Ambush of GM100

After Dien Bien Phu
The last Combat in Vietnam on the Monteagnard Plateau

- General Jacques Sockeel -

It may seem to the unobservant that the fighting in Indochina stopped after the loss of Dien Bien Phu. Of course, the majority of interest had left Vietnam for Geneva. But there remained with General Salan, the Commander-in-chief, the obligation to regroup his forces, should the need arise, to counter the manoeuvres of the VietMinh commander looking for other successes.

Operation Atlante had been stopped after the conquest of its first objective: Qui Nhon.

On the Montagnard Plateau of Central-Vietnam, commanded by General de Beaufort, were located 3 Mobile Groups: GM100 at AnKhe (completely isolated); GM42 and 41 at Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot. Thus dispersed, it would have been difficult for these forces to act to protect the coastal cities of Nhatrang and Phanthiet, as well as Dalat, Bien Hoa, and leaving Saigon exposed if the "cease-fire" was delayed in being signed.

The strategic interest of the Plateau caught the attention of all.

The decision of the Commander-in-Chief put in place in central Vietnam the last two important operations: "Eglantine" and "Myosotis".

Operation Eglantine: 21-30 June 1954:

The evacuation of Anhke had been decided.

Under the command of Colonel Buffin (commander, Pleiku operations) there are two Groups:

 Group East, under command of Colonel Barrou, commander of GM100, comprising of the 43rd BIC (battalion de march du 43e RIM) under command of Commander Muller; two battalions of the Korean regiment (the 1st Korea under Commander Guinard, and the 2nd Korea under Commander Kleinmann); the 2nd Group of the 10th RAC under command of Commander Arvieux; reinforced by a platoon of armour of the 5th Cuir (the “Royal Poland” Regiment); the Vietnamese battalion 520th TDKQ; the services of the Anhke post; a signals group; engineers; and medical services (under command of Commander Warme-Janville). Also at its disposal are the Banhars commandos of Captain Vitasse, and the DLB (Light Jungle Detachment); and

 Group West , under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sockeel, with GM42 comprising: the 1st, 5th, and 8th Montagnard Battalions; the 4th Vietnamese artillery group (under command of Commander Maubert); a surgical team; reinforced with 2 armour platoons – the 3/5th Cuir and the 1st ERVN - as well as of a company of engineers to rebuild the Dak-Ryunh bridge; and the GAP1 under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Romain-Defosses (consisting of 2 battalions of paratroopers: the 7th BPC under command of Commander Balbib and the 3rd BPVN under command of Commander Mollo).

They were to meet on National Route 19 at the Mang Giang Pass, in such a manner that Group West can come to the aid of the Group East leaving Ankhe to regroup at Pleiku.

Our intelligence on the enemy advised of the departure of the Vietminh regiments encircling Anhke that had blocked all access other that by air. Only light elements had been left on the spot.

This intelligence was exact but the delays caused by the aerial evacuation and the lack of discretion in the departure preparations permitted the Vietminh commander to group together 2 regiments as early as June 23 between Anhke and the post situated 22kms to the west: PK22. In preparing its ambush the VietMinh formed a very deep net spreading over more than 3kms into which GM100 was to fall on 24 June.

In was into this ambush that Group East fell after it had left Anhke at 3 o'clock on June 24 after regrouping at PK11. It had to pass the night of the 24 to 25 there, but after the intelligence furnished by the commando unit Vitasse and the observation aircraft signalling a roadblock at PK15, the commander of the Group was going to change his intention and force the pace towards PK22 and GM42 that had arrived at the Mang Giang Pass.

GM100 splits up into 4 columns, each with infantry and of artillery, moving separately along the road.

The first column leaves PK11 at 12h30 followed 10 minutes later by the second column. The third moves off in turn at 13h30, while the fourth column is delayed by the slow progression of the rearguard companies (which have been in contact with the enemy since the morning), and did not move off until 14h00 .

It is at this hour that, when the head of the column arrives at PK15, the Vietminh attack releases itself over a 3km stretch with unheard-of violence. The principal attack concerns itself with the rearguard of the 43rd BIC, the 5th battery, the 520th TDKQ, the PC, and the HQ Company (of which the radio vehicle is one of the first vehicles hit). In some minutes, over hundreds of metres, the vehicles form a continuous inferno. The Vietminh assault waves submerge the personnel of the convoy. The gunners unhook the 105mms on the road. But they are killed at their pieces. The PC of the Group is destroyed.

