The History of Viet-Minh Regional Battalion 303

THE BATTALION 303

The history of conflict give rise to published works that are situated at different levels: (i) politico-strategic syntheses that address themselves to the general public; (ii) the accounts of the battles that are of general interest to a circle more or less restricted to specialists; and (iii) history of the units that bring happiness to the veteran soldiers and their descendents, but which also add to the knowledge bank essential to the study of history.

The long conflict in Indochina has been approached following these three methods, and the history is enriched each year. One notices nevertheless that the public history exclusively focuses on French units and now Americans ones. Maybe the Vietnamese government has published studies or narratives on an elite division, whose success has sealed the destiny of the nation, but these works have yet to be released. And one can say, without risk of being corrected, that the units of the Vietminh guerillas of Cochinchina "in the time of the French" have never received the honor they deserve.

It is therefore interesting to bring a new light to the period of the French war, in the rise of the Vietminh of a Vietminh battalion. This battalion has been chosen, because the Vietminh regiments in Cochinchina had too fleeting an existence, and the companies changed too often to be studied. The battalion that we will follow, from its origin in 1945 to its departure for the north after the ceasefire of 1954, is supported from one end to another.

The traditional picture that is given of the war is that of peasants plowing the paddy-fields by day and transforming themselves into a combat unit at night. But the patrol falling into an ambush or the post of partisans removed by treason - was all the work of strong formation of regulars, well commanded, well trained, well disciplined, who come periodically to foil the pacification.

This is the case of the Battalion 303. The cadre of this battalion evolves in Zone 7 in the northeast of the Cochinchina, from eastern Vaïco to Cape Saint Jacques, from Baria to the source of the River Song-Be. This region is very different from the rest of South Vietnam: paddy fields between Vaïco and Federal Route No. 1; farming country around Saigon; and to the northeast is the domain of the rubber plantations (small and large), which then quickly change into large forest which buttresses the Annamatique chain. This variety of land corresponds to the diversity of the population: fundamentally Cochinchinese in the rice country; it is largely Tonkinise in the large plantations. The Vietnamese practically disappear in the forest that shelters the poor villages of the Montagnards, which are occupied by the "Moï” (the aborigines prior to the Annamese colonization).

The Bo-Doi Hoang Tho:

The Battalion 303 does not give itself this number until 1949. The Battalion originates as early as 1945 in Saigon.


1945:

After the Vietminh have taken power on 24 August, and organized large demonstrations on 2 September in Saigon, the Nambo committee organizes numerous voluntary groups that gave rise to the proclaimed independence, while grouping them together in “Chi-Doi”, regiments of variable effectiveness. The cadres for these units are militant communists, veteran tirailleurs or Gardes Indochinese, veteran Japanese auxiliaries, and members of the official youth organizations of Commander Ducoroy.

It is well to the north of Saigon, in the suburb of Govap, that Chi-Doi 13 is created. It is commanded by an individual by the name of Tieu Cai, and counted about 200 men. After the relief of the capital by British and French troops, on 12 October, it retreats to Bien Hoa with the Nambo committee. Then, following a British push on this city, on October 24, it withdraws to Tan Uyen (an important center on right bank of the Dong Nai River). At the end of January 1946, operations to relieve Nha Trang and Southern-Annam begin, and the Group Pontchardier (composed of the SAS paratroopers and the marine fusiliers) moves up the Dong Nai River, starting from Bien Hoa, and takes Tan Uyen on 25 January after ten-hours of street fighting. The city was bitterly defended by several units of Chi-Doi 13.

In the general break-up of Vietminh formations following the attacks by General Leclerc, the Chi-Doi 13, then commanded by Dang Van Thinh, regroups in the Govap region, while carrying out the occasion attack against Saigon and Tan Son Nhut. One element, Phan-Doi 10, is nevertheless detached to remain at the disposal of the Nambo committee.

The Phan-Doi 10 is equivalent to a section of about thirty men, structured into two combat groups. It is commanded, according to Nambo, by Hoang Tho. He is a veteran chief scout of the catholic militia of Saigon, with a strong and dynamic personality, authoritarian, faithful to his cause, and a convinced nationalist. He was noticed by Nguyen Binh, the new military commissioner of the Nambo committee, who often calls on Phan-Doi 10 to act as his bodyguard. Tho had then as his adjutant Hoang Truong (his real name is Trinh Van Bach).

1946:

After the signature of the modus vivendi (March 6 1946) Nguyen Binh reorganizes the Nambo bands and develops as early as the end of March a campaign of terrorism to regain the population through the suppression of the notables and the “viêt-gain” (traitors). In June it is decided to resume the offensive against the French through multiple ambushes and coup-de-main attacks. Phan-Doi 10 with Hoang Tho participates in these two types of action, receiving its missions directly from the Nambo military commissars and the commander of the recently created “Zone 7”.

In a note of 5 October 1946, Nguyen Binh authorizes Hoang Tho, to form a Dai-Doi (a company) with the elements taken from Chi-Doi 13, a new unit constituted from Phan-Doi 10, which carries the name “the Tay Ninh Mobile Dai-Doi”. Indeed, for concealment purposes, the unit also carries the names: Dai-Doi 52 and Chi-Doi57, the Mobile Commando no. 1, and the Bo-Doi Hoang Tho. The preferred zone of action is in the region of Go-Da-Ha and Trang-Bang.

After two missions, the Bo-Doi Hoang Tho take over as guards of the CP of Nguyen Binh (who wants to curb the ambitions of the bands of anarchists and the sects). On 13 November 1946, Nguyen Binh, circumvented by Nguyen Van Sau, second-in-command of Chu-Doi 4 (Binh-Xuyen) who played doubles game, decides to stop Bui Huu Phiet (commanding Chi-Doi 25, the other Binh-Xuyen regiment). Several nationalist commanders meet at the Hiep Hoa sugar refinery in eastern Vaïco. At his CP in the Binh Hoa pagoda, some kilometers to the south, Hoang Tho and his Bo-Doi are sent to arrest them. It is at this time that Sau and two Cao-Daïstes choose to assassinate Nguyen Binh. Nguyen Binh is wounded in the left shoulder and leg. Alerted by the firing, Hoang Tho returns to the pagoda and evacuates the Nambo commander to the hospital of the Zone 7, close to Tan Uyen. Nguyen Binh is operated on by Doctor Huong, and recovers quickly.

After this incident, the Bo-Doi Hoang Tho launches several coup-de-main attacks against convoys. In November, they move to Truong Mit, a small locality 20 km to the north of Go-Dau-Ha, and attack a re-supply convoy in the Cau-Khoi plantation. This operation did not achieve anything heroic, as the target is purely civilian, but it made it possible for Hoang Tho to seize several million piastres intended to pay the plantation laborers. It also enables Hoang Tho to make "gifts" to the Nambo Chi-Doi, with Chi-Doi 6 (in the zone in which the operation takes place) accepted for its part 200,000 piastres. The recipients of these gifts offer in exchange some weapons to the valiant commando.

In December 1946, the Bo-Doi has increased the number of effectives, and was structured into three combat groups with 3 LMG, 4 SMG, and 25 rifles. Hoang Tho had Tran Van Thanh for his adjutant and Hoang Bach for his political commissar; as Hoang Truong had left for a training course.

The Nambo always had the greatest difficulties with its fellow travelers of the National Front – the Hoa-Hoa, Binh-Xuyen, Cao-Daïtes – who the French command seek to detach from the rebellion. In November, the Cao-Daïtes rally to the French, and reinstall the sect’s Pope in Tay Ninh after he is brought back from exile in the Comoros. Nguyen Binh decides to attack the Holy See at Tay Ninh to punish them.

The operation took place on 30 December 1946, commanded by Huynh Kim Truong, former commander of Chi-Doi 1 of Thudaumôt, who had become chief of staff of Zone 7 under the pseudonym Truong Thanh Trung. The Bo-Doi Hoang Tho participate in the operation alongside Bo-Doi Hai Ngoai (the overseas commando unit), which was created in Thailand and is largely composed of deserters of the 5th RAC, commanded by Ngo That Son (a former professor). Their attack was violent and causes losses to the Cao-Daïstes, but fails. It results in closer cooperation between the sect and the French command in military matters. Hoang Tho returns to his favorite type of combat, but remains based in the region of Trang-Bang, although he widens his sphere of activity to the east of the Saigon River.

1947:

On 4 February 1947, the Bo-Doi Hoang Tho attacks a Michelin road convoy, escorted by the military, some kilometers to the south of the Dau Tieng plantation, between Duong-Lang and Ben-Suc, and recovers without loss 1 x LMG, 1 x SMG and 3 rifles.

On 1st May Chi-Doi 1 attacks two trucks in the Minh-Thanh plantation, that had returned from Chon-Thanhm carrying three combat groups of the 11/4th RAC. This episode caused some losses to the French, but Chi-Doi 1 does not recover anything. Hoang Tho decided not to repeat this episode. On 7 May, he establishes himself on the Chon-Thanh - Minh-Thanh road, 5km from Chon-Thanh with elements of Dai-Doi 3 of Chi-Doi 1. At 17h30 they attack a plantation truck escorted by two scout cars of the 5th Cuirassiers (Lieutenant Bocquillon) and a group of partisans of the 2nd Battalion de Marche de Cochinchina. The escort reacts without letting itself be over-run, and reinforcements arrive at 20h00 obliging Hoang Tho to retreat, taking with him 1 x Japanese LMG, 1 x Sten SMG and 7 x rifles take from the partisans, leaving behind him the bodies of eight of his men, three of the Cuirassiers, four of the partisans and 11 of the coolies and women from the plantation. One scout car is destroyed.

On 21 May 1947, there is continuing cooperation with Dai-Doi 3 of Chi-Doi 1 (commanded by Nguyen Van Ngo, a.k.a “Quy”), and Hoang Tho mounts in concert with Quy an attack on a small post at Pho Binh, established to prevent sabotage of the Ben-Suc road by the population. Dai-Doi 3, with a cadre of workers, sets fire to some houses, which draws out the garrison. This fit into the plans of Hoang Tho, and the French fall into Hoang Tho’s ambush 1km to the south of the post. The Vietminh inflict 3 dead (including the sub-officer commanding the patrol), 2 wounded and recover 1 x LMG.

The Bo-Doi can now count, in June, five combat groups, and now has 5 x LMG, 10 x SMG, and about twenty rifles.

Returning to the right bank of the Saigon River, Hoang Tho launches several ambushes on the roads. From 16 July to 15 August, they have two engagements in the Tay-Ninh region and the Gia Dinh province, and recover 1 x LMG, 1 SMG, and 1 x rifle.

The techniques of Hoang Tho are to the point. He decided that he would next attack the self-defense post at Thoi-Hoa, on RF13 between Thudaumot and Ben-Cat, with two Dai-Doi of Chi-Doi 6. The attack takes place on 19 August 1947, the anniversary of the Vietminh taking power. At about 11h00, a legionnaire deserter presents himself at the post, requesting entry. As soon as the gate is opened, the Bo-Doi attack and slaughter the partisans and notables (13 dead, 7 wounded), seizing 16 x rifles. They then burn the post.

