manpower 1952.
[9] Evolution of the Indochinese problem, 1950-1953; Salan private files.
[10] SHAT, carton 10:00 187, File No 1370/EMIFT/1/30/SO of June 5, 1953.
[11] Id., carton 10:00 187, Appendix with the letter No 856 of June 11, 1953.
[12] Ibid, carton 10:00 508, File on manpower.
[13] Ibid, carton 10:00 508, File on manpower and 10:00 187, Card of synthesis of June 29, 1953.
[14] Ibid, carton 10:00 186, situation of the FAEO, Drives No 3151/EMIFT/1/3121 of November 1, 1953.
[15] Ibid, carton 10:00 508, File on manpower.
[16] Evolution of the Indochinese problem, 1950-1953 Salan private files.
[17] SHAT, carton 10:00 508, File on manpower.
[18] Evolution of the Indochinese problem, 1950-1953, Salan private files.
[19] SHAT, carton 10:00 186, State of the battalions in May 1953.
[20] Id., carton 10:00 186, Appendix with the letter No 1227/EMIFT/1 of June 20, 1953.
[21] Ibid, carton 10:00 508, File on manpower.
[22] H. Navarre, “The time of truths”, Paris, Plon, 1979,463 p., p. 105.
[23] Evolution of the Indochinese problem, 1950-1953, Salan private files.
[24] SHAT, carton 10:00 1061, Report No 14/T/SC of November 11, 1953.
[25] Id., carton 10:00 1062, Report No 55/1/SC/AG of November 23, 1953.
[26] Ibid, carton 10:00 1061, Survey No 291/EMIFT/B/INS of January 25, 1954.
[27] Ibid, carton 10:00 371, Report on the morale of II/2nd RTM of the 1st half of 1953.
[28] Synthesis of the reports of the BCAAM, the soldier of the ground forces, Indo-China, 1945-1954, thesis of Mr. Bodin.
[29] Mr. Bodin, “Soldiers of Indo-China, 1945-1954”, Paris, Harmattan, 1997,239 p., p. 63.
[30] B. Fall, “Diên Biên Phu, a corner of hell”, Paris, Laffont, 1968,520 p., p. 113.
[31] Ibid, p. 37.
[32] Mr. Bodin, “Soldiers of Indo-China, 1945-1954”, COp cit., p. 68.
[33] File-index of June 30, 1953 quoted by P. Rocolle, “Why Diên Biên Phu”, Paris, Flammarion, 1968,604 p., p. 103.
[34] Ibid, p. 104.
[35] SHAT, carton 10:00 186, State of the battalions in May 1953.
[36] Evolution of the Indochinese problem, 1950-1953; Salan private files.
[37] Id.
[38] Mr. Bodin, “the weaponry of the Expeditionary Corps in Indo-China and its problems”, IVe Republic vis-a-vis the problems of armament, Paris, Addim, 648 p., p. 291-308.
[39] Evolution of the Indochinese problem, 1950-1953; Salan private files.
[40] This question was treated in Mr. Bodin, “the French soldiers vis-a-vis the war of Indo-China, 1945-1954”, Paris, Harmattan, 1998,270 p. and in “Africans in the Indo-China War, 1947-1954”, Paris, Harmattan, 2000,240 p.
[41] Many testimonies gathered by the author.
[42] See in particular Mr. Bodin, “From war to another, the evolution of the state of mind of the Algerian soldiers, 1947-1956”, GMCC, No 177/1995, p. 167 to 186.
[43] P. Rocolle, Op cit., p. 104.
[44] B. Fall, “Wars of Indo-China, France 1946-1954, America 1957…”, Paris, 1970,439 p., p. 183.
[45] Mr. Bodin, “Aspects of the Franco-Chinese relations; Chinese assistance with V.M., 1947-1954”, GMCC, No 187/1997, p. 129-146, and C. Goscha, “Chinese military aid with the Vietminh (1949-1954)”, RHA, no3/2000.

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