Despite the heroism of the 43rd BIC, the 1st and 2nd Koreans, and the support of B26, GM100 is deprived of its commanders. Colonel Barrou is wounded, Colonel Lajouane (his adjutant and commander of the Korean regiment) is killed. Without any means of liasing with the outside world, the situation is desperate. At 15h00 an enormous explosion rocks the entire column, as the munitions trucks of the engineers detonate.

At the centre of the mass of the 2 battalions, the Koreans succeed in re-establishing the position and receive at 17h15 the order of the zone QG to abandon their vehicles and to move on foot to PK22. They regroup themselves at about 19h00 for the ultimate fight. Night falls, playing to our favour, as the Vietminh cannot stop the French breakthrough. After an exhausting march south, they will succeed in reaching PK22 on the 25th. The 43rd BIC is there already, along with the commando units and isolated elements, as early as the evening of the 24th.

Anhke Is located in the centre of the plateau to the East of the Annamitie chain, which forms a balcony to the west over the plain of Quinhon. It is covered with rather scattered vegetation with some wooded massifs offering little possibilities for manoeuvre for armour and artillery. The population is not very numerous; generally Bahnars, who were of a generally hostile manner because of the proximity of the coastal zone that had been occupied for some time by the Vietminh.

Immediately after PK22 one rediscovers the Annamitie chain, that after having touched the sea at Cape Varela (with the majestic massif " Mother and Child") declines in altitude to enclose the coastal plains of Tuy Hoa and Qui Nhon, turning back to leave Kontum, to the west of Hue, to link up with the high regions of the Tonkin and China.

Route 19, narrow and twisting, with a propensity for ambushes, crosses the west of the chain at the Mang-Giang Pass where posts command the passage. The vegetation returns to jungle. The slopes then descend into Laos and the Mekong basin.

On the western edge of the massif is located a difficult passage due to the Dak Ryunk which flows into the Dak Oreng. After this is a stretch of very dense vegetation, of about ten kilometres, to Radung on the Pleiku Plateau.

During this tragedy, Group West held, as early as June 24, the approaches of Dak Ryunk with 2 Montagnard battalions of GM42, with artillery deployed. The engineers launched a bailey bridge over the Dak Oreng under the protection of the para sub-group. The commander of this Group had the intention of maintaining a reserve in this very vulnerable position, the occupation of which was indispensable to the retreat of the 2 Groups.

It is at 16h15 that he was advised of the situation of GM100 between Anhke and PK22.

It was decide to abandon Dak Ryunk to move as fast as possible to PK22 while holding strongly the Mang Giang pass, where a battalion of GM42 had already reached.

The sub-group of the 2 para battalions had arrived in the morning of the 25th, after an exhausting march of 25km in battle formation. Some 2 battalions of the GM42 held the slopes and the west of the Pass where the artillery was deployed: while GAP1 formed a large zone of protection around PK22.

The elements of Group East had already succeeded in reaching PK22 as early as the evening of the 24th. The 43rd BIC, after having destroyed its vehicles, had succeeded in clearing a way through the ambush in a successful fight: it reached the post from 18h00. The 1st and 2nd Korean battalions broke through in the evening of the 24th, having been engaged to the south; they reached PK22 in the afternoon and evening of the 25th, along with the elements of the Vietnamese battalion 520TDKQ, collected by the Koreans in their passage.

In the evening of the 25th, all of these elements were arriving in constituted units or in small isolated groups: with gunners and engineers. A total of 65% of the units of Group East arrived. They were re-supplied. Their morale was good, but they were immensely fatigued.

As we were under a clear threat of being cut off from the Mang Giang Pass, it was essential to move the mass of the Group, some 2,500 men without delay.

There could be no question of pushing further out to the East.

The commander of GM42 had fallen himself fallen into an ambush in the afternoon, during the organization the rotations of vehicles between PK22 and the Mang Giang Pass. It was proof that the enemy was hounded us closely, not wanting to let this prey escape, and wanting to hold the Montagnard Plateau of Central Vietnam before the signing of the Geneva agreements.