In the evening, the French launch (as Hoang Tho had anticipated) a pursuit operation, with the commandos of the 2nd Battalion de Marche de Cochinchine. As night falls, the commandos find the tracks of Hoang Tho‘s men, crossing the Thi-Tinh creek. At dawn on the 20th, the commandos again take up the pursuit, pass through the Anson forest, and march directly into Hong Tho’s trap. At An-Thanh-Thon, Hoang Tho ambushes the French-Cambodian commandos, pinning them down with fire in the paddy-fields and then destroying the unit. The ambush kills 45 men (including one Lieutenant and 4 European sub-officers), captures 25 prisoners (including 1 European), and recovers 5 x LMG, 15 x SMG, 46 x rifles, 2 x revolvers, and 2 x Japanese mortars. Only one French soldier and 17 partisans succeeded in escaping.

But Hoang Tho did not recover all the weapons lost by the French. After the Bodoi withdraw, the inhabitants of An-Thabh collect from the rice-fields 2 Bren LMG, and give them to Quy, the commander of Dai-Doi 3 Chi-Doi 1, who had authority over the village. Having learned of this, Tho claims the two weapons from Quy, but Quy refuses to give them to him.

Hoang Tho then surrounds the cantonment of Dao-Doi 3 in Rach Kien, and fires some mortar shells into it. Very quickly Quy negotiates, and proposed to put the case before of the commander of Zone 7. Nguyen Binh decides that the two weapons in question are to be assigned to the zone’s military-political school. Hoang Tho accepts the compromise, but requires that the butts of both weapons be inscribed with the statement “Recovered by the Hoang Tho mobile commando". Thereafter, all the weapons recovered by the Bo-Doi carry this inscription.

For his exploits on 20 August, Hoang Tho is decorated on 26 September with the Military Medal 1st Class.

On 11 September 1947, Hoang Thoa was again on the left bank of the Saigon River. He mounts an ambush at Bung-Cong, on the road from Dau-Tieng to Ben-Cat, and destroys a patrol of 2 jeeps of the SAS paratroopers, and recovers 2 machine-guns.

Hoang Thoa had another project. With his weapons he could equip two full companies (Dai-Doi). With the veteran Bo-Doi, he would structure the first Dai-Doi, which was given the number 19 (for unknown reasons), with Commander Thao, Adjutant Tran Tien Sang, and for political commissar Pham. But to structure the second Dai-Doi, it was necessary to find men. In the night of 16 September, Dai-Doi 19 encircles the villages of V8 and V14, in the Michelin plantation of Dau Tieng and abducts 450 coolies (men and women). From these, he chooses 80 young men, suited to battle, and returns the remainder to Nai-Son, a veteran overseeing the Dau-Tieng plantation, who becomes president of the "Rubber Union" zone 7. Tho also receives, at the same time, reinforcements to act as cadres for the new recruits.

Once again Nguyen Binh gives Tho satisfaction. On his orders, Lien Quan-C, the territorial military entity covering Gia-Dinh and Tay-Ninh, sent on 6 November, hundreds of combatants to Tho from different units. This amalgam gives rise to Dai-Doi 20 under the command of Phan Trong Pho, with Dang Van Ky as political commissar (an outgoing Tonkinise, and student of political-military training courses, but also a veteran team leader of Phan-Doi 10). Hoang Tho carried out its training and also took care of its moral formation. Each month, every month, he institutes a day of fasting to harden their bodies and to adjust them to the economy. On 8th December, the Bo-Doi combatants decide to give 50 piastres to help the disaster victims in Binh-Xuyen, Chau-Ddoc, area.

It is with these two companies, that the "Bo-Doi Luu Dong" receives the order to go in the Baria region. Nguyen Binh is concerned about the situation in this province, where Chi-Doi 16 of Huyh Cong Dao (a non-communist) seems ready to rally to the Emperor Bao-Dai, and where the Chi-Doi 2 and 7 (originally Binh-Xuyen), had undergone heavy losses following operations of the 22nd RIC.

1948:

On its way, crossing Zone D, the Bo-Doi had to react to an unexpected event on 11th January 1948, with the launching of the airborne operation "Têta". This operation is aimed at the CP of Zone 7 in the triangle Tan-Tich, My-Loc, and Ta-Nap, to the east of Tan-Uyen. In its counter-attack, Hoang-Tho recovers 1 x Thompson SMG and 8 x rifles. During the night, they also recover some 200 parachutes left in the rice-fields by the 2nd BCCP. Proud of this catch, the soldiers of Hoang Tho wear for some time scarves made out of parachute silk.

Moving to the south, the Bo-Doi - guided by a section (Trung-Doi) of the Chi-Doi 10 - but on 6 February collides with a French patrol from the Phuoc Thien post. A battle takes place between Phuoc-Lai, which costs the Vietminh 5 dead and 1 wounded, but they recover a British rifle. The Bo-Doi arrive, on 13 February, in the Baria region.

Hunted on the Plain of Reeds by Operation Vega, on 15 February Nguyen Binh moves to Zone D, and is anxious about the progress of the pacification of Cochinchina. He orders Zone 7 to intensify its attacks against the French communications. Thus Chi-Doi 10 attack on 1st March attacks and annihilates the Dalat convoy. Hoang Tho seeks favorable occasions in his new zone of action.

On 29 March, at 07h00, under Hoang Tho’s orders, the guerillas (Quoc-Ve-Doi) of Baria and the Chi-Doi 7, attack at Long-Hai a convoy of 5 trucks of the center of instruction of Nuoc-Ngot, escorted to Baria by 2 armoured cars of the 5th Cuirassiers (Lieutenant Malin) and a section of Garde Indochinese. One armoured car is neutralized by mines. But a relief column arrives quickly from Baria, with two additional armoured cars and two sections of the 11/22e RIC. The relief column relieves the convoy (which has 2 trucks burnt). The French have 4 dead, 7 wounded, and 2 missing. The Bo-Doi, for their part, mark the death of Tran Vant Tanh, adjutant to Hoang Tho, and have nine seriously wounded. They recover a machinegun (from the destroyed armoured car), and 2 (according to French) or 8 (according to the Vietminh) rifles. Tanh will be replaced by Hoang Gia Nhi, veteran commander of the Ban-Cong-Tac (action committee) of Saigon-Cholon. At the same time, Hoang Truong, veteran of Phan-Doi 10, returns as the political commissar.

On 18th May there is a new convoy attack, a little more to the north, between the Courtenay plantation and Baria. The Vietminh recover 4 x SMG, 6 rifles, and a radio transmitter.

Nguyen Binh has become exasperated with the attitude of the sects. The Cao-Daïstes, then the Hao-Hao have rallied to the French. One year previously, the Binh-Xuyen had broken with Nambo, and were looking at rallying. Nguyen Binh wrote to Bay Vien, their commander, inviting him to come in Plain of Reeds to receive the command of Zone 7.

Bay Vien leaves his fief of Rung-Sat, to the South of Saigon, on May 20 with an escort of 200 men. During this time, Nguyen Binh, with the complicity of one of Bay Vien’s lieutenants, attacks Rung Sat by all the Vietminh units established in the area. The Bo-Doi Hoang Tho abandons the Baria region of participate in this expedition, until the end of May. The operation accomplished the disarmament of 5 Binh-Xuyen Chi-Doi, and recovers the weapons and food depots from the Binh-Xuyen. However, Bay Vien escapes the arrest that the awaited him, and takes refuge on June 10 at Binh-Hoa (in Eastern Vaïco), and rallied with his staff on June 16 to the commander of the 2nd Bureau of Cochinchine (Commander Savani).

During the rainy season, the Bo-Doi returned in its zone of action of the previous year, between Trang-Bang and the Saigon River. As of July 10, a part of this force takes part, with the Tien-Doan 306, in an attack on the Dau-Tieng convoy, between the plantation and Ben-Suc. This attack damages 2 armoured cars of the 2nd Moroccan Spahis, sets on fire 6 trucks, and recovers ten weapons. On July 20, a detachment of the Bo-Doi reinforces the Ban-Cong-Tac No.5 (The No.5 action committee), harasses the post at the Ba-Queo crossroads (at Gia-Dinh) with mortar fire. The same elements on August 10 run up against a French patrol on the road between Ba-Queo and Ba-Diem and lose 2 men and several weapons.

On 19 August, the Vietminh celebrate national independence. In a message of August 26, the executive committee of Nambo announced that they have decided on this occasion to reward the units of the Zone 7, which Huynh Van Nghe had just taken command of (Nguyen Binh is military commander of Nambo). A credit of 65,000 piastres was opened to this effect, and the Bo-Doi Hoang Tho receives 1,000. He has some 230 effectives, of which 120 are combatants and 110 are support personnel.

Given the process of the pacification, and the improvement of the circulation of the French troops, thanks to the placement of posts on the routes prescribed by General La Tour, Nambo orders regular units to resume the initiative. Hoang Tho is entrusted with the plantation area to the north of Thudamot. The Tieu-Dian 903 of Trung-Doan 301 (formerly Dai-Doi 3 Chi-Doi 1, which was commanded by Quy) was put at the disposal of Hoang Tho at the end of the year.

1949:

On 19 October, Hoang Tho attacks the Minh-Thanh – Dau-Tieng convoy with his own means. The attack is a failure; it does not recover anything, and the commander of Dai-Doi 20 (Phan Trong Pho) is killed in the action.

Reinforced by the Tien-Doan 903, during the night of 5 to 6 January 1949, Hoang Tho encircles the villages V16 and V22) in Dau-Tieng and takes 163 coolies. On 25 January 1949, he burns 10 hectares of the town V52. He then moves his sphere of activity towards Honquan. On 22 March, he attacks 3 trucks of the Xacat plantation with mines on the road between Xacat and Candam, and recovers 3 British rifles. In May, he succeeds in penetrating the infirmary of the village of Xaco2 plantation (in Quan-Loi), and recovers several weapons and a post radio.

After the rallying of Bay Vien, the commander of Nambo, had amalgamated (after having “purified” them), the Chi-Doi 4 and 5 (which were originally Binh Xuyen) to form the Bo-Doi Chu-Luc Nambo (“the regular Nambo commando”). This unit was officially formed on 23 November 1948 on the Plain of Reeds. In March 1949 one of its two Dai-Doi is sent to Cambodia to follow the Tieu Doan Pocumbo. Nguyen Binh wanted to restructure his regular Chi-Doi units into “Trung Doan” (Regiments) and “Tieu Doan” (Battalions) of the type already in operation in the Tonkin.

It was decided in May 1949 to transform the Hoang Tho commando into a Trung Doan, by amalgamating the Dai-Doi of the remainder of the Bo-Doi Chu-Luc Nambo and another Dai-Doi (Dai-Doi 209) of the Plain of Reeds.

The Regular Regiment of Zone 7:

The “Bo-Doi Luu-Dong Hoang Tho” became in May 1949 the “Trung-Doan Ch-Luc Luu Dong Khu” (“The Regular Mobile Regiment of Zone 7”), and takes the name “The Bo-Doi 303”, which was reproduced on the official seals.

