More GM100

ANKHE (Central Annam): June 24 1954
A difficult extraction or “An ambush is announced”

“The evacuation of Ankhé had been foreseen in a directive of General Ely, that dated back to 20 May 1954, at the time of his mission to Indochina. But as of 20 June 20, it was necessary to commence its execution. It had become more delicate, but it was still necessary to realize it.” General Salan.

General Navarre, named in May 1953 Commanders-in-Chief of Indochina, had as his mission to put France in a favourable military position to engage in peace negotiations with the Vietminh.

To this effect, the Navarre Plan aimed, for the year 1953–1954:

• On one hand, to rid the Central and Southern Annam of the Vietminh threat, and to entrust the defense of the Annam to the Vietnamese forces,

• On the other hand, to recover the mobile forces for the North and the Tonkin (Operation ATLANTE – the principal effort), and

• Last, to set up a force in Dîen Bîen Phu, to the west of the Tonkin, to protect the Laos Highlands (Operation Castor – the secondary effort).

At the time of the Ankhé affair (24–25 June 1954), the entrenched camp at Diên Biên Phu was falling (May 7). The peace talks, started 26 April, will result on 21 July with the Geneva Agreements. The ceasefire will take effect, in Annam, from 3 August.

While Operation Castor and the battle of Diên Biên Phu (November 1953 – May 1954) are unfolding, the French forces engaged in Central Annam (and GM 100 in particular), were going to know an uncommon fate, in particular because of the consequences of the fall of Diên Biên Phu. The Group Mobile 100 (GM 100) was constituted from the “Korea” regiment, heir of the celebrated “Korea Battalion”. It is divided into two battalions (the 1st and 2nd) with the integration of French volunteers and the commando unit “Bergerol”. GM 100 also includes an additional “March” battalion (French-Cambodian) of the 43rd RIC, and of the 2nd artillery group of the 10th RAC.

After some months of formation, and a familiarization operation in the Anson forest, this unit of the general reserve (with 3,500 men, along with the 3rd squadron of the 5th Cuirassiers), moves with great speed to the High Plateau. The High Plateau is threatened by the Vietminh (of Interzone 5 or Lien Khu V), located to the North of Kontum, Cheo-Réo, and Song Ba. For the enemy, this area is within his reach.

The French High Command has emptied the area of its defenses. By themselves are some isolated units of the 4th Vietnamese “Montagnard” Division“ and small jungle commando units. The 11th Group Mobile (GM 11) is charged with the defence of Ankhé.

This zone is as also important to the Vietminh as it is to the French forces. It is here that will take place the combat between the eager elements of GM 100 and the excellent Vietminh regiments 803 and 108.

The Enemy:

The Vietminh are well known. On the High Plateau of the Annamite Chain, their number is estimated at twelve regular battalions and six regional units. The regiments 803 and 108 are supported by five CHU-LUKS battalions and two regional regiments. The 803rd regiment has already engaged GM100 six or seven times. The total number of enemy effectives engaged is estimated at 15,000 combatants, reinforced by 25,000 porters and stretcher-bearers.

Our intelligence service works well. Information originates from prisoners, rallied Viets, intercepts, sometimes from the population, as well as from the fine commando unit Vitasse (made up of Rhés who are comfortable in the bush, and who constitute the reconnaissance elements of GM 100). Afterwards, it can be judged that the 2nd Bureau appreciated correctly enough the position of the enemy forces and their PC, the number of the enemy force; and the likely hypotheses of the enemy’s actions.

It is the plan of the Vietminh, who already control Northern Annam, to push strongly towards the south, to control RC19, to seize Ankhé, Kontum and Pleiku, to open the road to Ban Me Thuot and Cochinchina. Their consistent method is to keep in constant contact, to mount ambushes whenever possible (in particular against road convoys), and to elude their enemy while leaving few tracks.

Colonel Barrou, commanding GM100, will talk of the “invincible and elusive 803”. The Vietminh have completed a system of tracks and paths to facilitate its concentrations and its logistical needs.

In summary, our opponent is a trained army, highly motivated, able to undergo serious losses and to walk 50 kilometers per day for several days. Strategically, for the Viet Minh, the goal is clear: it is necessary to be resolutely offensive. In his memoirs, General Nyuyen Giap writes:

“in accordance with our strategic principles – dynamism and initiative - our troops of the inter-zone V (Link Ku V) receive the order of leave only a weak force of their effectives to contain the enemy while the majority of our forces will pass to the offensive in the north of the High Plateau”.