All afternoon small groups of Vietminh with heavy weapons emerge to attack and harass the hastily formed transportation columns, with the vehicles of Group West: combat trains, engineers, and artillery. But the security provided by the armour and a battalion of paras was very effective while the Montagnards battalions of GM42 screen the slopes of Mang Giang Pass.

In the night, the 3rd battalion of Vietnamese paras under Commander Mollo, widely spread around PK22, disperse a strong Vietminh unit at 18h00, before manoeuvring itself to withdraw on Mang Giang Pass, always in contact with enemy elements as well as with GAP1.

The position at Mang Giang was solidly held, permitting (in the morning of the next day) the commander of Group West to arrange and assemble aerial re-supply of arms, munitions and supplies. This allows the units to begin the movement on Pleiku as early as the night of the 26 to 27June.

This force was certain to have to undergo several battles, and could not consent to a race against the clock during the day of the 26th.

The movement had to be carried out over extremely uneven ground, through jungle, over a path with the numerous cuts, facing possible interception by an enemy who had access to at least 2 strong groups (with 4 battalions each), moving by way of mountain paths that had been established some time previously.

In order to complete the journey the Group had a major handicap, with heavy transports, engineers, artillery, combat trains, surgical teams and wounded; and had two days to attain the slip road at Plei Bong Yon 35km to the west, while enduring three rough battles, thanks to a very flexible plan, perfectly implemented. This march included:

 The night occupation of 2 or 3 important points by Montagnards units. This covering force departed the following day.

 In the head, a strong advance guard with capable infantry units, which had been lightened up and could manoeuvre, with an armoured element in support.

 A pivot position was held by the GAP1 occupying a solid position for the following elements.

 The PC and the artillery established in two echelons, under command of the adjutant of GM42 (Commander Cocquerel), and Captain Guigot for the artillery).

 In turn, a rearguard, protecting the Group’s wheeled vehicles, it is also able to fight with shock and movement.

This structure was adapted for the terrain, and to the fluctuations of combat, and was able to realise excellent results.

The Group was able to deploy aerial support unprecedented for the Plateau. This support was guided by the VHF truck of the PC of GM42 . This support consisted of 4 x Moranes aircraft (for reconnaissance and regulating artillery fire) based in Pleiku; the Bearcats of the Arromanches anchored in the Qui-Nhon Bay; 4 x patrol aircraft based in Nhatrang; and 7 x B26 based at Tourane; who were decisive to the coming fight.

On 27 June, at 10h00, aerial reconnaissance signals that Dak Ryunh is occupied by a solidly-entrenched Vietminh battalion. Another reconnaissance Morane locates a large ambush in the massif to the east of Dak Ryunh by a force estimated at 4 battalions.

The paras of the GAP1 occupy a point of manoeuvre, at a dangerous place 5km to the East of Dak Ryunh. There is violent combat with the Montagnard battalion advance guard. The enemy is fixed with a manoeuvre to the north by the 1st Korea battalion with the support of armour, while another battalion Montagnard manoeuvred to the south.

The Vietminh battalions retreat after an hour of combat, leaving behind 75 dead and more than 50 light and heavy weapons. A reconnaissance aircraft also spots many stretcher-bearers, carrying wounded.

During this time, successive waves of Bearcats, fighters, and B26s fire rockets and drop bombs. These attacks are complemented by artillery fire, obliging the Vietminh battalion to abandon Dak Ryunh. The GAP1 is then immediately installed there as a point of manoeuvre.

By nightfall, the ground had been cleared to allow for evacuations and resupply. The Group was mustered again, spread out, and with artillery deployed, occupied Dak Ryunh. We had lost 16 dead, 58 wounded, and 8 missing (including one officer).

Given the certainty that, the next day, the Vietminh battalion that had retreated from Dak Ryunh would return with 4 or 5 other battalions, obliged the Group Commander to issue orders to the GAP1 to leave in the night, and occupy the crossroads at Plei Bong Yon. This crossroads is dominated by three wooded hills, from which debouched Route 19, coming from Kontum 10km to the west.

The paras manoeuvre, always in combat formation, and only encounter some lookouts, beating the Vietminh units into position.

An operation takes places before the dawn of June 28, to allow the manoeuvre of the large units, and the movement of the convoy. The convoy was to deploy at a point of manoeuvre mid-way through the movement. The point of manoeuvre is a clearing of 300 metres in length that had been occupied before the beginning of the day by 2 Montagnards battalions.