This number 303 was used until the end of the war, and is adopted by its combatants.

The order of battle of the new regiment was as follows, but the terms “Dai-Doi” was still used, as the soldiers were not yet permitted to talk about a Tieu-Doan (battalion).

Battalion 303:
Commander: Hoang Tho
Adjutant: Nguyen Van Quang
Political Commissar: Tran Dinh Cuu
Chief of Staff: Luc Si Ho

Dai-Doi 2719 (Originally Bo-Doi Hoang Tho)
Commander: Doan Duy Ngoi
Adjutant: Tran Tien Sanh
Political Commissar: Dang Van Ky

Dai-Doi 2720 (Originally Dai-Doi 309)
Commander: Nguyen Huynh Ngan
Adjutant: Tran Van Cham
Political Commissar: Le Thanh Nhan

Dai-Doi 2721 (Originally Bo-Doi Chu-Luc Nambo)
Commander: Dinh Van Sang
Political Commissar: Hoang Bac Phong

Dai-Doi 2723 (Administrative)
Commander: Ho Huu Duc
Political Commissar: Do Van Lai

The new organization “enters into the mould” of Bo-Doi Hoang Tho, but the new structure does not please the very independent Hoang Tho. Hoang Tho’s previous adjutant, Hoang Gia Nhi, is named military commander of the Song-Be delegation – a territorial function in a region that is both difficult and unhealthy. Hoang Gia Nhi is replaced by Nguyen Van Quang, previously adjutant of the Bien-Hoa Chi-Doi. Hoang Tho’s political commissar, Hoang Truong, his companion from the beginning, is named political commissar for the military command of the Bien-Hoa province, and is replaced by Tran Dinh Cuu, a veteran instructor at the Political-Military school of Zone 7, then the Dai-Doi cadre school.

Hoang Tho was given, as a chief of staff, Luc Si Ho, who came from the staff of Zone 7; and who is a native of Thudaumot. Luc Si Ho is a child reared by the army school of Cape Saint Jacques, and had been a veteran chief sergeant of the 73rd Indochinese Engineering Battalion, before passing over to the rebellion in October 1946. With the exception of Do Van Lai, a veteran secretary of administration from Saigon, all the political commissars were from north or central Vietnam:

• Dang Van Ky, was born in 1923, was an embroiderer originating in the province of Ha Dong (Tonkin), joining Chi-Doi 13 in 1945;

• Le Thanh Nhan, was born in 1924 in Thua-Thien (Annam) a veteran political secretary and bicycle repairer, who had been a militant trade unionist and a journalist for the Newspaper “Cam Tu”, before joining the rebellion in January1948; and

• Hoang Bac Phong, was born in 1925, close to Nam Dinh (Tonkin), who had been a sailor.

All three had a good primary education, elementary school for the first, and higher education for the two others.

Concurrently with this restructuring, the Nambo set up within the military formations a communist party organization which makes the control of the units by the party more effective. Previously the political commissar is subordinated to the commander, but from now on they will be integrated into a parallel hierarchy.

There is now in each Trung-Doi(Section) a “Tô” (cell) with a cell commander who is the section political commissar. Within each Dai-Doi and Chi-Bo there is a branch or group of cells directed by a Chi-Uy (Director), with a “Special Secretary” (or Bi-Tho) who is the political commissar of the Dai-Doi. In each Trung-Doan, later in each Tieu-Doan, there is a “Lien-Chi” (inter-branch), with a Lien-Chi-Uy (an inter-branch director) and a “Special secretary” who is political commissar of the Trung-Doan.

Immediately after its formation, the new Regiment is sent to Phu-My in the Baria Province to train for three months in “Nui”(in the mountains). On June 7 1949 there is a large reunion of the cadres to prepare the instruction and maneuvers, which were carried out in an intensive manner. At the end of this period, Bo-Doi 303 leaves Phu-My and moves to a bivouac in Binh My, 10km Northwest of Tan-Uyen, at the western edge of Zone D, close to the Zone CP. Once there, Hoang Tho is summoned by Nguyen Binh, to receive new orders.

What were the reasons invoked and the deeper reasons for these new orders? The sudden movements of this nationalist commander, his open hostility to the Communist Party, and the need to control the good quality units, were certainly not foreign to the decision of the one-eyed chief (Nguyen Binh).

Hoang Tho is assigned to the staff of Nambo in Zone 8, and put in charge with the organization of supply transport. One day, having drunk more than was reasonable, he destroyed the furniture of his office and set fire to it. He was arrested, had his head shaved, and was imprisoned in Zone 9 (the province of Rach Gia) close to Camau. He is not spoken of any more. Thus, the history of a hero of independence ends. Hoang Tho is venerated by his subordinates, haloed as a legend of glory in all Zone 7, generates jealousy as a favorite of Nguyen Binh, and has his exploits inflated by propaganda.

Hoang Tho’s subordinate, Nguyen Van Quang, succeeds him. In a decision of Zone 7, dated 20 November 1949, confirms to the post of Trung-Doan commander. For an adjutant, he is given Le Van Ngoc, who came from the military command of the Baria province. Ngoc was a native of the Bien Hoa suburbs (born in 1913) and (like Quang) a veteran commander of a Dai-Doi of Chi-Doi 10.

Nguyen Van Quang inaugurates his command, and the cantonment newly assigned to the Bo-Doi 303 at Binh My in a ceremony of "launching the troops", in the presence of Nghe, on 16 September 1949.

The concentration of the CP of the Zone, the Trung-Doan and a number of other organizations close to Binh My was not ignored for long by the French command, which unleashes an operation against this position on 10 and 11 November. The 303 oppose the attack with suppleness.

On 21 October, Quang meets with all his cadres, and wants them to become students, to improve the capability of the Bo-Doi, in political, administrative, and military matters. He decides to create a number of training courses:

• A course to improve the Group Commanders (from 1 to 30 November 1949), for the cadres “Tieu-Doi” who are weak in political knowledge.

• A course to improve the section cadres (from 1 to 31 December 1949), with a meeting of 8 political commissars of Trung-Doi, 8 sub-commanders of Trung-Doi and 32 commanders.

• Formation training for group sub-commanders (from 1 November to 31 January 1949) to which one every group had to send two men and every service a man.

• Formation training of soldiers and capable agents to assure their permanence (from 1 November 1949 to November 13 1950).

• Three administrative courses: typing, operating printing presses, engraving, and accounting (from 1st November to the 31 January)

This systematic training probably had Luc Si Ho, the chief of staff, applying what he had learnt in the French army.

On 10 December, the French unleash a large-scale operation against Zone D (“Operation Desire”). The operation was carried out from the north to south. The Bo-Doi 303 carries out a counter-attack at Xom-Sinh on the 11th that allows it to recover a MAS SMG and 1 x rifle. At the time the operation ends on the 16th, an action is mounted with coordinated harassment with inter-regiment 301/310, but without result.

1950:

By a decision notified on 16 January 1950, Bo-Doi 303 officially took the name “Trung-Doan” as of 21 December 1949. Thus the expression Bo-Doi (“commando”) dear to the combatants of the first hour, disappears. But the usage prevails for a long time with the soldiers of the Trung-Doan Chu-Luc of Zone 7, who call themselves "The Combatants of the Bo-Doi 303”.

The reorganization by Nguyen Binh, as the Commander-in-chief of the Nambo establishes by December 15 regular battalions (the term "Trung-Doan" does fool people).

The Nambo then passes into a serious economic and financial crisis caused by the continuation of the blockade of the Transbassac organized by General La Tour. Nguyen Binh decides, or receives orders from Tong-Do, to take the offensive, passing from the guerilla phase to the war of movement through the engagement of his regular battalions. He exercises his principal effort in the Travinh region, through massive attacks, and orders Zone 7 to carry out diversionary attacks.

To this end, Trung Doan 303 mounts an attack of the Ban-Me-Thuot convoy. This takes place on 3 January 1950 on the road section Phuo-Choa, dong-Xai, about ten kilometers from Phuo-Choa, in the paddy fields of Nuoc-Vang. It is only a half success: only 7 trucks, for the many mines laid, are destroyed. At a price of two dead and two wounded, the Trung-Doan recovers clothing and supplies, and take one prisoner (Lieutenant Leccia, of the Supply Corps).

Some days later, the Trung Doan receives a visit by a delegation of the central government.

Then, for a long time, the CP of Zone 7 and Bo-Doi 303 are established in a camp at Choi-Dung on the eastern shore of the Suoi-Gang, 2km to the northeast of Binh My. On 7 February, the French unleash Operation Trotinette against Zone D, a vast zone between Dong-Nai to the south, the Song-Be to the north, and Suoi-Thout to the West. The French do not leave the ground until the 14th, after they have destroyed completely the VM cantonments. The CP of the Zone and the Bo-Doi 303 escape destruction. But they are humiliated by having to leave the ground to their French masters for so long. Nguyen Van Dong, commanding Zone 7, therefore orders the execution of Lieutenant Leccia, who is suffering from the continuous movements imposed on him. The prisoner was "shot" on 10 February at the camp of Choi-Dung.

On the orders of Nguyen-Binh, who had directed that attacks be made wherever it was possible (to support the return of his offensive in the region of Travinh), Nguyen Van Quang decides to first attack the An-Binh post between Phuo-Choa and Dong-Xoai. But the reconnaissance element of Dai-Doi 2720 is pinned down on 28 January 1950 by a patrol of the 2/3rd RTA to the southeast of the post. Quang temporarily retreats, but the attack takes place on 21 March. For the Bo-Doi, the attack is a painful failure, and causes the loss of more than 40 soldiers, dead and wounded. The morale of the cadres and soldiers is seriously reduced.

Quang searches for ways of increasing the number of operations. On 31 March, it participates in an attack of the Dalat convoy on Route 20. The results are not significant; and Ho-Kim-Long (section commander of Dai-Doi 2719) is killed. On 12 April, it returns to attack the Tan-Uyen post. It is a total failure, and Ngo-So, (section commander of the Dai-Doi 2720) is killed. The mood of the troops is at rock bottom. For the first time, the Bo-Doi 303, this elite unit, records the desertion of a cadre. Cau-Van-Hieu, section commander of Dai-Doi 2719 deserts to the French on 16 April. A new, and poorly-prepared, attack against the Ban-Me-Thuot convoy is launched on 2nd May, without result.

It was necessary to do something to take the Bo-Doi in hand and interrupt the series of unsuccessful attacks. A reinforcement draft of about thirty soldiers originating from inter-regiment 301/310 is assigned to the Trung-Doan 303, on 8th May. With the agreement of the Zone, Quang launches a long march (baptized "Trung-Chinh"); from 14th May to 10th June. The regular mobile regiment of Zone 7 travels some 800km without leaving the zone, harassing the posts and truck convoys in their passage. On 20th June, as the monsoon season begins, a last attack is launched against the Dalat convoy (on Route 20).