GM 100 and Operation ATLANTE:

In mid-April, GM 100 is confronted by a succession of ambushes. It is unable to destroy at Plei Rinh its principal opponent: the Vietminh Regiment 803, which loses 3,000 men! On 9 April GM100 relieves the Vietnamese GM 11 in Ankhé, which is established as a true entrenched camp with an airfield (for Dakotas). But the post of the Deo Mang pass, situated 25 kilometers to the east, fell on 30 March. The tanks of the 5th Cuirassiers are kept in reserve in Pleiku, 55 kilometers to the west.

From 16 April (the date of the last road convoy), it must be considered that RC19 (from Pleiku – Ankhé – Qui Nhon) is cut. The liaisons and re-supply must henceforth be carried out by air. The 4th Vietnamese “Montagnards” battalion is sent by air to Ankhé. It is not anymore a question of eliminating the Vietminh forces of the Lien Ku V. It is necessary to adopt a general defensive position: “to avoid a worse position: an evacuation was precipitated” (General Salan).

In fact, after the fall of Diên Biên Phu (May 7), General Ely was replaced by General Navarre. His directive of 20 May 1954 foresees an evacuation of Ankhé. General Salan confirms the order of his commander. It is up to him to execute the decided operations: Operation “AUVERGNE” (in the Tonkin) and Operation “EGLANTINE” (for the withdrawal from Ankhé). It is up to Colonel Buffin to prepare the details.

Operation EGLANTINE:

• GM 100 was to depart Ankhé with a huge convoy and, always alone, will take the most dangerous stage of its itinerary in its move to PK 22.

• A recovery element will await GM100 at the foot of the Mang Yang pass (22 kilometers to the west). This recovery element consists of GM42 of Sockeel, the III/5th Cuirassiers of Doucet, the GAP1 of Roman-Desfossés (with the 3rd BPVN or 3rd “BAWOUAN” of Commander Mollo, which can be counted among the better parachute units, and the 7th BCCP).

• The slip-road at Dak Doa (20 kilometers to the west of the Mang Yang pass) will be held by the legionnaires and “Montagnards”.

• Air support will be furnished by the B26 from Nha Trang and by the fighter-bombers of the Arromanches in the Qui Nhon Bay to the East. Colonel Barrou, commanding GM 100, will learn the details of the operation on 15 June, when he is briefed by the air liaison officer of the Saigon general staff (EMIFT).

Five strategies for the withdrawal are studied and put before the various staffs:

• H1: to move to Qui Nhon to the Southeast. But the state of the road is such that the engineers will not have the time to repair it before the arrival of the Vietminh battalions;

• H 2: to evacuate Ankhe by air to Cheo-Reo. With 380 tons to transport, it would be necessary to abandon the heavy vehicles and certain equipment (240 trucks and a surgical station). This is an unacceptable solution for the staff in Saigon.

• H 3: to make a stand at Ankhé. But the general staff considers that GM100 is needed elsewhere. In his report, written after his captivity, Colonel Barrou, states that because of the losses foresee, the Vietminh would not have attacked Ankhé!

• H 4: to force the passage along RC19 adopting the dispositions similar to Cao Bang (in October 1950). This would involve moving rapidity (to cover 22 kilometers with the support of the artillery and aviation), and is proposed by Colonel Barrou.

• H 5: to send from Pleiku (in the west) a strong relief column (GM 20) “on foot, without vehicles and without artillery”, into the bush. It would then collect the elements of the entrenched camp. This option was judged to be too acrobatic.

The Evacuation of Ankhé:

On 19 June, Generals Salan, de Beaufort, and Buffin arrive in Ankhé. Captains Fiévet and Girard (commanding the 2nd Bureau of GM100) set out the possible actions of the enemy, as they have evaluated them:

• The Regional Regiment 120 is adjacent to RC19;

• Part of Regiment 96 is situated close to PK22;

• Major elements of Regiment 810 are some tens of kilometers to the East of Ankhé;

• Part of Regiment 108 is located in the region of the Deo Mang pass

• Regiment 803 has been restored.

In light of important and unexpected enemy reinforcements into the operational zone, a message of the PC EGLANTINE moves forward the date of the evacuation:

“The enemy is in a position to concentrate several battalions from the 25 (June) in the evening on the Ankhé - Mang Yang road. The order is given to GM100 to advance the departure to the morning of the 24th, and to reach PK22 by the evening. The personnel will move on foot, with the vehicles only serving to transport the equipment. The first stage: PK11, then GM100 will be regrouped into one force once PK22 is reached”.

It was immediately understood that the vehicles of the artillery and the engineers will considerably weigh down the march, and that this type of movement could only succeed if units are not delayed by obstacles and/or ambushes. This will happen at PK14.