It is here at noon that a large battle takes place, involving 3 battalions (the 43rd BIC and the 2 Korea battalions ), the PC, and artillery – which was already in place with well-established radio links to the air support . The attack itself is brutal, with a rare density. It lasts ninety minutes, and creates a wall of fire more than 2kms in length, with attacks, counter-attacks, and hand-to-hand combat. The 8 tubes of the 105mms fire horizontally, with their fuses set to 300m.

In the sky, bearcats, fighters, and B26s bomb and strafe with prowess, guided by the voice of the Group commander. The armour carries out counter-attacks in support of the Koreans and the “porpoises” [the nickname for the colonial artillery].

Towards the rear of the convoy, the convoy is strongly is attacked. But the engineers move forward with their bulldozers and clear 9 vehicles that had been bakooked, and clear a passage for the following rearguard column. It is now 13h30 and we are masters of the position, and the enemy suddenly retreats as quickly as they had attacked.

While the tanks and rearguard battalions sweep the ground, the march is resumed immediately by echelon towards the point of manoeuvre held by GAP1. The passage was free, and in the evening of 28 June the body of the two Groups musters in a base camp established by Group West over 21 to 22 June to the east of the Pleiku plateau.

To the honour of the returned dead - the operation is ended.

The enemy had left on the spot of the second battle more one than 100 bodies, and very important arms. We had lost 29 dead (of which 3 were sub-officers and 12 were European soldiers), 155 wounded, and 17 missing. The material lost included 10 vehicles and 2 jeeps.

It seems, in conclusion, that the enemy commander, after a very important initial success, tried to do the impossible – in preventing the return of the Group to Pleiku. But achieving this objective would have: (i) added to the French losses from Dien Bien Phu; (ii) absorbed the last reserves of Central Vietnam (10 battalions, 4 of which were European); and (iii) allowed him to developed his offensive from the Plateau to the East and South before the signing of the armistice at Geneva.

But the happy association of the Montagnard battalions – light and fluid – with the European battalions – that again proved very solid – allowed a particularly effective action.

The air support is the determining factor.

It certain that the retreat decided on by the Vietminh commander was due to these actions and to the heavy losses that had been inflicted on his units (engaged far from their bases). But the Vietminh commander had not renounced his objective; and had infiltrated other units towards the south. We were going to rediscover that the enemy was always willing to fight on ground of his own choosing.

At the beginning of July 1954, all the units that had lived through the rough moments of Operation "Eglantine" were resting back at Pleiku. Since Ankhe the sprit of sacrifice is generally revealed. But the tragedy of Caobang is always present.

We knew that on the operation had depended on:

 Massive air support; and

 The permanent need to have units that could engage themselves around points of manoeuvre, to allow the movement of heavy convoys (held to an obligatory route), to avoid total destruction in case of an attack.

We were unaware that this drama was going to renew itself and that we would also lack one of these two basic conditions - the massive aerial support. And so 2 of the 3 surviving companies of the 1st Korea battalion, 2 companies of the 8th Montagnard battalion, and the protection section of the PC of GM42 would be added to our already heavy losses.

Most of the units of GM100 (the 43rd BIC and GAP1 in particular) had returned to Saigon by air.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sockeel, commander of GM42, was lightly wounded in battle on 28 June, and is absent for some days.

Then on 11 July orders are received to re-establish the free circulation along RN14 by clearing the region of Chu Dreh, then moving to Ban Me Thuot with GM42 with artillery and armour, following the orders of the Central Plateau command. Operational orders are given for the movement of GM42, reinforced by the 1st Korea battalion and the commando units. The 2nd Korea battalion under command of Commander Kleinmann is to remain in Pleiku to assure its defence.

This operation, with the code name “Myosotis”, had to begin on 12 July 1954, with an intermediary position on RN14 at the Ea Hleo post (situated to about twenty kilometres to the south of Pleiku).

It was to the Ea Hleo post that Lieutenant Colonel Sockeel, returns in haste on the 13 July 1954. In his absence, the Group was commanded Commander Guinard, who also commanded the 1st Korea battalion.