The Bo-Doi are not alone in having failed; everywhere the offensive of Nguyen-Binh had been broken. This is due to the lack of armaments and munitions, and also by the continuation of the counter-attacks of General Chanson, which follows the Vietminh battalions even into their refuges with difficult access. Nguyen Binh decides to take advantage of the monsoon season to recover the consequences of his failure. He decides to reorganize, to “purify” the cadres, to improve the teaching methods, and to re-launch the fight.

Battalion 303 of Regiment Dong-Nai:

A new reorganization is carried out, centered on the formation of regulars and regionals into four Trung-Doan (regiments) in Zone 7. On 19th August 1950, Tran-Van-Tra, commanding Zone 7, meets with the military commander of the province at Dong Ken (the Chon-Ba-Den commune, in the Tay-Ninh province). There it is announced that the Trong-Doan Chu-Luc Dong-Nai will be created, with Tran-Dinh-Xu (a central Vietnamese) at his head. Previously, he had commanded the inter-regiment 306/312 in the Tay-Ninh province, with Nguyen-Chi-Sinh, as his adjutant and Nguyen-Viet-Hong as his political commissar.

The regiment is structured into a support battalion, three infantry battalions, and an administrative battalion. The classification of the Tieu-Doan (battalion) was structured around the number 303, which had been preserved since the time of the veteran Bo-Doi Hoang-Tho. The numbers used are:

• Tieu-Doan 301(heavy weapons);
• Tieu-Doan 302, 303, 305 (infantry); and
• Tieu-Doan 305 (administrative).

The Tieu-Doan 302 is provided by the inter-regiment 301/310 (Thudaumot and Bien-Hoa provinces), and the Tieu-Doan 304 from inter-regiment 306/312 (Giadinh and Tay-Minh provinces).

In Tieu-Doan 303, Nguyen-Van-Quang and Luc-Si-Ho are blamed for the previous failures, and are transferred: one to general staff of Zone 9, the other to the Nambo. Quang is replaced as battalion commander by Nguyen-Trong-Nghia from Trung-Doan 311; but is transferred two months later to take the command of Tieu-Doan 304. Therefore, from October 1950, the command committee of Tieu-Doan 303 becomes:

• Commander: Le-Van-Ngoc (the veteran adjutant)
• Adjutant: Duong-Can-Minh (from inter-regiment 306/312)
• Political Commissar: Tran-Dinh-Cuu

The supervision of the Dai-Doi has changed somewhat since May 1949. Doan-Duy-Ngoi, the Tonkinois veteran of Chi-Doi13 moves over to Dai-Doi 2721; and is replaced in Dai-Doi 2719 in December 1949 by his adjutant Tran-Tien-Sanh, who has Doan-Honh-Hai as his adjutant and Le-Than-Nhanh from Dai-Doi 2720 as his political commissar. Dan-Van-Ky, who had left for the Nambo for political training from August 1949 to June 1950, returned and was placed in the battalion cell under Tran-Dinh-Cuu. In Dai-Doi 2720, Nguyen-Huyn-Hngan was transferred to the Nambo and was replaced by Ngoi, and then by Tran-Nam-Son. Nhanh succeeded, in July 1949, by Pham-Khanh-My, a veteran tonkinois functionary of the Bencat agricultural school. Adjutant Tran-Van-Cham, a tonkinois veteran of the marine police, does not move. In Dai-Doi 2721, Dinh-Van-Sang, is killed in June 1950 in Xom-Sinh, and is replaced on 17th June by Doan-Hong-Hai; while Hong-Bac-Phong remains in place. There are no changes to the Dai-Doi 2723.

The reorganization ends in August 1950, and after a brief period of instruction, Nguyen Binh orders, in September 1950, the launching of a violent offensive in the 3 zones. The offensive is called "High Waters" (and takes place at the end of the monsoon season). The new effort will take place in the Travinh province, and also in Zone 7 where, from October 7 to November 15, the Trung-Doan Dong-Nai will launch hard attacks on the French forces.

This offensive is known to the French as "the Bencat campaign" and to the Vietminh as "the campaign Le-Danh-Cac" named after chef adjutant of the Dai-Doi 3 of the Chi-Doi 1. Le-Danh-Cac was killed on 8th March 1948 in Pho-Binh by the 3/43rd RIC, and had become a mythical hero in the Bencat region. The region of activity of the offensive is comparatively narrow, between the Saigon River of and Route 13, at the level of Bencat. The objectives of the offensive are Dautieng and its plantations, and the two roads: Route 13 and the Bencat – Dautieng slip-road.

The Tieu-Doan 303, for its part, will center his action on Route 13, and will launch three major attacks. On 15th October, Tieu-Doan 303 succeeds in destroying several armored vehicles. On 22nd October, Tieu-Doan 303 destroys a Coventry armoured car of the 5th Cuirassiers (recovering its 40mm cannon), and 8 trucks. But in this attack, Tran-Tien-Sanh (commander of Dai-Doi 2719) is killed and seven soldiers are seriously wounded. On 15th November, the third convoy attack takes place, and about twenty civilian trucks are destroyed.

The Thudaumot region receives reinforcements from General Chanson, and succeeds in clearing the threatened region. The Trung-Doan Dong-Nai eludes the French operations, while Tien-Doan 303 withdraws itself to Lai-Uyen between the Route 13 and the Song-Be bend. There, from 27th November to 2nd December, a briefing takes place on the "experiences of Front 3" in the campaign Le-Danh-Cac. During this session, the cadres themselves carry out self-criticism, and exchange operational intelligence. Then the Tieu-Doan takes rest.

The Vietminh Command uses this time to carry out a reorganization of Tien-Doan 303 that is necessitated by the continual losses suffered by the unit (due to battle casualties and the unhealthiness of the Bencat forest). The Dai-Doi 2720 and 2721, which have never been at full strength, are merged into a single company. Then, on the order of Zone 7, backdated to 7th December 1950, the numbering of the companies is changed to:

• Dai-Doi 2719 becomes Dai-Doi 65, under the command of Doan-Hong-Hai;
• Dai-Doi 2720 and 2712 are merged to become Dai-Doi 55, under the command of Tran-Nam-Son; and
• Administrative Dai-Doi 2723 becomes Dai-Doi 75 (with Do-Van-Lai as political commissar).

1951:

Nevertheless, General Chanson wants to exploit the overall failure of Nguyen Binh’s offensive; and takes again the initiative by continuous attacks against the Vietminh. The Tieu-Doan 303 is hunted in operations in its refuge zone of Lai-Uyen. On 29th December, Tieu-Doan 303 counter attacks the vice of the French forces, and succeeds in disengaging from Zone D. After this attack, Tieu-Doan 303 installs itself in Binh-My, close to its cantonments of the previous year. On 1st April, Tieu-Doan 303 again eludes a French operation, while certain elements counter-attack the enemy.

Centralized Battalion 303 in the Thubien Province:

The regional troops of Zone 7 who were to furnish effectives for Trung-Doan Dong-Nai had a stronger obligation as part of the national program for every province to provide a battalion, and every district a company. It was the same everywhere else in Cochinchina. In addition, Nguyen-Binh was resigned to "temporarily" entrusting some regionals and elements of 4 regulars Tieu-Doan to the Trung-Doan Chu-Luc. At the same time Nguyen-Binh proceeds with a territorial reorganization, merging two by two the number of provinces - thus the provinces of Thudaumot and Bien-Hoa give rise are merged into Thubien - and by dividing Nambo into 2 Phan-Lien-Khu (inter-zone divisions).

It is in May 1951 that Tieu-Doan 303 was removed from the Trung-Doan Dong-Nai to become the "TieuDoan Tap-Trung" (central battalion in the Thubien province). The command of the battalion is modified. Le-Van-Ngoc remains in places, but he loses his adjutant Duong-Van-Minh-Vo, who is transferred to Tieu-Doan 306 in the Giadinh-Ninh province, and his political commissar Tran-Dinh-Cuu who transferred to the same function in the Tieu-Doan 304, the Trung-Doan Dong-Nai. Their replacements are Ta-Minh-Kham, a veteran of the Chi-Doi 1, who is well known in the region of Bencat; and Nguyen-Van-Khoa, a veteran of Chi-Doi 10, who had first been with Tieu-Doan 302 and then Tien-Doan 304. The reorganization seems to have had the goal of “regionalizing” the command of the Tieu-Doan.

The battalion is believed to have 2 infantry Dai-Doi (Dai-Doi 55 and Dai-Doi 65), and was reinforced in july1951 by two units of the battalion providing security to the Nambo (Tieu-Doan 295), which is dissolved. The Dai-Doi 14 (td295), the veteran Dai-Doi Bach-Dang of Tieu-Doan Le-Loi of the Trung-Doan 310 of Bien-Hoa, became Dai-Doi 60 under the command of Phan-Duy-The. The Dai-Doi 18 (td295), a heavy weapons unit, becomes Dai-Doi 70, under the command of Luong-Toan-Trung.

Le Van Ngoc inaugurates his new battalion with an important success. On 20 July 1951, reinforced by a local company (the Dai-Doi Lam-Son), the battalion attacks the post of Trang Bom on Route 1 to the East of Bien-Hoa. The post is taken, and the reinforcing armour is destroyed (one armoured car and a Humber scout car). The battalion, at a price of about ten killed and wounded, recovers 3 x machineguns, 4 x LMG, 2 x mortars, 4 x SMG and 43 x rifles.

Nevertheless Ngoc is not satisfied with his immediate assistants. Ta-Minh-Kham and Nguyen-Van-Khoa had left the front at 2 o'clock in the morning, while the battle lasted until 6 o'clock; and their absence caused a certain disorder and losses: several of the wounded died due to the absence of rapid evacuation and immediate care. Nguyen-Van-Khoa is relieved, transferred to the Nambo (Zone D) and replaced in October by Quang-Van-Bay, who came from the political office of the Nambo. Ta-Minh-Kham is not the object of that criticism.

Benefiting from the profusion of arms recovered from Trang-Bom, the commander of the Thubien province volunteers to reinforce the Tieu-Doan 303, while recruiting new combatants among the members of the communist party belonging to different political-military organizations. This recruitment created Dai-Doi 80, known as Dai-Doi "Red Army" (or the Hong-Quan); but it was dissolved at the start of 1952, for the lack of suitable cadres, and due to the continuing supply difficulties. It is merged into other Dai-Doi of the Tieu-Doan.

After the victory at Trang Bom, the Tieu-Doan 303, returns to its cantonments in Zone D where it passed the month of August. It is decided to renew the battalion’s exploit by attacking in the night of the 2nd to 3rd September the post of Rach-Dong (or Cay-Dau) on the road skirting Dong-Nai. The Dai-Doi Lamson, joins them again, as had Dai-Doi Independent 902 of the Lien-Trung-Doan 301/310. But the post station is not surprised, and the attackers have to retreat, not without having undergone losses.