Certain persons in charge show themselves skeptical: Salan himself and de Beaufort. Roman Desfosses (who commands the GAP1) looks at the map and states:

“the Viets will attack GM100 towards the PK14- PK15, it is certain! Next, they will await us to return to the Dak Ayun and close the slip road at Plei Bon!”

After leaving Ankhé on 24 June at about 03h00, the different battalions of the GM, with the BM 43rd RIC in the lead, put themselves in road. The artillery is hitched up, and the 2nd Korea closes the march as rearguard. One can imagine the long column of 240 vehicles and 12 artillery pieces, organized into four columns, stretching out over eight kilometers!

The “Montagnards” battalion halts without reason. The 2nd Korea doubles passed it and will relieve BM 43 as soon as it arrives at PK11. It is 10h30. The observation aircraft signals a serious barrier of rocks at PK15. It is foreseen, in case of a clash, that the units will proceed with a “parrot march”: the following battalion will come to support the one ahead of it. The general staff of GM100 thought that the recovery element (the tanks of the 5th Cuirassiers, GM42, the parachutists of the GAP, and the “Montagnards” battalion) will be able to rendezvous at PK22. Now, all the recovery elements are well to the west of PK22. The support of tanks, in particular, is cruelly missing.

The Ambush:

Towards noon, GM100 is taken in a gigantic ambush and attacked over a three-kilometer length (from PK12 to 15). For the whole afternoon, its units strive to contain the enemy. After a while, the artillery of the II/10 e RAC, scattered all alongside the road, arrives to cool certain zones.

Colonel Barrou, commands the battalions and all their maneuvers with brilliance, holding off repeated assaults and concentrations of fire. The “Moranes” of the GAO and the “Bearcats” of the Arromanches calm the fervors of the battalion of the 803rd that emerge at about 13h30. But, from 14h30, there rages a strong fire coming from north of the road, follow by repeated viet assaults.

Submerged, our forces are reduced to defensive islands. In the evening, the troops receive the order to destroy their equipment (trucks, artillery, radio sets) and to move to PK22 through the bush. Many will succeed. But the losses are very important (at least 500 men of the French side in a half-day battle). GM 100 does not exist anymore!

Commentary:

Fifty years after, it can seem indecent to want to extract learnings from this battle. Nevertheless, doing so allows us to reflect on the special aspects of this engagement that laid waste to a mobile group in a few hours:

• The unit action was divided between several commanders who did not agree on the manner to proceed: Barrou, Buffin, or Beaufort . One cannot say that the operation benefited from a common will;

• The choice between speed and safety was not well done and (in this case), speed and the surprise did not give advantages;

• The lack of secrecy: from observing the Ankhé airfield, the enemy knew that we were abandoning the camp;

• Deprived of its tank company, the GM could not force its way through an ambush that had been in place for several days and was carefully concealed;

• Failure to use artillery in successive deployments of grouped batteries, using their maximum firepower before launching the infantry.

“There was a deep ambition of the subordinate officers, who awaited the moment when GM100 would take on the Vietminh forces, to pay them back for their dead and wounded. Colonel Barrou was of an offensive temperament. It was anxious “get out of Ankhé”, as he felt that the defense of this position was risky”

The intelligence estimates of the enemy forces are indispensable. At the place of the ambush, the enemy had an advantage of 1 to 2 or indeed 1 to 3. Certain members of the general staff staffs correctly had estimated the correlation of forces, and had recommended the option of rapid movement (without vehicles).

• The aerial support was essential. After several ground attacks, it is likely that the retreat of the enemy at about 13h30 was largely due this support (with napalm and canon).

• We must mention the courage of the soldiers and their officers. Many officers paid the price, and were killed or wounded. This largely explains the resistance of the soldiers, and the fact that their morale never cracked. They simply wanted to participate in a victory and to destroy the Viet.

• The solution chosen requires driving momentum. It seems that this was not the case. The Vietnamese battalion stops itself and the 2nd Korea has to double passed it (the “parrot march” method brakes down). The given rendezvous to the West Group (tanks, GM42, GAP1) in the region of the Mang Yang is not honored. The door is closed to going out to GM 100.

In front of such a sum of wills and local initiatives, and in the spirit of sacrifice, it is possible to wonder how this battle could have turned out if all the actions had been coordinated and if a single commander had imposed an overall momentum, refusing the “rendezvous” at the intermediary point (PK11), while taking a fight with all means possible against the enemy.

After Diên Biên Phu, this disaster brought the Indochina war to a poor close. An “announced ambush” had been conducted by a professional and determined enemy, which justified our determination and our courage.


From the memoirs of General de Corps Billiard,
Lieutenant of the II/10 e RAC,
(engaged in the operation EGLANTINE)

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