Operation “Myosotis” – 12 to 19 July 1954

As soon as Lieutenant Colonel Sockeel reaches Ea Hleo, he informs the command of the High Plateau of the danger of the operation, and of the certainty of finding on the road through the Chu Dreh massif, a Vietminh force of at least two battalions.

He asks:

 To cancel the move to Ban Me Thuot, and to keep the Group in the Ea Hleo region to search out and destroy the enemy, without having to move along RN14 through Chu Dreh with a heavy convoy.

 For aerial support comparable to that received during Operation "Eglantine" on 27 and 28 June, to successfully force a passage through a dangerous zone.

On his arrival on 12 July at Ea Hleo Commander Guinard had in fact sent the Commando Vitasse to link up with the post at Cheo Reo nearly 25km to the East, and ordered the 1st Montagnard battalion of GM42 towards the slopes north of Chu Dreh. This battalion, under command of Captain Giovansili, is soon harshly handled by a Vietminh unit. Supported by tanks and artillery, the battalion is able, once the action is concluded, to count 60 Vietminh corpses (with their armament) and some prisoners.

The information received by reconnaissance suggests the presence of a Vietminh battalion to the north of Chu Dreh and ... "the successive passage of important enemy elements from the west between 10 and 12 July" equal to a second battalion.

The commander of the Plateau operational sector believed that there was only a single Vietminh battalion in the area, and signalled this in his order of 11 July and confirmed this order - despite the inadequate aerial support that could be given to GM42. The only aerial support that would be available was:

 From the army: observation aircraft based in Ban Me Thuot and Pleiku; and

 From the airforce: the fighters based in Nhatrang.

We could not count on the support of the Bearcats of the Arromanches or the B26 from Tourane, whose intervention had been the determining factor during Operation Eglantine.

From this time the Group commander did not want to engage the Group in the Chu Dreh Pass area, but wanted to carry out a full search of the region from the Ea Hleo manoeuvre point (where the artillery was deployed).

My analysis was set out in my message to the operational commander.

The broad savannah and the forest of the Montagnard Plateau spread themselves in a uniform manner from Kontum and Pleiku to Ban Me Thuot at an average altitude of 500 to 600 metres. Some massifs rise to 800 or 1,000 metres, along the Annamitique chain that dominates the Plateau to the East near to RN14; after to have attained 2,500 metres at the "mother and infant" massif, which then touches the sea at Cap Varella. It moves away again to enclose the coastal plains of Thuy Hoa and Quinhon; and returns to high altitudes at Mang Giang and Kontum, which dominate (to the west) the plain of Hue before rejoining the high country to the north. Chu Dreh is the one of these massifs. Ea Hleo is at the same latitude as Tuy Hoa. The post of Cheo Reo is installed to the foot of the hills west of the chain, which are not high, but are in a region of jungle.

The days of 14th, 15th, and 16th July were disappointing. The enemy has disappeared, and Chu Dreh appears empty.

The local operations of the Montagnard battalions are launched:

 To the East of Chu Dreh, the 5th Montagnard battalion commanded by battalion commander d’Astorg in liaison with the Commando Vitasse;

 To the West of Chu Dreh, the 1st Montagnard battalion could not clear the Vietminh. But with better news, a fatigue unit, commanded by Sergeant Rivier (of the protection section of GM42), detailed to collect water, instead of going to the post near Ea Hleo (where Hleo flows), accidentally drives 25kms to the south, to the bailey bridge over the Ea Truck. This unit crosses the entire danger zone, and then returns, without incident.

It was nevertheless specified, to all units, in the orders of the 17th that: " it is not necessary to repeat again the hypothesis that Chu Dreh is likely to be occupied by several Vietminh battalions, doubtless concealed more to the west but likely to intervene quickly."

In the night of 17th July, the sub-group of commander d’Astorg is inserted in the jungle plain, with the Vitasse commando providing cover, and at the end of the day had reached the slip-road at B.Hioam Cham (reaching the post at Cheo Reo). The 1st battalion departed at 3h00 to search again the slopes of Chu Dreh; it had at its centre the DLB (the light bush detachment of GM100) that after having followed RN14 immediately installs itself facing west.

This operation takes place with a large complement: 1 trucked company of the Korea battalion, an armoured platoon, the PC, the artillery, and the 8th Montagnard battalion. They were ordered to hold by dawn on the 17th a point of manoeuvre at Ea Ton to the north of the massif.