A little time after, the Tieu-Doan joins the Trung-Doan Dong-Nai which regroups itself with reinforcements, with Long-Nguyen between September 9 and 11. It was decided to attack the "rafale" (an armoured train running between Saigon and Loc-Ninh. The attack took place on September 16 between the posts of Bau-Bang and Bau-Long. The attack is a failure, and the armoured train (Lieutenant de Chary) could not be silenced, and was relieved at dawn on 17 September by reinforcements who come by way of Route 13 (a company of Vietnamese paratroops commanded by the Lieutenant Do-Cao-Tri, - a future corps commander in the national army).

At the beginning of October, the Tieu-Dian 303 begins to move towards the Khanh-Van area, to attack a post in the Thubien province. On October 9, the attack on the Casanova post (in Nha-Tho) takes place, costing the French 3 dead and 10 wounded. During this attack, the key assault units, Dai-Doi 55 and Dai-Ddoi Nguyen-Van-Nghia (of the Tan-Uyen delegation) lose six dead and wounded.

Zigzagging, the Tieu-Doan moves back to Zone D; but is driven out of the Zone in mid-October by Operations “Impromptu” and “Salt box”, and had to wander for eight days in the forest to the north of the Song-Be, in the An-Linh area, where it goes hungry. The Tieu-Doan returns to Zone D after calm has returned. The Tieu-Doan is placed at the disposal of the Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Nghia. Along with a group of mortars, a section of the Dai-Doi 55 go to Lai-Khe to attack the post known as the "R.R.A.T" on 2 November, and to harass in turn the “Indochinese Rubber Research Institute” (IRCI) on 3 November.

At the end of November, it is decided to again attack: after “Casanova”, the post “David” 4 km in the east of the Bung will be attacked. In the night of 26th to 27th November, Dai-Doi 55 and Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Nghia are very active, and the Dai-Doi Nguyen-An-Ninh of Lai-Thieu launches an assault on this post of partisans. The Dai-Doi succeeds in penetrating the defenses, and inflicts 2 dead, and 3 wounded, and capture a prisoner armed with a rifle. But they are soon ejected from the position, leaving behind 6 dead, 1 wounded captive, 1 x SMG and suffering about thirty wounded.

The last attack on the post, before the closure of the operations, is timed to take place on 19th December. On 2 December, reinforced by Dai-Doi Lan-Son, the Tieu-Doan invests the post of Song-Ret in the Bien-Hoa sub-sector. But the rallying of a group commander of the Dai-Doi Lan-Son warns the post, and the attack fails.

The autumn campaign has been disappointing, after the major success at Trang-Bom. Moreover new threats take shape at the end of the year for the Vietminh units in Thubien, with the appearance for the first time of the light tanks of the 3/5th Cuirassiers, which become operational from December 20. In addition, a new post is established at Ben-San, not far from Vin-Chloi.

1952:

After the eviction of Nguyen-Binh by Le Duan in July 1951, and Nguyen-Binh death in an ambush at Stung-Treng on 29 September, the Nambo abandon large-scale attacks and devotes itself exclusively to guerilla actions and to working with the local population.

For the Tieu-Doan 303, there are the convoy attacks. In February 1952, on two occasions are ambushes launched against the Ban-Me-Thuot convoy, not far from its base in Zone D. On the 12th, the Tieu-Doan destroys an armoured car of the 5th Cuirassiers and 9 civilian trucks, and inflict on the French-Vietnamese, 3 dead and 9 wounded, recover 1 x rifle, and captures 29 exhausted young Vietnamese and their adjutant. The Tieu-Doan suffers only some wounded. On the 26th, the Tieu-Doan attacks the road-opening patrol on the road between the "Maison Rouge" and the village of Phuo-Choa. The Tieu-Doan inflict 18 dead and 17 wounded, for 8 dead in the Tieu-Doan, and recover 16 x rifles and 1x SMG.

It is also in February that Le Van Ngoc sets up Dai-Doi Tru-Bi (“the reserve”), by grouping together the sick, the weak, and the convalescing, under the command of Luong-Toan-Trung, with Do-Van-Lai as political commissar. In March it is decided to group together in a section (Trung-Doi Dai-Lien), within Dai-Doi 75, a machine gun group. Command of this section is given to Huynh-Dac-Thang, with Ta-Dinh-Uy as adjutant.

But the French are well informed: the battalion is spotted. On 14th March the battalion celebrates its third anniversary in the So-Hoi plantation, at Binh-My. There it undergoes artillery fire in the middle of the night, which curtails the féte and inflicts some casualties.

On 20 March Operation Sarabande is launched against Tieu-Doan 303. After an aerial bombardment, the 3/43rd RIC (Captain Setti) arrives in the Cau-Cay region, close to Binh-My, where the battalion CP is located. The 3/43rd RIC is the subject of a violent counter-attack from Dai-Doi 55, which is intended to allow the retreat of the rest of the Tieu-Doan towards Xom-Sinh then Trung-Cai. After 45 minutes of combat, the Dai-Doi 55 breaks off the battle and disappears. On 26th March, the operation is terminated, and the Tieu-Doan returns to its cantonment (which it finds has been burnt). The Tieu-Doan must then go to seek rice and salt from the stores of the province command. Moreover, Tieu-Doan suffers 4 dead and 9 wounded, and loses 1 x SMG.

Ngoc, to raise the morale of his soldiers, decides to execute without delay the planned attack on Cau-Dinh (on the route13, between Thudaumot and Bencat). A section of Dai-Doi Le-Hong-Phong (a local company of the Bencat delegation) had already joined itself to the Tieu-Doan at So-Hoi; and training on a model had already taken place. In the night of the 27 to 28 March, the Dai-Doi 55 and 60, the Le-Hong-Phong section, and the section "Trinh-Sat Dac-Cong" (a reconnaissance and assault engineering group) move to An-Thanh in the Anson forest, and rest there for 36 hours. At twilight on 29 March the Vietminh cross the Thi-Tinh rach with the assistance of 7 sampans. At about 3am, the attack is unleashed on Cau-Dinh, while 3 mortars harass the center of Bencat. Abattis and earthworks are established to block movement along Route 13 by the eventual reinforcements. But the garrison is relieved in time, and the post is victorious.

The Tieu-Doan must withdraw itself into the Anson forest, abandoning 6 dead and 2 prisoners, 1 x SMG, and 5 x rifles; and taking with them twenty lightly wounded. On the night of 30 to 31 March, the Tieu-Doan sets off again towards Zone D, but while arriving at Binh-My they discovers that a new operation, “Coker” has been launched, and must retreat towards Trung-Cay on 2nd April.

In April, the Tieu-Doan rests and re-supplies itself. In May, Dai-Doi 60 goes into the Anson Forest "to protect" cultural works. It returns to Zone D on May 25, and rejoins the reformed Tieu-Doan at So-Hoi to train.

On 29th May, to the Tieu-Doan is added the (specially equipped) Biêt Dong-Doi from the Thubien province, and a section of the artillery Dai-Doi of the province. The Tieu-Doan goes to Ca-Sac, close to An-Linh (in the bend in the Song-Be) and is joined by the Dai-Doi “Dia-Phuong (a local company). In the night of 31 May to 1 June, the main body of these elements, under the command of Ta-Minh-Kham, invests an isolated post at An-Binh. But the post is warned at the last moment by a message from the 2ND Bureau, and opens fire with all its weapons, while the men of Dong-Doi cut the barbed wire. Ta-Minh-Kham decides not to order an assault, and instead gives the order to retreat (which is carries out in the rain with several wounded). The expedition returns to Cau-Cay.

It is then understood that Le-Van-Ngoc is transferred out of the Tieu-Doan, and leaves on 11 June to carry out training in Central Annam. This native cadre from Bien-Hoa is replaced by Thanh-Tam, from the Tonkin province of Ha-Ham, arrives in February 1949 in Tong-Bo, and was assigned in April 1952 to the CP of the province. A large dinner is held in Cau-Cay for all the cadres of the battalion at the occasion of the change in command.

On 19 June, Huynh-Van-Nghe, military commander of the Thubien province, presides over a reunion of the Tieu-Doan cadres. Thanh-Tam outlines his decision to send the Dai-Doi on local missions. The Dai-Doi 55 will deploy to Bencat, the Dai-Doi 65 to Thudaumot and Lai-Thieu, and the Dai-Doi 60 to defend Zone D (at Dong-Nai). A "competition of exploits" is established, and each Dai-Doi is challenged to destroy a Franco-Vietnamese company before 19 December. A section of mortars (Trung-Doi Sung-Coi) is created in Dai-Doi 75.

From these points, the Dai-Doi are to search out opportunities to attack in the zone allocated to them. While the Dai-Doi 60 and the machinegun and mortar section of Dai-Doi 75 defend Zone D against Operation Gazelle, Dai-Doi 65 observes the new post at Xom-Chua with the Dai-Doi 55 in Anson forest with Ta-Minh-Kham. In collaboration with the Dai-Doi Dia-Phuong "Le-Hong-Phong" from Bencat, it establishes on 10 July a strong ambush between Cau-Dinh and Thoi-Hoa on Route 13, which fails.

Taking advantage of complicity from those within the post, obtained by the military command of the region, Ta-Minh-Kham decides to attack a post recently installed at Vinh-Hoa between Route 13 and the Thi-Tinh rach. The Dai-Doi 55 is reinforced by small detachments from other daidoi. The attack is launched on 22nd July at 0h30. While the Dai-Doi “Le-Hong-Phong” establishes roadblocks on Route13, facing north and south, the men of the Trin-Sat section Dac-Cong of the Dai-Doi 75 assault the blockhouse mounting a cannon. They are assisted by partisans who betray the position, and who turn the canon on the post. But the cannon is limited in its traverse, and cannot fire at the post’s central watchtower and the other blockhouse; and their fire kills several of their new comrades who have infiltrated the position.

Dai-Doi 55 does not penetrate the post. The Vietnamese adjutant, Nguyen-Van-Ngoi (temporary commander of the post), sweeps the defenses with machine-gun fire from the watchtower. The artillery battery from Bencat surrounds the post with fire. The mines are triggered.

At dawn, Ta-Minh-Kham must order the retreat; having lost 27 dead (24 of whom are abandoned on the ground), including the sub-commander of Dai-Doi 55 (Diem). Some forty men are wounded. But, as a sign of their mastery to the battle, only 1 x SMG, 2 x rifles, and 1 x automatic pistol are lost.

An Dien and Huynh-Van-Nghe, come to oversee a victory, and realize it is a disaster. In the evenings of 22nd July, escaping a dense network of French-Vietnamese ambushes, Nghe, Kham and the Dai-Doi 55 returns to Zone D. Le-Hong-Phong had lost three of his men dead. The Franco-Vietnamese garrison has 3 dead, and about twenty-lightly wounded; in addition to the 4 deserters who take their weapons.

After these heavy losses, the Tieu-Doan 303 remains at rest during the month of August and part of September. On 19 September, the Dai-Doi 65 and the Dai-Doi Nguyen-An-Ninh carries out an ambush against a patrol from the Bensan post, alongside the Thudaumot road near Tan-Uyen. But the result is mediocre: 5 dead on both sides (but among them is Duong-Quoc-Dat - recently promoted to command Dai-Doi 65 after the departure of Vo-Minh-Nhu for Nambo. There are also some wounded, and the attackers recover 1 prisoner and 5 rifles. Due to a lack of available cadres, Dang-Van-Ky (the political commissar of Dai-Doi 65) is given command of the Dai-Doi - combining the two roles.

On 24 September, the Dai-Doi 55 defends Zone D against the Operation Étrier, and must carry out an assault on the 3/43rd RIC at Bau-Ong-Yen to allow the retreat of the other surprised elements. During this time the Dai-Doi 60 escorts a convoy to Baria; and its commander (Doan-Hong-Hai) is sent for training with the central command (Tong-Bo) and is replaced by Nguyen-Van-May. In October, the Thubien province receives the order to intensify its activities to support operations in the Tonkin (the offensive on Ngialo and the Highlands).

Thanh-Tam assembles the Tieu-Doan 303, which is reinforced by Dai-Doi Nguyen Van Tiet (from the Thudaumot). On 14 October, the Tieu-Doan attacks and annihilated a section of Algerian Tirailleurs opening the road near to Chanh Luu. At a price of 2 dead and 12 wounded, the Tieu-Doan recovers 2 prisoners, 2 x LMG, 7 x SMG, 12 x rifles, 1 x carbine, and 1 x mine detector.

The battalion then withdraws into Zone D. There it undergoes a special test: a major typhoon that devastates the whole region and causes many floods. The Tieu-Doan takes refuge on the high (and dry) lands of Trao-Trao and Vinh-Loi.

The Dai-Doi Nguyen-An-Ninh, in the Lai-Thieu province, had for some time wanted to attack the post at Bensan-east, and this attack is facilitated through complicity. Thanh-Tam takes advantage of the presence of the entirety of his forces to carry out the attack. On 27th October, towards midnight, with Nguyen-Hue, commander Nguyen-An-Ninh, a section of his daidoi, a section of Dai-Doi55, and the Biet Dong-Doi of Thubien, launch an assault on the post. The attack benefits from the connivance of several sentries, and is supported by the fire of Dai-Doi 70 and from a section of the artillery Dai-Doi of the province.

The Dai-Doi 55 and the Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Tiet mount ambushes near Bensan-west. At the same time, other elements (furnished by Dai-Doi 60, Dai-Doi 70 and Nguyen-An-Ninh) harass the post "plantation 38" and the artillery training camp at Phu-Loi. Thanh-Tam and Bui-Cat-Vu (the chief of staff of the province command), direct the action from the rear CP.

This time, the attack is a full success: the garrison is annihilated with 45 dead, 17 wounded, and 12 prisoners, against 7 dead and 10 wounded from the attackers. The loot is sumptuous: a 40mm cannon, 1 x machine gun, 1 x 81mm mortar, 6 x LMG, 80 x rifles and corresponding ammunition.

The retreat is carried out at daybreak via So-Gon (on the bank of the Suoi-Ong-Dong) for the Dai-Doi Nguyen-An-Ninh and the Dai-Doi 60, and in direction of Vinh-Loi (which is still largely surrounded on three sides by water) for the remainder of the units. It is there that they are surprised twenty-four hours later, in the morning of 29 October, by the French. The French attack from the north to the south on the lone side left free of water. The Dai-Doi 55 covers the retreat of the remainder of the units, and holds the 3/43rd RIC, and inflicts strong losses. But with a heavy attack by the 2/43rd RIC (Captain Legarde), which arrives in the second echelon, the Dai-Doi breaks. Tran-Kim-Xuan, commander of this unit, will take six days to regroup the Dai-Doi at So-Hoi. The Tieu-Doan 303 loses 16 combatants dead or taken prisoner that day.

On its return to Zone D, the Tieu-Doan 303 devotes itself to repairing damage caused by the typhoon and to re-supplying itself. It has to elude, again, on 5 December, a French-Vietnamese operation against Batri and Vinh-Loi that costs the Tieu-Doan 4 dead and 9 wounded. The Dai-Doi 44 protects the retreat into Thudaumot Province, and the Dai-Doi 60 into Lai-Thieu.

As for the Dai-Doi 65, it was probably saddened not to have participated in the victory at Bensan. But on 16 November, under the command of Dang-Van-Ky, with the support of the Dai-Doi Van-Cong-Khai, it has the satisfaction of annihilating a section of auxiliaries at the post of Chon-Thanh. This attack gives the Dai-Doi 1 X LMG, 3 x SMG and 15 rifles. Another attack, on 29 November, on a road opening patrol between Chon-Tanh and Nha-Bich, has a similar result. The Dai-Doi 65 declares themselves to be the first Dai-Doi to win the “competition of exploits”, and is awarded the honor fanion of the Tieu-Doan 303. It returns to Zone D at the end of 1952.

On organizational matters, in September 1952, the Trinh-Sat section Lien-Lac (for reconnaissance and liaison) is created as a special group within Dai-Doi 75. Besides some French-speaking Vietnamese, the section includes three deserters: Robert Caplain (2nd BILA), Hans Bartsch (4/13th DBLE), and Khalifa (a North African from the Bien-Hoa sector). The first commander of this team, Nguyen-Van-Sinh, is wounded and captured in an engagement on 29th October. A Eurasian, Henri Giaon, from Chau, succeeds him.

1953:

The beginning of the year sees some modifications to the Tieu-Doan. Nguyen Hue is again affected by these modifications, and after having commanded the Dai-Doi Nguyen-An-Ninh, takes command of the Dai-Doi 65 of which he had been chief adjutant. Dang-Van-Ky returns to his original Dai-Doi.

The Dai-Doi 55 begins the year by mounting on 23 January an ambush against a patrol from the of Chin-Luu Garde post, which results in two partisans dead, eight Cambodians captured, and 10 rifles recovered.

Quitting Zone D on 20th January, the Dai-Doi 65 (reinforced by elements of Dai-Doi 70) returns to Ap-Dong-Co (in Lai-Uyen) the former cantonment of the Tieu-Doan in 1950. It is intended to attack the road convoys on Route 13, Route 14bis, and the secondary roads in the Minh-Thanh region. On 31 January, they attack the convoy returning from Ban-Me-Thuot, and lose three soldiers without appreciable results. The Dai-Doi continues of re-supply its combatants, and is reinforced by the Dai-Doi 60 and guides from the Doi Vo-Trang-Truyen-Thuyen (the army propaganda group of Loc-Ninh) - which has collected intelligence from amongst the coolies. The group changes its objectives, and moves towards the Michelin plantation at Thuan-Loi, to the north of Dong-Xoai. On 8th February, the two Dai-Doi attack the posts protecting the Plantation, which they partially destroy. The two Dai-Doi seize 1 x LMG, 1 x SMG, and 11 x rifles, and remove 60 coolies. But they must retreat due to the arrival of partisans returning from patrol.

As early as the 9th, Dai-Doi 60, 65 and 70 returns to Zone D, with a convoy of coolies and a number of pigs. The pigs are received as a joyous godsend on the eve of the Tet. Dai-Doi 55 is discovered by the French, and has to elude Operation Provence IV.

The Tieu-Doan regroups – under the command of Ta-Minh-Kham (as Thanh-Tam left at the beginning of January for the CP of the Nambo). The Tieu-Doan rests and celebrates the Tet. On the 28th February, Ta-Minh-Kham takes the Tieu-Doan (less the Dia-Doi 65 which remains in Zone D), with the artillery Dai-Doi of the province, to Buteck – in the Moi forest 15km from Dong-Xoai. There the Tieu-Doan, awaits the Doi Vo-Trang-Truyen from the Song-Be. The objective of the move is the post of Bunard, on Route 14bis between Dong-Xoai and the three frontiers, held by a garrison of montagnards.

The Tieu-Doan arrives on 6th March, and the post is invested and there are attacks for three successive nights. In the night of the 8th to the 9th, the Tieu-Doan 303 succeeds in overrunning the post. But the Moi partisans are able to retreat from the post. The Tieu-Doan has undergone heavy losses - 15 dead, 14 wounded - for a mediocre result. The Tieu-Doan retreats very slowly towards the south, slowed down by its wounded, with its prizes (1 x LMG, 1 x 60mm mortar, 1 x 50mm mortar, 2 SMG, and 2 automatic pistols), and returns in Zone D on 17th March, but without its last unit - the Dai-Doi 60. This Dai-Doi covers the retreat, and (on 11th March) destroys a jeep with mines in the neighborhood of Song-Be. In this attack, Captain Blanche is killed.

Dai-Doi 65 is then free to guard Zone D and moves again to the Song-Be bend, in the region of the Ho-May plantation, in Bo-Chon. For two months, all the units devote themselves to training and cultural instruction.

Quang-Van-Bay leaves the battalion at the end of March to carry out the training of the superior cadres (Truong-Chinh) to Lien-Khu 5. The battalion is provisionally commanded by Dang-Van-Ky who is also named assistant political commissar of the battalion. In the Dai-Doi 55, the new political commissar is Le-Duc-Nhuan, who comes from the Dai-Doi Lam-Son, and who is renowned for his bad character. Pham-Dinh-Hoc, adjutant to Dai-Doi 55, retires ill, and is replaced by Nguyen-Thinh, who comes from the Tieu-Doan 302. The special group of Dai-Doi 75 is dissolved, as it has not succeeded in distinguishing itself. The European elements of the group are assigned to the support Dai-Doi (Dai-Doi 70), where ten North Africans (from the political committee of the province command) join them.

At the end of May, the CP of the Tieu-Doan, the Dai-Doi 65, a section from each of the Dai-Doi 55 and 70 rejoin the Dai-Doi 65 in the Song-Be bend. On 2 June, under the command of Thanh-Tam, the Tieu-Doan (which is joined by Dai-Doi Dia-Phuong “Van-Cong-Khai” from Honquan), attack the Ban-Me-Thuot convoy between PK80 and PK86, between Phuoc-Hoa and An-Binh. Fourteen vehicles are burnt, but the results are discounted as very few supplies are recovered. The Tieu-Doan loses about ten soldiers dead or wounded. On 9th June, the Tieu-Doan returns to Zone D, leaving the Dai-Doi 65 in the Song-Be band.

Over 11 to 13 June, the Dai-Doi 55 comes to Phu-An, in the Anson forest, with 300 coolies, to look for the rice that is lacking in Zone D. On 16th June, the Franco-Vietnamese forces launch Operation Drome. The Dai-Doi 55 and 70 oppose this attack, but loses Ben-Chan-Chan, 2 combatants, and 2 rifles; and finally have to withdraw. Nevertheless, Dai-Doi 55 and 60, following an already agreed plan, rejoining the Dai-Doi Nguyen-An-Ninh. On 19th June, the Tieu-Doan covers the escape of mutineers from a Hoa-Hoa company, which held the Go-Luy post, at Point 30. The Dai-Doi 60 receives the mutineers close to their post, and escorts them to Route 16, and their passage between Binh-Co and My-Duc is then protected by the Dai-Doi 55. The Tieu-Doan receives 100 weapons.