The rearguard is composed of the Korea battalion, with 2 companies, reinforced with the protection section of GM42 manoeuvring in compliance with its orders.

The night had passed, and the enemy was still untraceable despite the search to the west and the east of RN14 by the 8th and 1st Montagnard battalions of the GM42. As the day advanced, the PC and the heavy elements moved through to the centre of Chu Dreh, with the 1st Montagnard battalion moving as the advance-guard already occupying positions, ready for the future move to B.A. Rieng to the south of the massif.

It was at 10h50 that strong enemy force, which had skilfully disappeared to the west, strongly attacked in the centre, on the slopes of Chu Dreh. The 8th Montagnard battalion is involved with the support of the armour – but unfortunately along a cliff-face road - against a Vietminh battalion. The aerial support was not very important, but was sufficient, while the artillery fire from the point of manoeuvre well regulated. The Vietminh arrived and there was hand-to-hand combat, but the Vietminh withdrew after 30 minutes of combat (with heavy losses). All the personnel of the PC are involved in this battle; drivers, radiomen, secretaries ... participating in the action due to the absence of their habitual protection.

At 11h35, the situation was again well in hand. Taking advantage of this lull, the point of manoeuvre moved itself to the South of the massif, to B.A. Rieng; the armour was driving to look after the artillery, while the combat trains were protected by the rear-guard.

At 12h15, the artillery had moved through the pass, and had reached a new deployment by 12h30 to the south of the massif, to B.A. Rieng, with the 1st Montagnard battalion. The combat trains and the rear-guard followed.

It was at 12h45 that a second Vietminh battalion, reinforced by a company of heavy mortars, released a second and violent attack. It was preceded by a heavy concentration of mortar fire that sets fire to the first vehicles of the combat trains. The armour is ordered north back along the cliff-face road.

The battle develops with the rearguard, which had begun to be overrun. The Vietminh had occupied the heights, and had installed a strong base of fire.

But the sky remained empty of aircraft to regulate our artillery fire. Observation and reconnaissance aircraft had not been in the air since the first battle. From 12h15 to 13h15 the blind artillery, limited to a single Detachment Liaison and Observation ("DLO") unit, was not able to effectively intervene in the action.

The convoy of the combat trains (which consisted of more than 50 vehicles) was blocked on a twisting road, surrounded by a thick jungle, by burnt out trucks.

The Vietminh heavy company, which had not been in place at the time of the first attack, completely isolates the rear of the convoy. The artillery could not yet help Commander Guinard.

In the centre, the 8th Montagnard battalion (that was moving forward well at the time of the first attack) was obliged of retreat back to the PC with many losses: 2 companies are out of combat, 1 captain is wounded, Lieutenant Dives is killed, as is a Vietnamese officer.

A counter-attack is launched by the Group commander, which helps to release the 8th Montagnard battalion, and which tried to clear the burning vehicles from the road to allow the passage of armour. The small bridge on the Ea Ktum, where the Commander of the Group was located, became the centre of the action. It had been given as objective to the fighters. We suffered important losses, and the localized fight was of a rare violence.

Only when the first objective had been attained with the release of the 8th Montagnard Battalion, were the orders given:

 To the rearguard, now under attack by a third Vietminh battalion (which had charged from the heights of Chu Dreh), to break off the fight, to move East through the bush to the clearing at B.Blech. The sub-group d’Astorg was to move to the assistance of the rearguard.

 To the fighters from Nhatrang, which had alone supported the manoeuvres of Commander Guinard, were to destroy the 43 vehicles that had been abandoned.

But the rearguard was submerged. The fight ceases as early as 13h35, a little after the (late) arrival of a reconnaissance aircraft. The destruction of vehicles is carried out by the fighters and the artillery. With the arrival of the reconnaissance aircraft, the artillery and fighters could at last intervene with precision against the Vietminh, who were now masters of the field. This intervention also allows the retreat of some isolated elements of the 1st Korean battalion.

In the evening a linkup takes place at B. Blech between an armoured detachment coming from Ban Me Thuot, and d’Astorg’s sub-group that had left its commando units in retreat of the rearguard.