The Tieu-Doan, with the exception of Dai-Doi 65 is regrouped at Xom-Sinh. On 29 June, the Tieu-Doan moves itself close to Maison Rouge, to prepare to ambush the road opening patrol preceding the passage of the Ban-Me-Thuot convoy. But a desertion of one combatant obliges the Tieu-Doan to abandon this operation. In July, new orders are given to reorganize and (especially) re-supply the Tieu-Doan, as the re-opening of Route 16 with its new posts makes re-supply precarious and dangerous. In August the Fan-Lien-Khu-Mien-Dong (of the Eastern sub-interzone) advises the Nambo that the Tieu-Doan 302 and 303 were reorganized with simplified structures, and that these two battalions have good tactical value.

Three cadres are assigned from Tieu-Doan 302: Tran-Quoc-Xuoi is named political commissar of the Dai-Doi 65, Ba-Lo-Ren as commander of the operational cell of the Tieu-Doan; and Le-Minh-Chau the sub-commander of Dai-Doi 70. The North Africans elements of Dai-Doi 70, all ill, are sent back to the hospital, at the political committee of the province.

On 25 July, the Dai-Doi 55, with elements of the Dai-Doi 70, rejoins the Dai-Doi 65 at Dong-Co (at Lai-Uyen). After an aborted attack on a convoy on Federal Road 13, the Dai-Doi 55 moves on 12 April to Long-Nguyen, with a section of the Dai-Doi. On 15th August, Le-Hong-Phong attacks a military GMC on RP7 between Le-Suoi-Xuyno and the Rach Kien post, while Dai-Doi 65 then rallies at Dong-Co. During this time, Dai-Doi 60, 70 and 75 defend themselves in Zone D against Operation Savoie(17-25 August).

On 2 September, Ta-Minh-Kham, Dang-Van-Ky, and Ba-Lo-Ren rejoin the Dai-Doi 65 at Dong-Co with a party of Dai-Doi 75, 55, and 70. Dang-Ngoc-Si has succeeded Tran-Kim-Xuan, who had left for training in the province. After concentrating their forces, they leave to attack in the night of the 5th to 6th September, the post of Rach-Can-Nom (or “Ben-Tranh”), on the Dautien Road. With the support of the Dai-Doi Le Hong Phong, and with thanks to the complicity of 5 partisans who betray the French, they overrun the post. The Tieu-Doan loses 7 dead, including a section commander of the Dai-Doi 55 (Le-Ngoc-Dot), and several wounded. The withdrawal is carried out towards Long-Nguyen, where a party takes place. In the evening of the 15th, the Thudaumot sector, warned of this development, unleashes artillery fire onto the locations of the celebration. The Tieu-Doan disperses itself into the Long-Nguyen forest, but it lacks rice.

The Dai-Doi 55, a section of the Dai-Doi 65 and a group of the Doi-Trinh-Sat-Lien-Lac leaves the Anson forest to re-provision itself in Phu-An, where they come up against Operation Vendee I. With very little ammunition, the Vietminh systematically avoid contact, and scatter into the forest in the rain. It is only after the end of the operation that these units can re-provision themselves and return to Long-Nguyen on 26th September. They rejoin the major units of the Tieu-Doan, just before it is the subject of an aerial bombardment.

During this time, Dai-Doi 60 is located in Zone D, from Xom-Gieng and Ba-Ho (the village of Cong-Hoa). The Dai-Doi acts as escorts for the re-supply convoys of Zone D. During the last week of September, it loses six deserters.

In the course of September a note from the FLKMD, dated 7 September, is circulated to all units, requesting that they deploy their efforts in a patriotic competition between September 2 and 19 December 1953. This competition, set by President Ho, animates the new "fall winter" campaign, the goal of which is to keep to the Franco-Vietnamese forces in the south, to facilitate operations in the north.

On 2 October, the major units of the Tieu-Doan leave Long-Nguyen for Dong-Co, where it has to face, from the 4th to 9th, Operation Vendee II (which does not succeed in trapping them). After some days of rest, on 23rd October, Dai-Doi 55 and 65 move into position to ambush, 500 m to the East of Mansion Rouge, the Ban-Me-Thuout convoy. This time the attack succeeds, and two groups of partisans of the 720th commando are put out of action. The French lose 13 dead and 8 wounded, and 1 x LMG, 7 x SMG, and 6 x rifles are recovered. The Tieu-Doan 303, for its part has six dead, including Tran-Van-Tru, a section sub-commander in Dai-Doi 55.

The main body of the Tieu-Doan regroups itself in Zone D, but only for a short time. Operation Auvergne obliges the Tieu-Doan to disperse itself, and during a clash at Le-Minh-Chau, the sub-commander of Dai-Doi 70 is killed.
Despite the success at Maison Rouge, the morale of the troops of the Thubien province is low. They have undergone heavy losses. The re-provisioning has became precarious, and the official rice ration has fallen to 10 liters per man per month; and the combatants had to nourish themselves with manioc. They lack salt and medicines also. Close to one third of the effectives are constantly unavailable due to sickness. The local Dai-Doi records numerous desertions and asks for reinforcements from the province.

The patriotic competition is suspended in the beginning of November. It is necessary to oppose through harassment the Franco-Vietnamese, who are establishing news post and opening new roads. The Tieu-Doan is also devoted to the harvesting of rice, to its transportation and storage.

The Dai-Doi 55 is broken up: one of its sections reinforces the local Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Tiet in the Trao-Trao region, another is the local Dai-Doi Nguyen-An-Ninh in the Thai-Hoa region, the third assures the security of the Vinh-Loi convoys. The Dai-Doi 65 shuttles between the Song-Be bend (Dong-Co) and Zone D in November, then between the Anson forest and Zone D in December. The Dai-Doi 60 assures the supply convoys and the munitions inside Zone D at Lac-An, My-Loc, and Suoi-Dia.

1954:

In January and February 1954, the situation remains marked by large-scale dispersion and extreme mobility. The priority remains in re-provisioning the units with rice. The harvest is good and, despite the activity of the Franco-Vietnamese seeking to deny food stocks to the rebels, they see their stocks increase. The ration of the combatants is raised from 10 litres to 25 litres a months. The units are able celebrate Tet.

The morale climbs back up, and there are no longer any desertions. The Dai-Doi 55 remains in place until the end of 1953. It regroups at the end of the month, at Suoi-Dia (in Zone D), and is taken in hand by its commander. For an unexplained reason Nguyen-Van-May (previously commander of Dai-Doi 60) takes command of Dai-Doi 55 on the 1st February, with Dang-Ngoc-Si becoming his adjutant. Le-Duc-Nhuan is killed by a grenade in the Lai-Thieu region, and is replaced by Nguyen-Dinh-Tu.

The Dai-Doi 65 escorts convoys towards Zone D, based in An-Dien (in the Anson forest) until 18th January; then to Long-Nguyen until 16th February; before moving to Dong-Co (in the Song-Be bend). Dai-Doi 60, which has been carrying out missions in the interior of Zone D, seems to have been subsumed into Tieu-Doan 320 (convoy specialists of the FLKMD). The Dai-Doi pushes several incursions into the north, towards An-Linh, reconnoiters the An-Binh post, returns to Suoi-Dia to celebrate Tet, and sets off again towards Phuoc-Sang (10 February) and An-Linh. It is there when Operation Meuse takes place. The Dai-Doi concentrates to defend itself, and a commando group passes within 500m of the Dia-Doi without spotting it. In the following night, the Dai-Doi harasses the French bivouacs in the hamlet of Ca-Sac. Then, on 24th February, the Dia-Doi leaves An-Linh to rejoin Nuoc-Vang in Zone D.
The dispersion of units permits the command committee of the Tieu-Doan to prepare the next campaign: elements of the Doi-Trinh-Lien of Dai-Doi 75 escort Thanh-Tam to the Anson forest in January. The province command wants to take its revenge on the Vinh-Hoa post that withstood attack in July 1952. The partisans in this post are contacted by Ba-Lo-Ren (who is transferred on 25th December as commander of the Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Tiet), but their proposed defection is discovered and stopped. Thanh-Tam passes along the right bank of the Saigon River. The committee of the Hoc-Mon territory (in the Dia-Dinh-Ninh province) continues to prepare for future actions against the Thudaumot sector. On the 28th February, the CP of the Tieu-Doan 303 is grouped together in Zone D.

But this is for a short time only. For the campaign will soon begin, and will quickly intensify, to relieve the pressure on the north where the battle of Dien Bien Phu is starting. In the beginning of March the advance CP, with Ta-Minh-Kham moves to An-Dien, in the Anson forest. The Dai-Doi 55, with a reinforcing element of the Dai-Doi Nguyen-An-Ninh is relieved by elements of the Dai-Doi 60, and regroups itself (less a section) in the Dinh-Hoa forest. This force, with Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Tiet, then moves to the Anson forest, where they are joined on 3rd March by Dai-Doi 65 (2 sections), which has come from Zone D by An-Loi.

In the night of the 11th to 12th March, the main body attacks the small post of partisans at Thuong-Binh-Hiep, which it overruns without having to rely on treason. The Garde Vietnamese record 3 dead, 6 wounded, 11 missing and the loss of 1 x LMG, 1 x automatic pistol, and 14 x rifles. The attackers leave three corpses in the field.

The retreat of the elements of Ta-Minh-Kham is difficult because of the density of the Franco-Vietnamese forces in the area, but is carried out without losses. The Dai-Doi 55 redeploys itself, but one of its Trung-Doi (sections) reinforcing the Dai-Doi Nguyen-An-Ninh at Thai-Hoa is the victim of a serious accident during a mine-laying exercise. A premature explosion kills 10 combatants (including 3 group commanders), and many others are wounded.

The Dai-Doi 65, for its part, passes along the right bank of the Saigon River, and trains for some days alongside the Tieu-Doan 306 (from Gia-Dinh-Ninh). Together, on 28th March, they try to over-run the post of "Gineste" (in the Bencat sub-sector). But there is a failure in the “Dich-Van” action, which is revealed too early and the traitors are stopped in time. The Tieu-Doan 306 and the Dai-Doi 65 must retreat after having been hit by the fire of the garrison and its supporting artillery.

Following the accident affecting Dai-Doi 55, this unit is regrouped at Suoi-Ddia (in Zone D), then supports Dai-Doi "Le-Hong-Phong" in Bencat, before moving to An-Thanh (in the Anson forest), where it trains. The Dai-Doi 60, commanded by Tran-Kim-Xuan, returns to training, relieves Dai-Doi 55 in the support of Dai-Doi “Nguyen-Van-Tiet” (the administrative unit) and “Nguyen-An-Ninh” (Laithieu). The unit participates in multiple harrarassment operations (notably against the Caodaïstes posts of Tan-Khanh and Phu-Van), and experiences losses on several occasions due to artillery.

In April, the Dai-Doi 65 carries out a journey that it knows well - Anson forest, Long-Nguyen, and Zone D - in reconnaissance of the paths to the Caodaïstes posts protecting the railway track – Phu-Trung, An-Hoa and An-Loi. The unit returns in the night of the 29th to 30th April with the other elements of the Tieu-Doan 303, including the mortars of Dai-Doi 70 (which are used by the cadres of propaganda arm for political intimidation).

The Geneva conference opens in May, in a dramatic mood for France, given the fall of Dien Bien Phu. The Nambo gives to the FLKMD and the provinces the order to pass over to the offensive wherever possible, to intensify propaganda with the population and terrorism against the notables, to prevent the mobilization of the Vietnamese National army, and to fill out the effective units with recalcitrants.

The military commander of the Thubien province and the command committee of Tieu-Doan 303 has several potential objectives ready. The first is post “David” (to the east of Bung); and it was decided that Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Tiet and Dai-Doi 60 would attack this post on 10th May. The idea of a "Dich-Van" operation against the post appears to be appropriate; but at the last moment the commander of the attack raises doubts as to the loyalty of the contacts, and demands a different attack. But the two Dai-Doi are surprised by an operation launched against them on 11th May, and suffer losses (particularly due to artillery).

The province then decided to harass RF13 and to attack the post of Cau-Dinh, where a delegation from the administrative centre had had a recent contact. On 30th May, arriving in the Dinh-Hoa forest is 2 sections of Dai-Doi 65 (commanded by Nguyen-Hue) from Zone D, a section of Dai-Doi 55 from Vinh-Loi, Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Tiet and of many guerillas of Thoi-Hoa, Dinh-Hoa and Phu-Huu.

On the same day, Dai-Doi 60 arrives in An-Dien (Anson forest) from Tan-Phuoc-Khanh, commanded by Nguyen-Chi-Hieu. Nguyen-Chi-Hieu had succeeded Tran-Kim-Xuan, who had been killed in an ambush that had been launched against the partisans of adjutant Thanh, which had been turned to their disadvantage).

In the night of 31st May to 1st June, Dai-Doi 60 establishes obstacles along RF13 and RP2, and harasses the Vinh-Hoa post.

At about 23h00, the conspirators in the Cau-Dinh post, 8 in number, murder the commander of the post (the sub-lieutenant commanding commando 752), as well as the mayor of Cau-Dinh who sleeps in the post. The conspirators seize a blockhouse and strive to neutralize their former comrades. It is only at about midnight that they open the gate to the assault elements (Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Tiet, Dai-Doi 65, and a section of Dai-Doi 55). By 2h00, all resistance has ceased. The local population is ordered to bring out carts to move the loot: 1 x automatic pistol, 20 x SMG, 29 x rifles, 4 x LMG, 1 x 60mm mortar, the post radio, ammunition, and the dead and wounded.

At 3h30, the post is evacuated at the moment the French aircraft arrive to strafe the position. At 5h00, the tanks finally arrive – they have been delayed by the obstacles. This is a harsh blow to the Franco-Vietnamese forces, which have lost 19 dead, 19 wounded, 38 missing. The losses are also heavy for the Tieu-Doan 303 and its auxiliaries, who bury about twenty dead in the Dinh-Hoa forest and leave 8 dead in the post. In the rear CP, Ta-Minh-Kham considers these losses excessive, and believes that they are due to poor coordination.

Nevertheless many parties are organized in the villages to celebrate this success, at the same time as the large victories are won in the north.

The month of June is a calm month, despite continuous movement. Nevertheless the Dai-Doi 65 reinforced by the Dai-Doi Le-Hong-Phong tried to exploit a “Dich-Van” action on the post of Bung-Cong (between Bencat and Bensuc). This matter fails in the night of the 10 to June 11, as one of the partisans contacted had not been able to evacuate his family on time. At 22h00, the post commander discovers the plot, and arrests the 4 partisans, triggers the alarm, and releases fire in the direction of Rach Kien - where the attack echelon is located.

Operation Lotx is launched over 16th to 18th June by the Franco-Vietnamese in the region of Vinh-Loi where the CP of Ta-Minh-Kham had been spotted. Dai-Doi 55 was with the Dai-Doi of the administrative center in its base at Thudaumot; Dai-Doi 60 with the Dai-Doi Nguyen-An-Ninh in the Laithieu, Bung, Tan-Khan, Tan-Ba quadrilateral); and Dai-Doi 65 with Dai-Doi Le-Hong-Phong in its bases around Bencat.

This relative calm precedes the storm that had to punctuate the end of the Geneva conference. It became evident that the one of the clauses of the agreement being completed would be the partition of Vietnam and the regrouping of the military forces of the two parties. It became important from that time for the authorities of the Nambo to: (i) instill into their troops the morale of conquerors, (ii) fill out the effective units, (iii) put in places some light structures to maintain the clandestine spirit of resistance, (iv) create the maximum difficulties for the administration and army of “South” Vietnam.

The battalion 303 is devoted to a major effort of the propaganda army, in cooperation with the local Dai-Doi. The Dai-Doi 55 harasses several posts and visits almost all of the towns of the administrative center. Two attempts of approach the town of Thudaumot are harshly countered by the special teams of the 2nd Bureau: on 7th July, at Cau-Dinh, the Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Tiet lose 3 dead, 1 prisoner and 1 rifle; while on 17th July, at Chanh-Hiep, the Dai-Doi 55 lose 4 dead and 4 rifles. On 8th July, the Dai-Doi 60 seizes the small post at Hoa-Nhut, thanks to internal complicity. The losses are 1 dead, 4 wounded, and 12 missing amongst the partisans, and they recover 1 x 30 cal machine gun, 2 x LMG, and 14 x rifles; without losses to the Dai-Doi 60.

The Dai-Doi 65 and Le-Hong-Phong finally make a beautiful double attack, seizing: (i) through a favorable Dich-Van action, on 5th July, the post of Rach Can Nom to the south of the Dautieng plantation; and (ii) on the 28th the post of Chanh-Luu to the east of Bencat.

The first affair was a repeat of the action of the 7 September 1953, and costs the garrison 9 dead, 14 wounded, 54 missing, 1 x 60mm mortar, 4 x LMG, and 21 x SMG. To these losses must be added those of the intervention detachment from Dautieng, which falls into an ambush and suffers 1 dead and 21 wounded. The attack echelon suffers only one dead left on the ground, but Doi-Trinh-Lien of Dai-Doi 75 come forward as reinforcements were intercepted between Bencat and Laikhe, and loses several men. The Dai-Doi 65 joined Vinhloi on 15th July without losses.

The second affair practically describes the war of Tieu-Doan 303 in South Vietnam: like Rach Can Nom with a balance-sheet of the same order. The post of Chanh-Luu is removed on 28 July by the Dai-Doi Le Hong Phong, Dai-Doi 65, and detachments of two other Dai-Doi.

The ceasefire has been proclaimed in Geneva on 21 July 1954, at the time of the final meeting of the conference. It takers effect in South Vietnam on 11th April. It was effective in East Cochinchina as early as 8th August. Consequently, the concerns of the command of the Nambo was on gathering their troops in order to better keep them in hand until the departure for the North and to withdraw them from family influences.

Thanh Tam has been designated to take the command of the Thubien elements of destined to leave, which were designated under the name Trung-Doan Dongnai, sometimes under the Lien-Trung-Doan 301/310. He leaves in May for the CP of the Nambo to receive orders, and is replaced in his command of the 303rd by a freshly arrived cadres from the north: Pham-Ngoc-Huynh, who brings with him Phan-Tat-Taanh, another Tonkinois. However, Thanh Tam retains overall command of operations from May to July. Dang-Van-Ky is confirmed in the role of political commissar – he is one of the few in the battalion who belonged to the original Phan-Doi 10 and the Bo-Doi Hoang-Tho.

As with previous months, the Dai-Doi of the Tieu-Doan visit, with the local Dai-Doi, all the accessible villages. This is facilitated by the evacuation or neutralization of the Franco-Vietnamese posts, which had been carried out to assist with the separation of the troops. Many farewell festivals are carried out throughout the province, during which the stories of the epic of the war of independence are magnified.

With the continuation of the agreements signed between the Franco-Vietnamese command and the Nambo, the units of the Thubien and Bacho (Baria, Cholon) provinces are to regroup in September in a zone situated between Xuyen-Moc and Ham-Tan, to the east of Baria. It was announced that 16,000 men and 1200 tons of baggage of the “Popular Army of Viet-Nam” would be transferred from the south to the north by sea from 21st September, with 1,000 men and 80 tons of baggage per day. The movement from Thubien and Zone D takes place on the 19th, 20th and 26th August on foot and with some vehicles provided by the French.
In fact, only 11,042 personnel were embarked, including 4 Europeans, 11 North Africans, and 1 African. Their total manpower had been over-estimated by the Nambo, and 600 men had deserted during the regrouping and embarkation operations, choosing (against the will of their commanders) to remain in the land of their birth.

The battalion 303 was not very affected by this epidemic of defections. The Dai-Doi 65 embarks on 21st September on the SS Grenoble at Rach Dua to the west of Cap Saint-Jacques, along with assorted units – Dai-Doi Nguyen-Van-Tiet and Nguyen-An-Ninh and a group of cadres. There are 997 effectives from the 1002 planned. The weapons commander is Thanh-Tam, assisted by Pham-Ngoc-Huynh, commanding the battalion.

In his report, Lieutenant Grosjean, 2nd BM RIC, liaison officer to Thanh-Tam, recognized the absolute discipline and neatness of the detachment. The cadres give many talks to their men, and gatherings are organized almost every evening with songs and folkdances. The Dai-Doi 65, for its part, embarks forty-eight hours later on the SS Montbeliard.

The 303rd leaves the scene while singing ... and disembarks on 25th September at Samson, a small port serving Thanh-Hoa, to the north of the 17th parallel. Here for us the history stops.

Conclusion:

The reconstitution of the history of this Vietminh unit in South Vietnam had to be attempted. Composed mainly from sure sources, this is a first contribution to the difficult history of a war that was particularly complex and shapeless. Denuded of all devices, indeed of all didactic appearances, these sources nevertheless can deepen our understanding for whoever wishes to study the conduit and operations of the guerilla.

I especially want this account to be a homage by a veteran officer of the 5th Cuirassiers Regiment to a hard but honest adversary. The “Royal Poland” and the young “303” opposed each other from one end to the conflict to the other, not only in the Thudamot sector (where the CP merged with the regiment), but throughout the whole of the East Cochinchina zone, where the armored cars and scout cars are marked with the eagle.

And we learnt to think highly of each other. All the blows, these were certainly allowed - it is the law of the kind - but men always respect each other in combat, carried out without rage, always without hatred. Nobody, of the 5th Cuirassiers nor of the 303rd, will be able to deny this assertion. This testimony deserves to be delivered to those who, today, seek to evaluate the conflicts of French decolonization.

Wow, Tim! You are not in the least bit intimidated by lots of translation.

You are Fields of Fire's own Merle Pribbenow.

Tom

Many thanks for great post...
Just found the great ~1954(?) topo maps of Cochinchina on UTx site... just what I needed also.
indotoc

How about link to the maps?

Tom

Links to maps as follows:

http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/indochina_and_thailand/
(especially nice 1:250000 topos of era)

and for more detailed on specific areas and topos at 1:50000, etc. see

https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/vietnam.html

indotoc

Neat!

Thanks.

Tom