This tragic end to the battle was the consequence of a lack of sufficient aerial support, and of (especially) the absence of artillery observation aircraft. For the lack of these means, in front of important enemy forces, all manoeuvre resulted in failure.

The journey had been hard; and was not yet over. After we have sent on to Ban Me Thuot, with the armoured reinforcements, the wounded and the bodies of the Lieutenants Nha and Dives , the Group Commander hoped that the units of the Commander Guinard can rejoin him at B.Blech, as well as his own protection section.

The artillery and the armour were intact, the passage through Chu Dreh had been carried out, and the full mission had been completed. The price of the sacrifice had been high, but the road to Saigon could be defended.

At 19h00, the Group commander signals by telegram that the 2 companies of the Korea battalion were missing, along with Commander Guinard; that some survivors had escaped along the road to the north; and that twelve men had succeeded in reaching the Ea Hleo post. To the list of casualties already signalled, it was necessary to add Captain Bossard of the 8th Montagnard battalion (who was wounded); Sub-Lieutenant Shepherd (who was wounded and a prisoner); Lieutenant Tho (who was missing); 92 dead or missing Montagnards; 30 other Montagnards of the protection section of the GM; and two European sub-officers missing.

The night falls, and the Grouping is widely scattered around the clearing of B.Blech; and the Bailey bridge to 2km to the south on RN14 is solidly held.

It is at this precise moment that Captain Vitasse, who had received the order to retreat and rejoin us at B.Blech, was attacked in turn by a Vietminh battalion coming from the north. The Commando unit was obliged to disperse itself, while evacuating the grievously injured Lieutenant Ballet. It was evident from that time that the enemy was going to attempt to exploit his success, and that it would be necessary to undergo a new attack in the night or in the morning of the 18th at the latest.

At 20h50, with the arrival of Captain Vitasse and his men, the Group Commander took the decision to leave immediately the position:

 While pushing the vehicles by hand on to the road in order not to warn the enemy; and

 Then move with headlights extinguished 15km to the south to path through the areas subject to the possibility of attack.

This movement was difficult because of the general fatigued state of the men, but was needed to save the Group from certain encirclement.

Commander Guinard and Captain Guillemin testify, once they have regained Ban Me Thuot two days later, that ... "from the dawn of the 18th, the whole region of B.Blech was occupied again by Vietminh units "

At midnight the PC, the artillery, the armour, and the truck company of the 1st Korea battalion reached safety. The Montagnards battalions and other units were recovered, in turn, by rotations of all available vehicles to 5kms to the south of the Bailey bridge on the Ea Truck.

Captain Vitasse had rejoined with his 33 men, while the commando unit in 4 groups followed on foot through the bush.

By 13h00 on 18th July, the whole Group had attained the post of B.Ho, 5kms to the North of Ban Me Thuot, covering the city to the North and East.

In regard to the quote of General Vo Nguyen Giap, mentioned earlier in this narrative, one should not compare his directives of 1954 for the Montagnards plateau of central Vietnam (Tay Nguyen), and those given by General Van Tien Dung in the preparation for the Ho Chi Minh campaign in the Spring of 1975.

 In the first case, in 1954, the Vietminh High Command aimed the attack at: Ankhe, Kontum, Pleiku, before Ban Me Thuot; and

 In the second case, in 1975, it was decided to directly attack Buon Me Thuot. The city fell on 12th March 1975, opening the Ho Chi Minh campaign and the road to Saigon. This attack was going to be decisive. It is happy for the negotiators in Geneva that this point of view did not prevail in 1954.

I would want, before finishing, to excuse the rigid nature of this narrative. The account has doubtless lost its literary interest, in going without making judgement or engaging in the debate.

General Salan, Commander-in-Chief returns to Vietnam after Dien Bien Phu, to “put back the pieces”. He states in his memoirs his intention of evacuating Ankhe, and indicates that he is responsible for the decision, without spreading blame more widely. It is therefore difficult to specify responsibility, from them top to the bottom of the hierarchy, until the official documents preserved by the Army Historical Service will be opened for all.

To conclude, I wish to thank all those who lived through, or knew of these events, who have helped with completing or rectifying this account. It is difficult to describe them all without committing omissions or errors.

Throughout these pages, I have not stopped thinking with the emotion of the rare friendship of the camaraderie of battle. This is the privilege of those who have chosen "the trade of the arms".